Indication that the Kremlin may not cancel the September regional elections, after all, or at least not yet: the regular spring gubernatoropad has started. The unpopular heads of two "hot" regions, Tomsk and Kirov, are leaving their offices. zona.media/news/2022/05/1…
For context: "gubernatoropad" is the practice of changing governors in potentially problematic regions months before an election in order to avoid protest votes against unpopular incumbents. Tomsk and Kirov are both regions where United Russia's popularity is quite low.
Other interesting regions with gubernatorial elections include Karelia (low United Russia popularity), Buryatia (very high per-capita number of military casualties), Kaliningrad (war-induced industrial breakdown) and Sverdlovsk (the governor's public spat with Solovyov).
It's quite interesting that Sergey Zhvachkin, the resigning head of the Tomsk Region said that he was leaving because he's nearing 65 years of age and it was "time to give way to the younger generation". In today's Russia this has double-entendres. theins.ru/news/251107
And there are three (!) more:
- Nikolay Lyubimov, Ryazan
- Valery Radaev, Saratov
- Alexander Evstifeev, Mari El
Of these, Evstifeev was probably in the weakest position, a "varangian" cadre, criticized for weak leadership and featured in one of Navalny's investigations
As I mentioned above, resignations like this happen often, but not so often does one see so many on the same day (and the day is not over yet!), suggesting that the while an informal ban on cadre changes may have been lifted, the Kremlin wants to get this over with swiftly.
Telegram channels are tipping Alexander Churin, the current head of the Kirov Region's government, as the region's next governor. Churin is a local power broker and former backer of Vasilyev, with a history of shady bankruptcies of state-owned firms. kommersant.ru/doc/2469033
Given the Churin family's reported interest in local development & construction projects, it wdn't be surprising to see him actually occupy the position of governor, especially now that governors are expected to assume a bigger role in these & more control over local budgets.
It'll be interesting to see if the replacements are "varangians" (technocratic outsiders and/or former colleagues of Moscow power brokers from another region), or local elite reps. 4/5 governors who resigned were "varangians" - Radaev is local (in Duma Speaker Volodin's region)
One thing that others have also pointed out, but it's worth repeating: so far there's absolutely no indication that any of this is somehow the consequence of the war. Coordinated "resignations" like this happen in every year. If anything, this year they happened later than usual.
Now this is interesting: @rbc says Pavel Malkov, the current head of Rosstat - and a former official in Saratov, Volodin's home region - is a candidate for one of the governorships, possibly Ryazan. Still no official confirmation. rbc.ru/politics/10/05…
The new governor of the Republic of Mari El is a "varangian": Yury Zaitsev, alumnus of the Defense Ministry's academy, until now the head of Kalmykia's government (and formerly director of the Rosseti power company in the Northern Caucasus) rbc.ru/politics/10/05…
In Tomsk, Vladimir Mazur will take over, he is a local cadre and former colleague of Putin's representative for the Urals FO, Vladimir Yakushev (when Yakushev was the governor of the Tyumen Region, home to Moscow mayor Sergey Sobyanin). riatomsk.ru/article/202205…
In the end, Churin is not taking over in Kirov. Instead, the "varangian" Alexander Sokolov looks set to become interim governor. Like Mazur, Sokolov has spent time in the Presidential Administration and earlier he had also been vice-governor of Kostroma. kirov-portal.ru/news/poslednie…
In Saratov, nothing really changes. Roman Busargin, a local cadre who has until now been vice-governor, will head the region in the future as interim governor.
However, with Rosstat head Malkin's appointment to head the Ryazan Region now confirmed, another cadre with deep ties to speaker Volodin's home region, is becoming governor. He, like Sokolov and Zaitsev, is an alumnus of "The School of Governors" program 62info.ru/news/vlast-i-p…
Starting a thread🧵on "mega-projects" in the regions being cancelled or suffering postponements due to Russia's war on Ukraine.
1. Sibur and Sinopec announced in April that they are “reconsidering” the implementation of the Amur Gas Chemical Complex, which was due to open in 2024, due to sanctions on the delivery of high-tech equipment. As of March, the project was 37.8% ready. rbc.ru/business/08/04…
The project, which is 40% owned by Sinopec, is worth ~$10 bn and is the largest investment project in the otherwise fairly depressed region. The plant itself is supposed to supply polymers to the Chinese market, and become the largest factory of basic polymers in the world.
Germany's minister of foreign affairs says stronger sanctions & more help to Ukraine are coming, but doesn't offer details.
The way to go is a full gas and oil embargo, expanding SWIFT & currency sanctions on all Russian banks and ramping up weapons shipments, including jets.
Orban, even if he remains in power, can likely be strong-armed into supporting an embargo. Today he was notably vague on the future of the government's key cheap energy policy when asked & his European alliances are under heavy strain.
Another argument for an embargo is that EU countries will have to prepare for an abrupt stop of Russian energy supplies within the next weeks or months anyway. I see this coming up more and more often in the German press too.
#Hungary is holding a key parliamentary election today, which could see Orban's government voted out after twelve years. In the past three days I posted three threads about the vote. Let me re-up them. The first one, about Fidesz and the electoral system:
This is the final THREAD in a series of three threads about Hungary’s parliamentary election tomorrow. You can read the first two threads, in which I talked about Fidesz, the opposition and the electoral system below. Now let’s see what's ahead.
Are there chances for an opposition victory? Yes. Most polls suggest a Fidesz advantage of ~5% among voters who made up their mind. But mobilization will be key: polls usually overstate Fidesz’s support. They didn’t predict Karacsony’s 2019 win in Budapest politico.eu/europe-poll-of…
However, due to the undue advantage that the electoral system grants Fidesz (see thread nr. 1) the opposition will likely have to have a fairly large margin (3-4%) over Fidesz nationally to win a simple majority.
This is THREAD nr. 2. about Hungary’s upcoming parliamentary election. In thread nr. 1 (see below) we took a look at Orban, Fidesz and how Hungary’s peculiar electoral system helps the government. In this thread we are going to look at the opposition.
First, the opposition coalition. It’s a veritable smorgasbord.
Jobbik, a radical right-wing party that started right of Fidesz and cooperated with the government on some of its ultraconservative legislation has worked hard to change its image. theguardian.com/world/2020/feb…
The party has been trying to rebrand as a more moderate right-of-center outlet with a focus on common folk for years, but it still includes many unpleasant characters. Its new chair, Peter Jakab, a former teacher, came to prominence with his outspoken speeches & performances.
I tried to scrape together my thoughts about Putin's domestic political Hinterland in the context of his war against Ukraine and the looming severe economic crisis. I am quite pessimistic, but I've been spectacularly wrong before. Read on. noyardstick.com/?p=939
The argument is that Putin is not irrational from his pov, but he probably has a distorted view of costs and consequences: the result of a gradual isolation, which started post-2014 w his gradual withdrawal from day-to-day politics, and was likely exacerbated by covid. But also
The shifts in European politics regarding Russia over the past week have been seismic. These have been for years in the making, but Putin has a poor understanding of how democratic consensus is built. Until now, he has been used to winning with these tactics.