TLDR: There is no evidence for any organised participation. There is evidence that, particularly during the retreat from Alamein German soldiers mistreated civilians, which may have included Jewish civilians, although many of them would have been in the Giado camp by then. 2/
There is no evidence for any orders to Rommel in early 1941 to round up Jewish citizens in Libya. This doesn't mean there wasn't an order, but if there was, we have not found it. I consider the likelihood that it existed very low, considering Libya was Italy to all intents. 3/
The Brigade penetrated farthest into enemy territory and met its fate at Sidi Rezegh, where it was annihilated between 20 and 23 November. It's three regiments were 2 & 6 @RoyalTankRegt and 7 @ChurchillsOwn Hussars. By the end of November, only 2 R.T.R. operated as a squadron.
6 R.T.R. were the first to go, crossing the ridge north of Sidi Rezegh on 21 Nov into an AT gun front. The regiment was torn apart with heavy losses, its CO killed. There are claims that Rommel personally directed the AT guns but I have no evidence of this crusaderproject.wordpress.com/2009/11/01/the…
Brigades turned into regiments, regiments into squadrons. The brutal nature of attrition warfare asserted itself. 12 days later, only 84, or 20% of the tanks present on 17 Nov in 30 Corps remained operational - a nadir had been reached 3/ @ITM_archivescrusaderproject.wordpress.com/2008/07/16/dia…
It is sometimes claimed that following the destruction of the Duisburg convoy, no supplies reached North Africa from Italy until 21 December when German steamer Ankara docked in Benghazi. As they say in 'Good Omens', this is not correct. @AC_NavalHistory@ITM_archives@ajcboyd
Empire commanders preferred to penny-packet available guns out for roving 'Jock' columns. This was a disastrous habit, which replaced effectiveness on the battlefield with the feel-good factor of playing cowboys and indians. crusaderproject.wordpress.com/2010/10/24/reo…
A key concern was the expectation that the Empire air force would be numerically inferior, an expectation that was not borne out in the end. Neither the Luftwaffe nor the Regia Aeronautica reached the numbers of planes he feared 2/ @ITM_archives@NavalAirHistory@Balloons2Drones
What is interesting however is that there were real constraints on the soft aspects of air power, crews and mobility. A lack of trained pilots is probably surprising, as is a lack of vehicles to make squadrons mobile. 3/ @Airminded@aerohistorian@Luke_Truxal@smooreBofB1940
The strike was considered easy, against a lightly defended target, so the loss came as a bad surprise, shortly after losing two planes off Sicily. All crew members were killed. They were F/O Greenhill, Sgt. Smith, Sgt. Whidden & Sgt. Routh, Sgt. Parker, Sgt. McLeod @RCAF_ARC
F/O Greenhill, Sgts. Smith and McLeod are remembered on the Malta memorial, while Sgts. Routh and Parker are remembered on the Alamein memorial.
While all the sources I can see agree on him leaving command on this date, he seems to have hung around, maybe as alternate to General Gioda, since he was subsequently decorated with the Silver Medal for Military valor for Operation CRUSADER performance.
After his return to Italy he entered the reserve. On the armistice he remained loyal to the king and the legitimate government, even though he was in the north. He joined the #resistance#partigiani in a leading function in Milano. In May 1944 he was betrayed and arrested.
Once upon a time there was a general, and he was a nice man who doted on his children, and he took his regiment into the forest north of Pripyet and fought a big battle with the nasty partisans. And after a day and a night and another day he emerged victoriously.
He was a good general so he did not lose a single soldier, but they killed 2,000 partisans or more, all of them armed to the teeth and vicious, men, women, children, babies and the elderly. Because those partisans don’t know what’s good for them and never give up.