If you want to understand *modern* Russian culture, don't read 19th c. aristocrats. They're all dead and their world is dead, too. Read the "Twelve Chairs" and "Golden Calf" instead. Picaresques on Ostap Bender's adventures may be two most influential books of the Russian 20th c
And they are certainly the most quotable in normal talk, in every day situations
Quoting the 19th c poetry is classy for Russians for the same reason it is classy for Europeans to quote Roman or Greek authors. It is a dead language of a dead culture. 19th century is the Russian antiquity. That world died and modern Russia doesn't have much continuity with it
1921-1929 - that's when modern Russian culture started for real. Retrospectively the roaring twenties may look as a flash of light in the darkness. Old pre-revolutionary culture is honestly not that relatable. Regarding the Soviet culture of 1930-1980s, few want to relate with it
Crazy yet witty Galkovsky made a good observation. Muslims described Christians and Jews as "People of the Book". Soviets could also be described this way. Except this book would be the Twelve Chairs rather than Bible or Torah. Yuri Andropov reportedly learnt this book by heart
The high to late Soviet literature turned out to be sterile. Writers were not all bad, it's just that the world they lived in and described is unattractive. Stalinism what nightmarish, Khrushchevism absurdly delusional, Brezhnevism just outright dull. Who reads Trifonov nowadays?
In spite of all their hardships and horrors, the 1920s turned out to be a breath of fresh air before the darkness fully gathered. And few want to relate with the art created under the Necropolis of Stalinism. That's why it is so unreadable today
1920s were probably the highest point of the 20th c Russian literature, at least in terms of their long term cultural impact. These books are so readable and quotable largely because of the world they picture. This world might be horrifying. But it is certainly not dull. The end
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The primary weakness of this argument is that being true, historically speaking, it is just false in the context of American politics where the “communism” label has been so over-used (and misapplied) that it lost all of its former power:
“We want X”
“No, that is communism”
“We want communism”
Basically, when you use a label like “communism” as a deus ex machina winning you every argument, you simultaneously re-define its meaning. And when you use it to beat off every popular socio economic demand (e.g. universal healthcare), you re-define communism as a synthesis of all the popular socio economic demands
Historical communism = forced industrial development in a poor, predominantly agrarian country, funded through expropriation of the peasantry
(With the most disastrous economic and humanitarian consequences)
Many are trying to explain his success with some accidental factors such as his “personal charisma”, Cuomo's weakness etc
Still, I think there may be some fundamental factors here. A longue durée shift, and a very profound one
1. Public outrage does not work anymore
If you look at Zohran, he is calm, constructive, and rarely raises his voice. I think one thing that Mamdani - but almost no one else in the American political space is getting - is that the public is getting tired of the outrage
Outrage, anger, righteous indignation have all been the primary drivers of American politics for quite a while
For a while, this tactics worked
Indeed, when everyone around is polite, and soft (and insincere), freaking out was a smart thing to do. It could help you get noticed
People don’t really understand causal links. We pretend we do (“X results in Y”). But we actually don’t. Most explanations (= descriptions of causal structures) are fake.
There may be no connection between X and Y at all. The cause is just misattributed.
Or, perhaps, X does indeed result in Y. but only under a certain (and unknown!) set of conditions that remains totally and utterly opaque to us. So, X->Y is only a part of the equation
And so on
I like to think of a hypothetical Stone Age farmer who started farming, and it worked amazingly, and his entire community adopted his lifestyle, and many generations followed it and prospered and multiplied, until all suddenly wiped out in a new ice age
1. Normative Islamophobia that used to define the public discourse being the most acceptable form of racial & ethnic bigotry in the West, is receding. It is not so much dying as rather - failing to replicate. It is not that the old people change their views as that the young do not absorb their prejudice any longer.
In fact, I incline to think it has been failing to replicate for a while, it is just that we have not been paying attention
Again, the change of vibe does not happen at once. The Muslim scare may still find (some) audience among the more rigid elderly, who are not going to change their views. But for the youth, it is starting to sound as archaic as the Catholic scare of know nothings
Out of date
2. What is particularly interesting regarding Mamdani's victory, is his support base. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that its core is comprised of the young (and predominantly white) middle classes, with a nearly equal representation of men and women
What does Musk vs Trump affair teach us about the general patterns of human history? Well, first of all it shows that the ancient historians were right. They grasped something about nature of politics that our contemporaries simply can’t.
Let me give you an example. The Arab conquest of Spain
According to a popular medieval/early modern interpretation, its primary cause was the lust of Visigoth king Roderic. Aroused by the beautiful daughter of his vassal and ally, count Julian, he took advantage of her
Disgruntled, humiliated Julian allied himself with the Arabs and opens them the gates of Spain.
Entire kingdom lost, all because the head of state caused a personal injury to someone important.
One thing you need to understand about wars is that very few engage into the long, protracted warfare on purpose. Almost every war of attrition was planned and designed as a short victorious blitzkrieg
And then everything went wrong
Consider the Russian war in Ukraine. It was not planned as a war. It was not thought of as a war. It was planned as a (swift!) regime change allowing to score a few points in the Russian domestic politics. And then everything went wrong
It would not be an exaggeration to say that planning a short victorious war optimised for the purposes of domestic politics is how you *usually* end up in a deadlock. That is the most common scenario of how it happens, practically speaking