Most of so called foreign policy is domestic policy by other means. For this reason I think Putin is reluctant to start a full scale invasion of Ukraine. During such a war professional military would get too much power and authority. Which might be Kremlin's biggest fear (🧵)
Let's go a bit deeper in history. When Bolsheviks took power in 1917 they were constantly comparing themselves with English and French revolutionaries. As they new well, both English and French revolutions ended with military usurpations done by victorious revolutionary generals
Thus Communists were wary of their own officers. E.g., Trotsky noticed a highly capable lieutenant of Red Army Blagonravov and told to Lenin:
'Such a lieutenant could make a new Napoleon. And his surname fits well: Blagonravov is a literal translation of the word Bonaparte'
'Lenin first laughed and then started thinking. Then said seriously and almost threateningly:
- Well, we'll overcome these Bonaparts, won't we?
- With God's help - responded Trotsky'
(Leon Trotsky. My life)
That probably explains why the victorious Red Army had so many commanders killed under mysterious circumstances. According to official narrative - by the enemy fire, but suspectedly - by assassins shooting at their back from the close range. Like Schors
Or openly killed without any trial like the commander of the Second Cavalry Army - Mironov. As some researchers argue - this was personally ordered by Leon Trotsky
At some point during the Civil War Lenin was discussing executing 100% of all the Red Army commanders including the Commander-in-Chief
It would be wrong to assume that all of this was complete paranoia. For example, the commander of the 11th Red Army Sorokin indeed tried to raise a rebellion against the Soviet Power, arresting and executing a number of Communist commissars
They built two layers of control to keep the army in line. First - by the Party, which was 'the leading and organising force', of the Soviet state
Every army, regiment, batallion etc - had a Commander and a Commissar. Commander was a professional military. Commissar was a political appointee to keep Commander in check. To control him, arrest and execute if needed. Any order of a Commander had to be confirmed by the Comissar
Second - by the State Security. Their name evolved. First - Extraordinary Commission ЧК, Second - Main Political Bureau ГПУ, then People's Commisariat of Home Affairs НКВД, Ministry for State Security МГБ, Committee for State Security КГБ and finally Federal Security Service ФСБ
Interestingly enough, also the State Security was proclaimed as the 'punishing sword of the Party' early Bolsheviks didn't hold it in high regard
When Lenin knew that Checkists in Odessa were harassing Turkish visitors, he responded
'The more Checklist scum we'll be able to execute on this occasion, the better'
Lenin considered Checkists as dirty criminal scum, also xenophobic which he didn't like at all
PS 'the more of X we're able to execute on this occasion the better' - is very typical for Lenin's style. It's more like - that's a good opportunity to deal with those we should have taught a lesson to much earlier
So the balance of power in the Soviet state was basically a Three-body problem. The Party. The State Security. The Army.
Stalin for a while reduced both three to submission by extreme violence
For example, during the Great Purge he executed 3 out 5 of Red Marshals, 15 out of 15 of Army Commanders, 4 out of 4 Navy Admirals, 58 out of 62 Corpse Commanders and so on. In 1937-1938 professional military were exterminated. Right before the WWII started
After Stalin's death balance of power was renegotiated. The Party stroke back reducing other institutions into submission. State Security was prohibited to even think of investigating, collecting info, wiretap and so on nomenklatura. They couldn't indict nomenklatura with crimes
Just an illustration. Soviet Society was full of state security informators. And ofc many uni students were recruited. How can you trust your classmates then? One hint - nomenklatura kids are 100% not agents. State security isn't allowed to approach the families of Party bosses
So in 1953-1991 the Three-Body problem looked like this. State Security controlled the Army, while the Party controlled both. So State Security had resources, had capable officers, knew more than anyone else. But it was prohibited from doing anything by nomenklatura higher-ups
That explains a funny counterintuitive fact. Radical economic liberalisation of 1990s was largely planned in the Soviet era:
1) by economic institutes working under KGB patronage and funding 2) by individual economists coming from state security or intelligence families
Consider Gaidar - the mastermind behind the market reforms and very bright guy. He was coming from Soviet patriciate. His dad was a Vice-Admiral (=naval intelligence). Their family lived on Cuba during the Caribbean crisis, constantly hanged out with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara
Coming of age he became the editor of 'Communist' magazine - of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Although formally a civilian economist, he was doing lots of industrial intelligence. And in 1990s he eagerly dismantled Soviet economic system
Paradoxically it may seem, the radical economic liberalisation of 1990s was developed within State Security. The Army couldn't because any independent thinkers there would be destroyed immediately. The Party wouldn't, cuz why would they? Nomenklatura wasn't interested in changes
Counterintuitively it is, but in the late USSR, the KGB was the only real counter-elite. And most of social changes don't come from elites or from 'oppressed masses' - they come from counter-elites, who have power and resources, but are not really in charge
