Yes, but that's unimportant. Nobody cares about the suffering of the few. It can and will be ignored. What can't be ignored however is the problems in dentistry. You might not give a damn about kidney dialysis, but very soon you'll need to fix your teeth. That gonna be hard
You can see a good overview here. Russian dentistry is critically dependent upon Western materials, tools and anaesthetics. So the prices are skyrocketing and very soon many services will either be unavailable or will have to swtich to Soviet technologies ngs55.ru/text/health/20…
Unavailability of some high tech services like the kidney dialysis doesn't have political significance. Nobody really cares. What does create political consequences however is the general decrease in life standards for everyone. Dentistry >>> Dialysis, politics-wise
You see, any sort of regime however horrendous it might look from outside can exist only as long as it relies on some sort of social contract. Which is generally accepted by the population. And Putin's regime can exist only as long as it fullfills the social contract conditions
Westerners generally misunderstand Putin's social contract . It's not about "gimme your freedom, and I'll give you money". Not at all. Much of Russian population lived in horrendous conditions and that was ok. Cuz it's not what Putin's social contract is about
Putin's social contract is not about securing some life standards or employment or even economic growth. It's primarily about securing FULL SUPERMARKET SHELVES. That's the basis of his legitimacy
Westerners generally underestimate how much Russian population is traumatised by the Soviet empty shelves. It was not "poverty" that damaged the Soviet legitimacy. It was the empty shelves. You kinda have money, but what are you gonna buy?
Putin's social contract is not about everyone having something to eat. It's about food being always available in the supermarket and available in variety and abundance, which never really happened in Russian history before, at least since 1917
It's not poverty that damages the legitimacy of the regime. It's the deficit. If you can't buy food cuz you're poor, then well, fuck you. You're lazy or stupid, because if you were smarter you'd earn cash or take a loan. And buy food which is available in a supermarket, just look
If you can't buy food cuz you don't have cash, it's your own fault. Putin's responsibility is to provide you with supply. However, if you can't buy food, because there is no (or little/limited choice of it), that's Putin's fault. He didn't fulfil the implicit promise of abundance
Paradoxically enough, poverty or starvation don't damage the regime nearly as much as the limited choice of yogurts does. Starvation is your own fault. The limited choice of yogurts is Putin's fault. Know the difference
Russian people love to consume. They love to consume way more than Europeans do, because they didn't have much chance to consume at least since Stalin took the power. Limiting the consumption choice or consumption dreams is way more painful than it would be in Europe. End of 🧵
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.