Russian regionalist Media «7x7. Horizontal Russia» compiled a map of attacks on the military commissariats (draft & recruiting stations) all over Russia from Feb 24 to May 31, 2022. Unlike most of what passes for "liberal Russian media" in the West, this one isn't based in Moscow
«7x7. Horizontal Russia» was established in the northern Komi republic. Having expanded to dozens of Russian regions it still keeps its regional focus. They do massive work on the ground that remains virtually unnoticed in the West semnasem.org
I'm inclined to think that the focus of Western journalists, politicians and (let's be honest) researchers on everything Moscow-related at the expense of the rest of the country is motivated not only by their implicit biases or prejudices but also by simple laziness
How come that the Western media pay nearly zero attention to a wildly successful regional initiative?
1. They're biased 2. They're lazy
And they lack self awareness to realize either of this
Look whom the Western media are quoting and interviewing. Almost always it will be the representatives of a closely interconnected political&media ecosystem of Moscow tusovochka. Those who work in the province get almost zero coverage no matter how much they are doing
Interestingly enough the same Westerners usually can reflect their own biases and prejudices when it comes to their own country. But for some reason they lose their ability when it comes to the Eastern Europe. The can't overcome their basis because they don't know it exists
Why do Westerners give voice only to the Moscow tusovochka? My guess:
1. It's easy 2. It's pleasant. Tusovochka usually has that social polish that will make Westerners feel good. And feeling good is the priority here 2. They think they can add some positive knowledge this way
It's delusion for most part. I would argue that talking to, writing about, quoting the Moscow tusovochka has negative rather than positive value for the progress of knowledge. You give additional representation to people and institutions which are already wildly overrepresented
Giving additional platform and additional representation to the already wildly overrepresented Moscow establishment skewes the already existing bias even further. You are not helping, you are making things worse. Just stop it
Instead of quoting the Moscow media how about quoting the regional ones such as 7*7? Instead of quoting the Moscow politicians and activists how about quoting the regional ones which currently have almost no voice and no representation in the West at all? End of thread
PS Moscow's domination over the regions is not "natural". It's constructed. And its key element is the cultural hegemony which largely results from Moscow being almost the sole intermediary with the West (with the single exception of StP). This cycle must be broken
When you give additional platform and additional voice to Moscow you reinforce its cultural hegemony over the regions. You increase its status and its symbolic capital. You reinforce the current imperial system. It's a political act
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.