That's Mikhail Khodaryonok. Out of all people in the room he is the most sober one. Why? Well, may be because he's the only one with the substantial military experience. He's a career officer of the air defence who turned to a pundit career only after retirement (not a thread)
Khodaryonok used to be a senior operative officer in the Russian General Staff. Most Russian pundits judged the military capacity of the Russian army based on official propaganda. Khodaryonok - on his lived experience. Now wonder he is way more pessimistic about the war
Khodaryonok published a pessimistic prognosis about the Russian invasion of Ukraine back on February 3, long before it started. Many pundits expected a quick Russian victory. But the one who actually worked in the Russian General Staff didn't believe in it nvo.ng.ru/realty/2022-02…
Some Khodaryonok's points he raised back on February 3, three weeks before the Russian invasion:
- Pundits are wrong about the political situation in Ukraine. Many claim that nobody iwould defend the "regime in Kyiv". That's false. They will, including the Russian-speakers
- Pundits claim that Russia can win in a few hours by destroying Ukrainian army with "a mighty artillery strike". Well, even a term "mighty artillery strike" suggests it were the Politruks who made it up and not the military. It's propaganda. It's also factually wrong. They won't
- Pundits claim that Ukrainian army is in disarray. Well, it used to be back in 2014. Back then it used to be a very much deteriorated version of the Soviet army. Since then it improved immensely. It is now organised on very different principles and largely by NATO standards
- Pundits claim that the Western countries won't send a single soldier to die for Ukraine. Probably they won't. But they will support Ukraine massively "There is no doubt that in the case of war, the USA and NATo will reincarnate some version of lend lease much alike WWII"
- Pundits expect Russia to win in days or hours. They forget that the USSR spent more than 10 years exterminating guerrillas in Western Ukraine. Now Russia will face guerrillas in urban landscapes that naturally favour a weaker and less heavily armed side of the conflict
- Conclusions. There will be no Blitzkrieg in Ukraine. Experts who claim that Russia will defeat Ukraine in "8 minutes", "10 minutes" and even in "30-40 minutes are wrong". Best of all, forget about your jingoist fantasies and never bring them up again
I very much recommend to translate Khodoryonok's prognosis from back on February 3 and publish it as a full length thread. It's really the most astute, detailed and shockingly precise prognosis of the future war that I read. That's literally Cassandra-level of prophesying
Some wrote that my prognosis from Feb 27 aged well and I take this as a compliment. But Khodoryonok's article was *waaay* more precise and came out 3 weeks earlier. He predicted the course of this war before it even started. That's the power of a true expertise & lived experience
TL;DR Out of all predictions and prognoses about the Z-war that I ever read or hear about, Khodaryonok's one was the most precise, like unbelievably precise. I don't exclude the possibility that this guy understands the situation better than anyone else. The end of not a thread
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.