Analysts may be focusing too much on restricting the Russian fossil fuels export and too little on restricting the Russian import of:
1. industrial equipment 2. components
necessary to keep the Putin's war machine going. Most of it is probably coming from Europe, not from China
Russian import dynamics suggest that import from China has actually *decreased* since the start of the Special Operation. In other words, individual Chinese companies might have avoided doing business with Russia to avoid repercussions. Those that remained boosted the prices
Meanwhile, the export from Turkey increased significantly. It is partially the Turkish production, including the foodstuff, etc. But much of it is probably the Western European technological export. In this case Turkey probably serves as a proxy and as a smuggling hub
Most of European technological smuggling to Russia is organised in a shockingly simple way. Exporters typically use very "dumb" schemes with only one single proxy. Like Rheinmetall AG sells equipment to the Garnison Ltd to build Mulino, where Russian invasion army was trained
Putin's military machine cannot do without European industrial equipment and components. Putin's rearmament was based on the direct technological import from the West. He tried to become more self-sufficient since 2011-2013, but failed. Import dependency is total
Some critical dependencies of the Russian military industrial complex from Western Europe:
1) Machine tools. Most importantly, German. But also Italian, Swiss, Austrian, Czech 2) Metal cutting instruments. Especially Swedish - for precision manufacturing, like nuclear warheads
3) CNC. Even "Russian" or Belarusian produced machine tools operate with German/Japanese CNCs, software and Swedish instruments. Especially Siemens/Fanuc
4) Spindles, ballscrews, bearings, etc.
5) Cutting fluids (mostly Germany)
That's necessary to keep the Russian army going
To stop Putin's military machine it's absolutely necessary to stop the technological import from Western Europe. Russian military plants cannot do without it. China can't substitute the loss of European suppliers
Official European export to Russian has been growing in late-spring - early summer forbes.ru/biznes/474301-… Unofficial grey schemes used to smuggle the forbidden equipment to Russia are usually very dumb and use one single proxy. Track them. The end
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I feel it may be an even more virgin field. Administrative documents are written on a dead language of a dead culture and thus are inaccessible even for the modern Turks. Once you learn modern Turkish, you'll need years to start reading the Ottoman. In some cases - many years
Add to that that reading legal and especially fiscal documentation may take many years of excruciating training. There are very few people who can read them, including in Turkey itself. So yes, I believe there may be lots of potential to introduce new sources in this field
Discontinuity between the modern Anatolian Turkish and the literary language of 1900 is far greater than in any big European language that I'm aware of. 1900 literature is almost completely inaccessible. The same goes for many other Turkic languages such as my native Tatar
Another very smart and altruistic professor encouraged me to concentrate on China instead. Indeed, we both knew that if I potentially focused on China, I would probably do well, even in the UK and even coming from Eastern Europe. There's *way* less gatekeeping in this area
I don't really know how it is in Japan/Korea studies but in my experience China Studies have very, very little gatekeeping. You literally can be a noname from the backwoods and do great. And by doing great I don't mean glorifying the Party, I mean actual academic research
You are implying that's some kind of exception, while in fact that's typical. You represent yourself as *whatever you think the West wants to see* when there is an incentive for that. And you act the opposite when the system of incentives change. I mean that's kinda obvious
I think every non-Westerner with half a brain knows how to please the Western public opinion. Just identify what they want and try to fit into that role. How to identify what they want? Well, they won't shut up about it. May be you would like them to shut up, but they won't
That's not some high strategy. That's basic functionality. How do you get into a PhD program? Identify what they want to read in application and write it. A scholarship? The same to get *any kind of resources*. Once you get them, make an U-turn and do what you really want
No. Putin's regime is not Stalin's and the extent of *bloody* purges is vastly exaggerated. Also they don't really care for your views as long as you don't take active action. Some my social media mutuals were posting critical stuff, while working for the state. Nobody cares
Back in 2015 I worked in a quango. My boss would casually come to the room where I and three other employees were sitting and make speeches like:
"How I turned towards the oppositional views"
In reality this quango was a part of the state's economic apparatus. But nobody cared
I also knew an official who would casually post super critical stuff in social media. He also made critical speeches privately. Later, he would make a yuuuge rise, like to the very top of the political hierarchy. But he didn't even bother to delete his old posts. Nobody cares
Most foreigners don't read Russian and are thus unfamiliar with the Russian internal discourse. Let me give you a single but illustrative example
Russian discourse is largely centred around how much our consumption standards have fallen or will fall. And nothing else matters
Russia is not an idealistic irrational society as many picture it. It's ultra-pragmatic culture. If you think it can be moved by the killed Ukrainian civilians (or Russian soldiers KIA), you are insane. Decrease in consumption standards, that's the *only* thing that really hurts
Putin's decision to start the war will be judged based on how much our consumption standards will fall. If they don't fall too dramatically, it means Putin made good or okayish decision. Everything's alright, just chill down. If they *do* fall though, oh, it's very painful
Tourism issue is not just tourism issue. Russian public opinion interprets it as the marker of the *real* attitude of Europe. When Macron/Scholz express a deep concern, Russian public either laughs over it or interprets it as the de facto endorsement. Empty words, no action
Visa ban may be a small action, but it is an action. Unlike words visa ban has nonzero value. This can and will be interpreted as Europe being *actually* upset about what's happening in Ukraine and probably even somewhat angry. It's a sign of actual, unironic disapproval