The media and the academia are obsessed with the unimportant. Once you interiorise this principle, their obsession with "Putin's philosopher" Dugin becomes almost forgivable
There's no philosopher at the Putin's court
The king doesn't need a philosopher
He needs a jester🧵
As I said, obsession with the (supposed) "philosopher behind the Putin's plan" is almost forgivable, considering that the dominant Western discourse in Russia is mostly a projection of Western intellectuals. They project their fears, of course. But also their hopes and dreams
Being the King's Philosopher, a brain behind the tyrant, has been a wet dream of intellectuals at least since the days of Plato. It almost always ended the same. After all these millennia, intellectuals could have learned a basic truth:
The King is in no need of a "philosopher"
A Western intellectual may know he will never ever be a grey cardinal. But the idea that somewhere in the world, in the far-off, snow-covered Hyperborea there lives a sage guiding a mighty king is too beautiful to be just made up
Dugin is the proof that verbalism matters
The King's Philosopher is a made up figure. Countless generations of intellectuals tried to play this role only to find out that the king is in no need of a philosopher
What the King needs is a jester. And this is why every royal court worthy of this name had one
Trying to guess what is on Putin's mind based on the (non-existent) philosopher figure is absolutely futile. Unless you have a very solid evidence of the contrary, assume the king doesn't employ any
And yet, based on what we know about kings he very likely employs a jester
If the modern courts do not have a salaried position of a jester, that doesn't mean they don't employ any. It's just that modern jesters go under a different name
In this case, the favourite royal jester is usually referred to as a journalist
Andrey Kolesnikov is the longest serving journalist of the Kremlin pool: an accredited group of journalists allowed to visit events with the First One. No journalist ever accompanied him in so many trips and spent so much time with the First One as Kolesnikov did
While Kolesnikov rejects the title of "Putin's favourite journalist" as too immodest, he is widely known as such. He doesn't actually deny the special relations with the First One:
"It is a great happiness for a journalist. One should pray to keep such a relationship"
An editor of the Kommersant, a major business-oriented media (where Kolesnikov worked) described his role in the following way:
"Andrey alone counts for 20% of our value. Tomorrow he leaves and Kommersant loses 20% of its price"
For more than two decades of his work with Putin, Kolesnikov published countless articles, interviews and a few books about the First one
You know what is interesting about Kolesnikov's writings? The tone. A very dry, sarcastic description of everyone, including the Big Boss
The sarcasm is subtle, so it may be lost in translation. But it is absolutely obvious in the original. It was so obvious that the Russian encyclopedia of internet folklore had a special page with Kolesnikov's quotes on Putin, etc.
Most plausible explanation: Putin enjoys it
Example:
A comment on the Putin's address to the military/paramilitary who were suppressing the Wagner mutiny
Kolesnikov's role is the common knowledge in the Russophone space. When I mentioned "Putin's favourite jester" (without specifying the name), the Russophone commenters immediately identified it
Now what does this story tell us about the reality we live in?
First. The common and obvious knowledge does not transcend through the linguistic barriers
What constitutes the obvious for the speakers of Russian or Mandarin rarely ever diffuses into the Anglophone space
The wall is largely impenetrable
Second. Putin is most probably sane. I don't say he is good, or that he is "rational". I just say that as long as he keeps a jester and tolerates his teasing he most probably has not gone mad yet
And vice versa, removing a jester would be a good marker of him getting insane
Third. The jester was selected based on the ruler liking his jokes. Therefore, the character of the jokes reflects the character of a ruler
Based on Kolesnikov's jokes, Putin seems to be the most naturally pessimistic person to have ruled Russia in its verifiable history
The end
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1. Kornilov putsch fails 2. Purges against its real or imaginary supporters follow 3. Two months later the Bolsheviks come to power
Focusing on whether the putsch was orchestrated by the government (it probably was) is missing the point. Staged or not, its consequences are real
There is often an implicit assumption that the "serious" ventures have serious consequences, while the "non-serious" (stage, orchestrated, just a show) ones don't
This assumption is completely and fundamentally wrong. It is usually the other way around
As a general rule, anything serious and long lasting can commence only non-seriously
Consequently, what had been started seriously will most probably lead nowhere
Prigozhin's mutiny looks shady. And that is fine. Many coup stories sound shady even in retrospective, as they often included some elements of 4D chess by the political leadership. Still, their consequences were real.
So let's talk of the consequnces🧵
Raising a mutiny in the south, far off from the capital may sound like a dumb plan. Unless this was not a plan at all. My hypothesis: it looks like a false start
23 June - Wagner mutiny
24-25 June - "Scarlet Sails" in St Petersburg
Both Putin and Medvedev were expected to come
The ruling gang is first and foremost a St Petersburg gang. The core of the Russian leadership including Putin, Medvedev and many others including Prigozhin were originally an extensive crony network from St Petersburg. With Putin's succession in 2000 they became the regime
The mutiny is real. It is also unlikely to succeed. Most probable outcome is:
1. The mutiny fails 2. The regime stands (for a few months) 3. Upon its suppression, regime becomes increasingly dysfunctional -> falls
In other words, Kornilov putsch🧵
Let's start with the "real" part. A sizeable force of Wagner troops have left their positions in East Ukraine and entered the Russian region of Rostov Oblast. This is a real mutiny
It is also likely to fail. Not because there is few of them, but rather because they are far away
Russia is a hypercentralised country. Control over Moscow is the only thing that matters. And it is unlikely these fellows will be able to reach it, let alone occupy it
"Only those deserve to be called Communists who understand that it is impossible to build or implement socialism without learning from the [corporate] trust founders"
(Vladimir Lenin. On the Left-Wing Childishness. May 1918)
"For socialism is not a figment of the imagination, but the implementation and application of what had been created by the [corporate] trusts by the proletarian vanguard, which has seized power"
"We, the party of the proletariat, have no other way of acquiring the ability to organise large-scale production ... except by acquiring it from the first-class capitalist experts"
IF there are unprecedentedly wide sanctions imposed on Russia
BUT Russia is able to increase its production of cruise missiles
THEN the implementation and especially targeting of sanctions are wrong. Like actually, wrong
Military production base is not targeted
@McFaul you are doing it wrong. Your focus is wrong. You are not alone in doing it wrong, but it does not make your work any less wrong
To do it in a correct way, you must be targeting the production base. Not only the components, but the production processes themselves. Disincentivizing the U.S. allies-based companies to supply the metal-cutting, especially machining equipment would be a good start