And then the Party collapses. I think that's the elephant in the room overlooked in many discussions on the USSR collapse. It's not that the Soviet Empire collapsed suddenly - it's that its 'leading and organising force', the Party was consumed by the internal strife
That explains much of the chaos of the 1990s. Most of officials - CEOs of industrial plants, police chiefs, government staffers - suddenly broke free. Previously they were closely guided and controlled by the Party but now with no Party they got completely disoriented
State Security was demoralised, too. Consider a case when KGB special forces squad captured an Azeri prison to release Armenian militants. For that Moscow rewarded them with 200 roubles. They were shocked, devastated, didn't what to do
Hyperinflation turned them into beggars
On the eve of 1990s virtually all the salaried professionals became beggars. They either got no salary at all, or got insultingly small ones. That includes the army, the police, the state security. There was only one single institution that always paid on time - the railways
A typical situation for the 1990s - in small towns and in the countryside railway workers and staffers are the only ones with cash. Nobody else (including police) gets paid. Because they're unimportant. Railways are important because they're what's keeping the country together
So with the country in crisis, the Party collapsing under its own weight and with State Security almost disfunctional, new Yeltsin's regime got extremely wary of the army. Yes, they're demoralised, too. But ultimately it's the only force in the country that presents a real threat
Consider general Rohlin. Fought in Afghanistan, in Georgia, in Chechnya. During the Chechen war he refused to grant medals and awards to troops, considering it a civil war on which no awards should be earned. When awarded as a Hero of Russia for his role, he refused that, too
In 1997 he established a movement 'To support the Army, the military industry and the military science'. After that he was touring the country meeting with the military, governors, regular civilians and openly telling that the government should be 'removed'
That was the eve of default with pretty much nobody (including the army), getting paid, strikes blocking the infrastructure - including so necessary railways and the Yeltsin's rate of approval being 6%
Reportedly Rohlin was preparing a military coup scheduled on July 20, 1998. On 3rd July, 1998 he was found shot in his country dacha. His wife was accused of murder and spent four years in prison. Some argue however, that the Kremlin eliminated him preventively
Was he really preparing a coup? According to official narrative - no. According to others, including his own family and aides - yes. It seems that of all the military he went further than all, but generally speaking in the times of chaos the idea of military rule was in the air
What does the Rohlin's story teach us? First - that the military can pose a potential threat. Second - such a threat increases after the war. Even if the war is lost (like Russia lost the First Chechen War), individual generals can increase their status, power, get national fame
Power is the only resource that increases when you use it. During a war officers and men have to obey a general's commands quickly, unquestioningly, and without control from the center. That dramatically increases his personal power over his troops. Especially if they are winning
Let's look at this infographic with 'strange' deaths of Russian generals. When did they die mysteriously? In Yeltsin's era (blue timeline) - after the First Chechen War. In Putin's (orange timeline) - after the Second Chechen War, and then after the Georgian-Ukrainian-Syrian one
The Chechen war happened in 1999-2000, and then we have a cluster of strange generals' deaths. One could assume it was a necessary cleansing operation after the war - the military got too proud and self-assured
Since 2008 we have a constant supply of strange deaths' of generals. The war in Georgia, then in Syria. And then another strange spike in 2014. And what happened in 2014? Well, the war in Ukraine
Let's some up. When foreign observers talk of the potential threats to the Putin's regime they usually imagine them like this. Civilians coming with a peaceful protest which makes Kremlin very, very afraid. I would say that's bullshit. The real issue is not controlling civilians
The real issue is controlling the army. Because the army will always, ever and under any circumstances win over the unarmed civilians. The end of thread
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Many are trying to explain his success with some accidental factors such as his “personal charisma”, Cuomo's weakness etc
Still, I think there may be some fundamental factors here. A longue durée shift, and a very profound one
1. Public outrage does not work anymore
If you look at Zohran, he is calm, constructive, and rarely raises his voice. I think one thing that Mamdani - but almost no one else in the American political space is getting - is that the public is getting tired of the outrage
Outrage, anger, righteous indignation have all been the primary drivers of American politics for quite a while
For a while, this tactics worked
Indeed, when everyone around is polite, and soft (and insincere), freaking out was a smart thing to do. It could help you get noticed
People don’t really understand causal links. We pretend we do (“X results in Y”). But we actually don’t. Most explanations (= descriptions of causal structures) are fake.
