Russia and China are too similar in too many important respects. They share too many chokepoints (though to a different degree). They're kinda the same
If Russia was looking for alternatives to Western Europe, it would look at Japan - the old industrial power. If Japan was politically problematic (as it is), it would look at Taiwan and South Korea, new industrial powers on the very advanced stages of their learning process
And that is exactly what has been going on in the last decade, especially after 2014
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The USSR was never "self-sufficient". The initial Stalinist industrialisation was planned and managed by Americans, and based on the import of American + to the lesser extent German equipment.
1920-1930s - US + Germany
WIth the start of the Cold War, America semi-excluded itself from the Soviet market. So it was monopolised by the Western Europe. E.g. in the 1970s Western Europe counted for like 90% of Soviet imports, Western Germany alone counting for 45%
On Twitter, you see not dumb people falling into the Grilling Trap
There are two problems with grilling
1. It gives you cheap dopamine -> very addictive
2. It destroys your brain
In this regard Grilling Trap is just a particular case of the Opposition Trap🧵
Grilling is a social game taking place in the argumentative space. Now the thing about the argumentative space is that it is not identical to the real space. A true zealot of course, believes that his own argumentative space is (more or less) identical to the real space
It's not
There is always a gap between what makes a good argument and what makes a good decision. It may be wider or narrower, depending on circumstances, but it always exists
Making a decision =/= justifying a decision
First is optimised for the real space, second for the argumentative
Soviet war machine was not created autarkically. It was built by the American businesses through the 1920 - early 1930s. Detroit-based Albert Kahn Associates company was a key organiser of the Soviet military industrial buildup
The thing about Soviet military buildup is not that they imported stuff. That's pretty obvious. The thing is that they outsourced the planning. When we are discussing the Stalinist planned economy, we should keep in mind that the planning was done in the US
Albert Kahn Associates was the most important *planner* of Soviet industrialisation. They were not alone though. It was conducted by the joint efforts of the US industrialists
"On the way to automobilize the USSR": Henry Ford signing a contract to built a GAZ automative plant
Whereas the Wagner's shell hunger is real, ascribing it to the ill intentions of bureaucracy may be somewhat simplistic. It reflects the peculiar structure and the peculiar history of the Russian military manufacturing base
(not a 🧵)
What you should know of the Russian military industry:
1. After 1991 the output collapsed, often by few orders of magnitude 2. In Putin's era it bounced back, but not to the Cold War era levels 3. Both the collapse and the revival affected various types of weaponry unevenly
It would not be *too* much of a simplification to present the demand on the new weaponry in the following way:
Demand = State Defense Order + Exports
Now the thing is that in the 1990s the State Order was usually non-existent. If it was existent, it was often not paid for
The managed system more often than not appears as a black box to its upper management. It is not transparent. I do not quite understand how it works. All I have are the output signals of the very uneven quality. And that is all I can base my judgement and my decisions upon🧵
This explains much of the perceived "irrationality" of top decision makers:
a) The system isn't transparent. It produces signals of uneven quality
b) Choose the presumably higher quality signals *you are able to process*
c) Base your decisions upon them
Hence "irrationality"
Reality is incomprehensible in all of its complexity (and we tend to very much exaggerate how well we do comprehend it). It is covered by the fog of war. And perhaps nothing else illustrates it so vividly as, well, the war
Medvedev's diatribes make sense if we consider that from Putin's standpoint the real threat must be coming from those already in power, rather than from the cartoonish & powerless opposition. And among those already in power, his own courtiers are by far the most dangerous
Like where else the threat may be coming from? From nowhere. People can never beat the army
1. Street protests? Well, they can't beat the army 2. Rebels (e.g. Caucasus). Same story. They can't beat the army 3. Regional barons. Same story, unless they have their own armies
4. Army itself. YES! Absolutely, yes. And that is a major reason for the Russian military setbacks. The army in Russia is not optimised for winning a foreign war. It is optimised for presenting as little threat to the regime as possible. At cost of the fighting power, of course