Many think Putin aims to annex Ukraine. I find that implausible. That's based on assumption that Putin is primarily concerned with foreign policy. But what if his main concern is domestic one? What if the real goal is to keep Ukraine a failed state as an example to the Russians?
Firstly, the territory currently hold by Russians or pro-Russian separatists is small. For example, the border in Donbass more or less stabilised in 2014. And let's be honest - if Kremlin really wanted to expand it, it would. Not as an invasion, but in a form of 'rebellion' etc
So why doesn't it expand it? One possible answer is - because it doesn't want to. Because the point of the entire conflict is not to expand in Ukraine but to keep Russians in line
Let's go a bit deeper in history. We all know of Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. After all, the Warsaw Pact is known as the only military alliance in history which fought only against its members. But why there was reprisals against Romania?
Romanian leaders, both Ceaușescu and his predecessor Gheorghiu-Dej behaved very independently. Their policies were known in Russian as an особый курс - different/particular course, not in line with the policies of Moscow. They were quite disobedient
This was partially economy-motivated. Soviets wanted to increase economic integration of socialist camp. Romanians accused them of trying to make a 'raw-materials appendage' out of Romania. They wanted full economic independence, even when dealing with the capitalist countries
They were also political. Bucharest objected against Warsaw Pact forces being commanded by Soviet generals, objected against Non-Proliferation Treaty (why can't we have nukes, too?). In 1968 Ceausescy raised huge demonstrations against Soviet invasion of Czecholslovakia
In socialist camp Romania was a constant trouble-maker. They established diplomatic relations with FRG (USSR didn't allow it, cuz FRG didn't recognise borders of DDR), they demanded to return them the gold reserve of Romanian Kingdom evacuated to Russia in 1916 and never returned
Unbelievable it may sound, but Romania tried to make territorial claims against the USSR. During the Chinese-Romanian discussions in 1964, Romanians claimed that Bessarabia and North Bukovina annexed by the Soviets in 1940 should be returned back. And Moscow knew Romanians did it
So why Soviets didn't do anything? They took drastic measures against Hungary and Czechoslovakia and would certainly do against Poland. In foreign policy these countries never did so much trouble-making as Romania. And yet Romania got away with all of that, why didn't they?
One possible answer is: while Romania presented some foreign-policy threat (it even talked of territorial claims against the USSR) it never presented domestic-policy one. Because Romania wasn't regarded as a potential role model, as a positive example by anyone in the USSR
From the perspective of Soviet ppl, Romania was very much like the USSR, just inferior. We have God-Emperor, they have God-Emperor. We have abject poverty, they have abject poverty. We have KGB, they have Securitate. Nobody in the USSR ever said 'I wish we were more like Romania'
So the Romanian regime was spared, because it wasn't so much different and thus couldn't be regarded as a potential alternative to the Soviet order. Meanwhile, political transformations in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia were too dangerous in the context of Soviet domestic policy
Imagine that these countries would work on different political principles, with broader political participation and allow diversity of opinions. And they'd be still functional, they wouldn't fall in chaos. That would be considered a positive alternative by very many in the USSR
In fact, even those who supported Soviet system, believing it is their protection from chaos and disorder, could see that the alternative is possible and totally functional. So the public opinion within the USSR would drift in the direction of these new role models
Czechoslovakia was more dangerous than Hungary for cultural reasons. Czechoslovakia is Slavic, less language& culture barrier and thus it's more of a reference group. Russians would more naturally compare themselves with Slavic countries, than with non-Slavic ones like Romania
Poland was much more dangerous than Czechoslovakia. Historical connections much closer, culture&language more similar. Poland was historically considered by many as a sort of alter ego of Russia and thus everything happening in Poland was super relevant
And what is happening in Ukraine is most relevant of all. Many observers correctly claim that much, well, honestly speaking, most of Ukraine is Russian-speaking. By my observations actual zone of Russian is bigger than shown here, certainly includes Kiev. But it goes both ways
That means that Ukraine and Russian exist in the same cultural and language space. There is no barrier at all, everything is interconnected. So everything happening in Ukraine will immediately reflect in Russia, in public discourse in mass opinion, in the mindset of the people
So the worst case scenario is 1) clearly different 2) functional system in Ukraine. It shouldn't even be particularly rich, it just has to pay its bills to show it works. That's enough to create a core of sympathisers in Russia. And before the war Ukraine was growing quickly
Russian nationalists criticise Kremlin for moderation. 'They could take Kiev, why don't they?'. May be they don't take Kiev because it's not the goal. The goal is simply to create enough destruction and chaos, so Ukraininan model would be unattractive in the eyes of Russians
Perhaps the real audience of this play is neither Ukraine, nor West, but Russians themselves. And the goal is to teach one simple lessons - if you do this
... you get this. So basically the only result of protests, civil disturbances and revolts is death and desolation - even in case of success
Assuming this interpretation is correct, which predictions can we make? I'd say Putin isn't going to push deep into Ukraine. There can be fight in the border regions though. Because the real goal is not to destroy Ukraine but to keep it as a failed state as an example to Russians
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Wagner march was incredible, unprecedented to the extent most foreigners simply do not understand. Like, yes, Russia had its military coups in the 18th c. But those were the palace coups, all done by the Guards. Purely praetorian business with zero participation of the army.
