Thread🧵consolidating updates from May 30 – June 5 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
It may be helpful for context to read the consolidation I put together previously:
May 29
Combat Strength
Of an estimated 120 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) committed by Russia to the invasion, it is believed there are currently 110 BTGs in Ukraine. No change this week
Doubts still remain about the speed with which Russia may be able to make certain equipment available for combat, as other reports have found how reliant modern Russian equipment is on advanced foreign components
Captured Equipment
In recent weeks I have been incorporating figures for captured equipment into my larger thread on available forces using a conservative estimate of only 1/3 of captures being suitable for short term reuse
After last week’s second monthly meeting of donors of military aid to Ukraine, announcements of new aid continued. The third meeting is now scheduled for June 15
And there has been frustration at the uncertainty surrounding an expected German-Polish ring exchange deal in consideration of approximately 240 tanks that Poland has already provided to Ukraine
While not part of Ukraine’s requests this thread attempts some rough math on what the numbers would be like if Ukraine were to switch its artillery units over completely from 152mm to 155mm
In addition to 18 Polish AHS Krab self propelled guns already donated to Ukraine, it was announced Ukraine intended to purchase 54 more units. South Korean cooperation in providing chassis is expected to speed up the manufacturing
This purchase of additional SPGs from Poland may also reflect an intention for closer industrial cooperation between Poland and Ukraine in the production of weapons
Sweden announced the donation of Robot 17 anti-ship missiles, which are lighter than many other anti-ship weapons and may offer unique deployment options
Russia has focused on attacking Ukrainian logistics capacity in the past several weeks, but this has repeatedly failed to stop the flow of military aid
June 5 Full update to thread🧵on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 36.3(9.9) vs 7.2
Armor 42.4(12.6) vs 12.5
Tanks 44(22.8) vs 15.7
Artillery 15.5(4.7) vs 4.1
Aircraft 8.3(2.2) vs 15
Helicopters 15.7(4.7) vs 9.7
In case you missed the big updates last week (I finished at 3 am😅) they were:
⁃ updated Ukraine personnel to 550,000
⁃ Added up Russian daily claims of Ukrainian losses for 38,257 killed
⁃ Used Pentagon estimates as cross check
I was recently asked: "Some western businesses initially suspended their operations in Russia and said they would pay employees for around 3 months. Are they now pulling out of Russia entirely?" Here is an update
We start with the list maintained by Yale som.yale.edu/story/2022/alm…
The list maintained by team of experts at Yale CELI, grades companies' disengagement from Russian business on a scale similar to school grades from A-F
At the moment, the breakdown is:
A 335 'withdrawal'
B 466 'suspension'
C 159 'scaling back'
D 159 'buying time'
F 244 'digging in'
Compare these numbers to values over two months ago
May 29 Full update to thread🧵on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 35.7(9.7) vs 6.9
Armor 42(12.4) vs 12.2
Tanks 43.2(22.2) vs 15.3
Artillery 15.4(4.6) vs 4
Aircraft 8.1(2.1) vs 16.3
Helicopters 15.2(4.5) vs 8.3
Thread🧵consolidating updates from May 23 – May 29 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
It may be helpful for context to read the consolidation I put together previously:
May 22
The Russian Central Bank continues to publish updates on Russia's foreign currency reserves. The net balance varies quite a bit from week to week, but we can see that it was flat from mid-March through mid-April and has been negative for a month at an average outflow of ~$1B/day
Note that the foreign currency reserves in the graph above above represent the available reserves. $320B has been subtracted from the values in the table to reflect reserves frozen overseas. Additional details can be found in this report
Note that European energy purchases from Russia are adding inflow of ~$1B/day in the last few months. This may be dwindling as several countries have reduced their purchases or had energy flows cut by Russia. If such purchases were eliminated, the net outflow would be ~$2B/day