Czech manufacturer TDZ Turn posted this hilarious public statement on their website. They were triggered because Yale researchers led by @JeffSonnenfeld included them into the list of Western companies continuing to operate in Russia.
TDZ Turn seem to be really scared. Why?🧵
We never operated in Russia directly. We do not have business contacts there. After annexation of Crimea we limited our operations to the minimum and (God forbid!) didn't work with sanctioned companies
Our conscience is clear. Unlike that of the American Yale University
Why is TDZ Turn so triggered? Well, because they helped to build the Russian nuclear arsenal. Russian ICBM and SLBM production is concentrated in Roskosmos megaholding or more specifically in its two sub-holdings:
JSC Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant (Krasmash) is the key manufacturer of missiles within the JSC Makeyev Design Bureau Structure. Basically it is *the* bottleneck in Russian liquid propellant ballistic missiles production, such as the SLBM Sineva or ICBM Sarmat
Russian administrative culture is anniversary-centric. Ridiculously obsessed with all kinds of anniversaries. Let's open a video on the👏84th👏anniversary👏of👏 the👏Krasmash👏broadcasted on a regional TV channel "Yenisey" in 2016.
On 3:00 you see this
This is a VLC 4000 ATC + C1 vertical lathe produced (who could've thought?) by the TDZ Turn company. Check out their brochure google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j…
How could a Russian nuclear weapons delivery systems producing plant acquire a Czech machine? Trough the KR Prom (КР Пром) proxy company apparently. It looks like TDZ Turn deleted information about this partnership from their website by now. But I screenshoted it on June 27, 2022
Let's formulate our research hypothesis. It looks like the Russian KR Prom company acted as a proxy for TDZ Turn. Technological import for the Russian ICMB/SLBM producing plant seems to have been organised in the following way
TDZ Turn -> KR Prom -> Krasmash
Now let's check it
Let's check the KR Prom -> Krasmash connection first
Fortunately, we have a documental evidence. It is a protocol of the Krasmash procurement commission on purchase of spare parts for the metal-working machines from the KR Prom. January 29, 2018
Now let's check customs data to establish the TDZ Turn -> KR Prom connection
Voila, we see shipments of carousel lathe machining centres, CNC lathes, components for fixing the metal-cutting instruments. Starting in 2013 and finishing in 2019. Well after the annexation of Crimea
Interestingly enough, on June 27, 2022 when I did screenshoting, TDZ Turn openly recognised that main consumers of its machine tools are in Middle Europe and in Russia
In Russia = in Russian military industry. It consumes almost all of the industrial equipment in the country
According to Sergey Chemezov, CEO of the largest Russian defence megaholding Rostec, 84% of machine tools in Russia are consumed by the military industry. There are few other large consumers in Russia
Russian industrial equipment import almost fully goes for the military needs
This short article published in 2017 on a seemingly crappy website became a starting point for this research. NB: seemingly crappy websites may hide tons of valuable & uncensored data.
We won't stop here ofc, we'll go all the way down the rabbit hole
Actually I may have been unfair to Russian KR Prom calling it simply a TDZ Turn proxy. They're better than that
There is a major "domestic" Russian producer of machine tools ГРС Урал. Let's look up its ownership structure:
49% KR Prom (Russia)
51% TOS VARNSDORF (Czechia)
Let's return back to our 👏 Krasmash👏 84th👏 anniversary👏 video👏 .
2:29 The hell is this? This is the Czech-produced TOS Varnsdorf WRD 150 Q floor type horizontal boring machine. It is most probably imported
And yet, Krasmash could've potentially "import substitute" this kind of equipment, switching to "domestic production". Because Czech TOS Varnsdorf localised its production on ГРС Урал. So these Czech machines count as Russian for legal and statistics purposes
This raises some interesting questions. Wasn't Bloomberg too optimistic when it assessed Russian import dependency in machine tools at 70%? What do we even mean by Russian machine tools production? Does Russia even have it?
I'll guess we'll find out next time. The end of🧵
PS I think it's time to start giving cultural references to where I am taking my meme templates, etc. from
I think this guy from a Soviet cartoon "Caliph Stork" would perfectly represent TDZ Turn company and its values. Consider using him as your mascot
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.