Russia's shifting war narratives update: after incorporating additional topics discussed in @HannaNotte's 🧵on similarities b/t Russia's campaigns in Ukraine and Syria, we start to see some stabilization around 3 clusters of war topics on Russian TV. 1/5
Tier 2, treachery: human shields, CBWs, Nuclear weapons, and Kosovo/Yugoslavia references; and
Tier 3, legitimation: genocide and information warfare. 2/5
The gap between national and regional media coverage continues to widen. National TV keeping nationalists at the top of the agenda, while regional broadcast media emphasizes sanctions, above all. 3/5
So what are regional media saying about sanctions? I've only had time to look at some broadcasts from last week. In Tatarstan, lots of stories about sanctions' lack of impact. In Krasnodar and Yaroslavl, sanctions are revealed as a gift in the form of import substitution. 4/5
In general, regional press dismisses sanctions loudly and often. Mentions of local concern, lack of goods, supply chain issues are followed by reassurances that they aren't serious, won't last, or that Russia is better off. Basically, all the repertoires learned since 2014.
5/5
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A lot is being made of the @levada_ru survey showing 83% support for Putin as evidence of popular support for the war. Now, polling in Russia is highly fraught right now, as @russophiliac, @Krawatzek & others have observed. But one part gives me pause: just 44% trust Putin. 1/7
Is this strange? In March 2014, trust (71%) and approval (80% - not pictured) moved together after Crimea. There was a gap (about 9%) between the two, but they were closely matched. So what accounts for the 39% gap in today's poll between public approval and trust in Putin? 2/7
First, it depends on the question being asked.
March 2014: "to what extent do you trust Putin?"
March 2022: "name some politicians whom you trust above all."
See the difference? The second allows people to answer (or not answer) more freely.
3/7
A few updates on Russia's domestic propaganda. As before, data are drawn from Russian TV broadcast transcripts.
1. In the ever-shifting narratives of war, Russian TV doubled down on Nazis & fascists last week. Mentions of bio weapons, info war, nukes & genocide dwindled. 1/4
2. Russian TV is erasing Zelenskyy from view and filling the space with Ukrainian nationalists. Obviously de-humanizing the enemy, perhaps preparing the Russian public for even greater loss of life and for belt tightening. On that score... 2/4
3. National & regional broadcasts were mostly in sync at the start of the war. BUT, while national TV continues to push nationalists and DNR/LNR topics, #sanctions have emerged as the dominant topic on regional media as they start to impact Russians' daily lives. 3/4
Last week, I made a short thread to document the Kremlin's use of TV to prime the public for the invasion of Ukraine. I keep getting asked what Russians are seeing on TV and how this informs their world views, so let's dig a little deeper. 1/8
How impactful is a topic’s mention on Russian TV vs “normal” reporting? To set a baseline for “normal,” I used weather reports on each channel and then calculated topic mentions relative to the weather. It’s a rough measure, sacrificing some rigor and nuance, but it's fast. 2/8
My assumption is pretty simple: a topic that's mentioned less often than the weather probably doesn't garner much attention. The more that a topic is reported relative to the weather, the more pervasively it saturates the information environment. 3/8
A lot of us hoped this war would end quickly, and a lot was riding on how things would play out in Russia's domestic politics. Unfortunately, the grounds for pessimism have only increased with time.
This is an aggregation 🧵 that gathers some of my thoughts on this war. 1/4
First, it quickly became clear that Russia was expecting Crimea 2.0, not a protracted, grinding war. There are reasons for this miscalculation, but the upshot is that the Kremlin doesn't have an "off-ramp" to the war it started so it is doubling-down. 2/4
Second, Putin's regime patrols and contains defections among the elite. Sanctions after 2014 failed to weaken Putin because his enablers had nowhere else to turn for krysha. Today's sanctions seem even less likely to fracture the regime now. 3/4
Everyone keeps asking what's motivating Russia in this war. Now, TV is the primary means by which most Russians get their news. It's largely state controlled, making it useful to examine justifications for war, so I looked at 5 channels since Putin's December ultimatums. 1/14
All data is from Integrum's tv broadcast transcripts for Dec 13-Feb 27. I included Pervyi Kanal, Rossiia 1, NTV, Moscow's TV Tsentr. Also included is the independent Dozhd channel as a check on whether a topic might have broader resonance & not just Kremlin talking point. 2/14
Let's start w/ Russia's claim about stopping genocide. If really motivated by humanitarian concerns, then you'd expect them to be constantly expressed throughout the crisis. Instead, we see an instrumental mobilization of genocide once the decision to go to war was made. 3/14