There may be no connection between X and Y at all. The cause is just misattributed.
Or, perhaps, X does indeed result in Y. but only under a certain (and unknown!) set of conditions that remains totally and utterly opaque to us. So, X->Y is only a part of the equation
And so on
I like to think of a hypothetical Stone Age farmer who started farming, and it worked amazingly, and his entire community adopted his lifestyle, and many generations followed it and prospered and multiplied, until all suddenly wiped out in a new ice age
1. Normative Islamophobia that used to define the public discourse being the most acceptable form of racial & ethnic bigotry in the West, is receding. It is not so much dying as rather - failing to replicate. It is not that the old people change their views as that the young do not absorb their prejudice any longer.
In fact, I incline to think it has been failing to replicate for a while, it is just that we have not been paying attention
Again, the change of vibe does not happen at once. The Muslim scare may still find (some) audience among the more rigid elderly, who are not going to change their views. But for the youth, it is starting to sound as archaic as the Catholic scare of know nothings
Out of date
2. What is particularly interesting regarding Mamdani's victory, is his support base. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that its core is comprised of the young (and predominantly white) middle classes, with a nearly equal representation of men and women
What does Musk vs Trump affair teach us about the general patterns of human history? Well, first of all it shows that the ancient historians were right. They grasped something about nature of politics that our contemporaries simply can’t.
Let me give you an example. The Arab conquest of Spain
According to a popular medieval/early modern interpretation, its primary cause was the lust of Visigoth king Roderic. Aroused by the beautiful daughter of his vassal and ally, count Julian, he took advantage of her
Disgruntled, humiliated Julian allied himself with the Arabs and opens them the gates of Spain.
Entire kingdom lost, all because the head of state caused a personal injury to someone important.
One thing you need to understand about wars is that very few engage into the long, protracted warfare on purpose. Almost every war of attrition was planned and designed as a short victorious blitzkrieg
And then everything went wrong
Consider the Russian war in Ukraine. It was not planned as a war. It was not thought of as a war. It was planned as a (swift!) regime change allowing to score a few points in the Russian domestic politics. And then everything went wrong
It would not be an exaggeration to say that planning a short victorious war optimised for the purposes of domestic politics is how you *usually* end up in a deadlock. That is the most common scenario of how it happens, practically speaking
Global politics are usually framed in terms of kindergarten discourse (“good guys” vs “bad guys”) with an implication that you must provide “good guys” with boundless and unconditional support
BUT
Unconditional support is extremely corrupting, and turns the best of the best into the really nasty guys, and relatively fast
Part of the reason is that neither “bad” nor “good” guys are in fact homogenous, and present a spectrum of opinions and personalities. Which means that all of your designated “good guys” include a fair share of really, really nasty guys, almost by definition.
Purely good movements do not really exist
That is a major reason why limitless, unconditional, unquestioning support causes such a profound corrupting effect upon the very best movement. First, because that movement is not all
that purely good as you imagine (neither movement is),