Kamil Galeev Profile picture
Sep 3 8 tweets 2 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
1. Time exists

2. Things change with time

3. In 2014, Russia could reasonably expect a fairly high level of acceptance

4. Which was not the case in 2022

5. This invasion was planned based upon the picture of how it *used* to be

6. Which became completely outdated by 2022
7. As time exists, you should not presume that the opportunities you have now will last forever

8. They probably won’t

9. In 2014-2015, Russia had a high chance to launch a successful full scale invasion

10. But it did not

11. I think this was due to the crash in oil prices Image
12. By the time Russia decided to invade (I have a reason to believe it was 2019) things changed

13. The popular sentiments changed

14. On the Ukrainian held territory, you could hardly find *young* supporters of Russia

15. The Russian fanbase had been reduced to the elderly Image
16. This included that part of Donbas that remained in the Ukrainian hands

17. Russians approaching -> exodus of the young people of both sexes

18. While Russia still had and has a lot of popular support, it has little support among the non senile part of the population
19. I think that the permanent catastrophe of Donbas played a role in this change of attitude

21. Russia could have made the DPR/LPR a showcase of prosperity demonstrating the benefits of living under the Russian rule

22. It chose not to

23. DPR/LPR became a negative showcase
To summarise:

A. Opportunities don’t last forever. You may be simultaneously:

- Correctly estimating the likelihood of your success

- Exaggerating how long will the window of opportunities last

Happens all the time. I think this is the case with Putin’s invasion. Chance gone
B. Temporary and accidental divisions crystallise. While the specific borderline between the Russian and the Ukrainian held Donbas was largely accidental, with time these populations developed very different loyalties

Everything permanent used to be temporary
C. Identity is a choice

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More from @kamilkazani

Aug 24
François Guizot defined feudalism as perhaps the only form of tyranny that will be never accepted by the ruled. The theocratic despotism, the monarchic despotism can be genuinely loved and voluntarily accepted by their subjects. In contrast, the feudal despotism is always hated
Image
What makes the difference is that a monarch/theocrat does NOT act on his own behalf. To the contrary, he represents something larger, superior to himself. It may be God. It may be an idea. Anyway, he is only a representative of something bigger, making his rule more acceptable Image
Consider Stalin. He does NOT act on his own behalf. He is merely a representative of something bigger. It's not all about Stalin. It's not all focused on Stalin. There is a divine, super-human institution of which Stalin is only a temporary executive

That's how he borrows power Image
Read 11 tweets
Aug 23
Prigozhin was a junior member of the St Petersburg gang. A vassal of Putin's vassal. Still, a rightful member of the gang that constitutes the core of the ruling elite. Consequently, his death will make an impression of the regime killing its previously untouchable core members
If the regime has indeed killed one of its core members, then the St Petersburg gang is probably not as united as it seemed to be. The death of Prigozhin reflects the depth of divisions in the narrow circle of upper elite.

This is the impression it makes on the outsiders
Even worse, this raises a question of how secure the other members of the gang should feel. In particular, how much of their previous untouchability will remain
Read 7 tweets
Aug 16
Daily reminder

1. Complex weapons such as the WMD/delivery systems include precise parts

2. Production of precise parts relies on subtractive processes

3. Which had overwhelmingly relied on the manual control even in 1991

4. But have been radically computerized since then
5. As the production of precise parts switched from the manual to computer control, the labor capable of producing precise parts (-> weaponry) manually was lost

6. The tactic knowledge has been lost, too

7. Which cements transition and makes it absolutely and 100% irreversible
8. No military industrial complex in the world can produce precise parts at a consistent quality other than based on the computer control

9. That includes every military industry including Russia, China, N. Korea, Iran

10. Iran may be the only one who even tries to obfuscate it
Read 20 tweets
Jul 23
Starting from today, I will be publishing selected threads in my newsletter. I will start with three
Why Russia will lose this war?

kamilkazani.substack.com/p/why-russia-w…
Kadyrov Kingdom: What you should know about Chechnya?

(this one is more on historical factors that shaped Chechnya as it is, starting with the Columbian exchange)

kamilkazani.substack.com/p/kadyrov-king…
Read 4 tweets
Jul 16
This is a very common mistake

“They” who “know better” do not exist as a coherent group. There’s no “them”

If I were to name the most underrated force in the world, I would choose the information asymmetry. We systematically and semis-consciously underestimate how great it is https://t.co/bRt4mSEHxH
Image
Consequently, the line of argumentation:

“They can’t do something so obviously stupid/irrational”

Is usually wrong. They absolutely can. Why?

Because it is NOT obvious. You mistakenly think it is obvious because you ignore the elephant in the room - the information asymmetry Image
Which is more often than not a particular case of the worldview asymmetry and the asymmetry of conceptual frameworks. An even bigger elephant in the room

But that is for another day Image
Read 11 tweets
Jul 15
Soviet military doctrine was shaped by the WWII experience

Russian military doctrine was shaped by the Gulf War impression

The former felt the need to build a strong land army. The latter felt no need to. Very large missile forces + small expeditionary corps was deemed enough
The Russian military doctrine was built upon assumption that a small expeditionary corps will be enough to crush any rival on the post-Soviet space. Meanwhile, large missile forces will disincentivize external players from interfering

Strategic missiles were heavily prioritised
As a result, the Russian army was heavily lopsided. Very strong missiles, very weak land army. The former would compensate for the weakness of the latter

(Russian army, 1997 - till now. Unknown author) Image
Read 4 tweets

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