Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian military assets in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. 1/ isw.pub/UkrWar020423
Geolocated footage shows #Ukrainian forces striking a #Russian Tor M2DT air defense system 12km southwest of Nova Kakhovka, #Kherson Oblast and 8km from the east (left) bank of the #Dnipro River on February 3, the second instance in two days. 2/
The presence of these short-range air defense systems optimized for Arctic warfare near the riverbank suggests that the #Russian 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Northern Fleet is operating close to the riverbank and has brought its own air defense systems. 3/
The Tor M2DT was clearly unable to defend itself against whatever system #Ukraine used to destroy it in a single shot. 4/
#Russian forces continued to conduct routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk, #Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts on February 4. A #Ukrainian source claimed that Russian forces shelled Kherson City with incendiary munitions. 5/5 isw.pub/UkrWar020423
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#Putin’s decisions regarding #Ukraine since his initial flawed invasion on February 24, 2022, indicate a likely disconnect between his maximalist objectives and his willingness to take the high-risk decisions necessary to achieve them. 🧵of key takeaways:
2/ Putin has consistently ignored, delayed, or only partially implemented several likely necessary pragmatic decisions concerning his invasion. Putin continued to select comparatively less risky options even when faced with spiraling military failures in the fall of 2022.
3/ ISW assesses the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are belatedly implementing large-scale-military reforms and treating Ukraine as a protracted and major war—yet Putin is continuing a similar pattern of reserved decision-making.
2/ Russian milbloggers are conflicted on whether Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from #Bakhmut, and #Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin denied claims of a Ukrainian withdrawal.
3/ @TheStudyofWar continues to assess that Russian forces are likely unable to force an imminent Ukrainian withdrawal from #Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut area on February 4. 1/ isw.pub/UkrWar020423
The #Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister stated that #Russian forces have committed a substantial portion of their forces to offensive operations in the direction of #Bakhmut intending to break through Ukrainian defenses in the past week but that they have been unsuccessful. 2/
#Russian milbloggers are attempting to portray Russian offensives northeast of #Bakhmut and south of Kreminna as being a complementary effort to encircle Siversk. 3/
NEW: #Russian decisive offensive operations are unlikely to target #Zaporizhia City from the western Donetsk–Zaporizhia frontline as the Russian military continues to prepare for an offensive in western #Luhansk Oblast.
2/ ISW continues to assess that Russia is concentrating troops and military equipment to stage a decisive offensive on the western Luhansk Oblast and Bakhmut areas.
3/ Western and Ukrainian military officials have repeatedly noted that Russian forces are likely setting conditions to reach the Luhansk and Donetsk oblast borders — an objective that Russian Chief of General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov had also outlined on December 22.
Russian forces did not make any confirmed territorial gains along the southern axis on February 3. isw.pub/UkrWar020323
2/ Ukrainian officials continue to include a possible Russian offensive in the southern direction within their forecast cone as of February 3. isw.pub/UkrWar020323
3/ Russian sources claimed that the front line in #Zaporizhia Oblast has not changed and that Russian and Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue to operate along the front line.
.@TheStudyofWar has not observed any evidence that Russian forces have restored sufficient combat power to defeat #Ukraine’s forces in eastern Ukraine and capture over 11,300 sq km of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast (>42% of its total area) before March as #Putin reportedly ordered. 1/
2/ Indeed, #Putin may again be overestimating the Russian military’s own capabilities, as ISW assessed last week.
3/ ISW on 28 JAN assessed that a major Russian offensive before April 2023 would likely prematurely culminate during the April spring rain season (if not before) before achieving operationally significant effects. isw.pub/UkrWar012823