If you want to understand *modern* Russian culture, don't read 19th c. aristocrats. They're all dead and their world is dead, too. Read the "Twelve Chairs" and "Golden Calf" instead. Picaresques on Ostap Bender's adventures may be two most influential books of the Russian 20th c
And they are certainly the most quotable in normal talk, in every day situations
Quoting the 19th c poetry is classy for Russians for the same reason it is classy for Europeans to quote Roman or Greek authors. It is a dead language of a dead culture. 19th century is the Russian antiquity. That world died and modern Russia doesn't have much continuity with it
1921-1929 - that's when modern Russian culture started for real. Retrospectively the roaring twenties may look as a flash of light in the darkness. Old pre-revolutionary culture is honestly not that relatable. Regarding the Soviet culture of 1930-1980s, few want to relate with it
Crazy yet witty Galkovsky made a good observation. Muslims described Christians and Jews as "People of the Book". Soviets could also be described this way. Except this book would be the Twelve Chairs rather than Bible or Torah. Yuri Andropov reportedly learnt this book by heart
The high to late Soviet literature turned out to be sterile. Writers were not all bad, it's just that the world they lived in and described is unattractive. Stalinism what nightmarish, Khrushchevism absurdly delusional, Brezhnevism just outright dull. Who reads Trifonov nowadays?
In spite of all their hardships and horrors, the 1920s turned out to be a breath of fresh air before the darkness fully gathered. And few want to relate with the art created under the Necropolis of Stalinism. That's why it is so unreadable today
1920s were probably the highest point of the 20th c Russian literature, at least in terms of their long term cultural impact. These books are so readable and quotable largely because of the world they picture. This world might be horrifying. But it is certainly not dull. The end
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.