Yes, there was a Kornilov affair in 1917, but that happened after the coup in capital. In March they overthrew the Tsar, then there was infighting in the capital, including a Bolshevik revolt in July, and only in September part of the army marches to St Petersburg.
Half a year after the coup. Not the same thing
I think the last time anything like that happened was in 1698, when the Musketeers marched on Moscow from the Western border. And then, next time, only in 2023.
(Army leaves the border/battlefield and marches on the capital without a previous praetorian coup in the capital)
As a person from a post-Soviet country, I could not but find the institutions of People’s Republic of China oddly familiar. For every major institution of the Communist Russia, I could find a direct equivalent in Communist China.
With one major exception:
China had no KGB
For a post-Soviet person, that was a shocking realisation. For us, a gigantic, centralised, all-permeating and all powerful state security system appears to be almost a natural phenomenon. The earth. The sky. Force of gravity. KGB
All basic properties of reality we live in
It was hard to come up with any explanation for why the PRC that evolved in a close cooperation with the USSR, that used to be its client state, that emulated its major institutions, failed to copy this seemingly prerequisite (?) institution of state power
Soviet output of armaments was absolutely gargantuan, massive, unbeatable. “Extraordinary by any standard” , it was impossible for any other country to compete with.
From 1975 to 1988, the Soviets produced four times as many ICBMs and SLBMs, twice as many nuclear submarines, five times as many bombers, six times as many SAMs, three times as many tanks and six times as many artillery pieces as the United States.
Impossible to compete with.
Which raises a question:
How could the USSR produce so much?
It is not only that the USSR invested every dime into the military production. It is also that the Soviet industry was designed for the very large volumes of output, and worked the best under these very large volumes
We are releasing our investigation on Roscosmos, covering a nearly exhaustive sample of Russian ICBM producing plants. We have investigated both primary ICBM/SLBM producers in Russia, a major producer of launchers, manufacturers of parts and components.
Each material includes an eclectic collection of sources, ranging from the TV propaganda to public tenders, and from the HR listings to academic dissertations. Combined altogether, they provide a holistic picture of Russian ICBM production base that no single type of source can.
Overall, you can expect tech moguls to have much, much higher level of reasoning abilities compared to the political/administrative class. But this comes at a cost. Their capacities for understanding the Other (masses count as the “Other”) are much poorer.
E.g. Putin is much, much less of an outlier in terms of intelligence compared to Thiel. He is much more average. At the same time, I am positively convinced that Putin understands the masses and works with masses much better.
One problem with that is that too much of the supply chain for drone production is located in China. The thing with drones is that they grew out of toys industry. Cheap plastic & electronic crap that all of a sudden got military significance
That is also the major problem I have with "China supports Russia" argument. China could wreck Ukraine easily, simply obstructing & delaying the drone/drone components shipments. That would be an instant military collapse for Ukraine.
Both Russian and Ukrainian drone industries are totally dependent upon the continuous shipments from China. To a very significant degree, their "production" is assembly from the Chinese components which are non alternative and cannot be substituted with anything else (as cheap).