1. Russia makes more weaponry than its enemies. If nothing is done about its military production, Russia will win this war
2. Establishing the new political rule:
Always bet against the US allies
3. With the absolutely destructive effect on the US policy and standing in Asia
4. The Russian victory in Ukraine will radically devalue the worth of the US alliance in the eyes of the world
5. Yes, America lost asymmetric wars before. But this is the first time, it will be defeated in the symmetric warfare
6. Its standing will be adjusted accordingly
7. Yes, never bet against the US rule will stand for a while (don't declare the war, don't attack the US soil)
8. But now it will be supplemented with always bet against the US allies
9. Promises, guarantees and commitments are not worth much. America is weak -> backs off easily
10. The world is guided not so much by the "rational choice" (abstraction), as by impressions (real thing)
11. Defeats in the asymmetric warfare may have raised a suspicion of weakness
12. But the belief in the US ability to win a symmetric war was never undermined
Now it will be
13. In the post Ukraine war reality, the world will be governed by the new impression:
The US is withdrawing from the symmetric wars, because it cannot win them
13. And the US commitments are not worth much, because the US is simply incapable of fulfilling them
14. Asian countries have every reason to expect the Ukraine scenario in the Pacific:
US give promises they cannot fulfil -> You stand against the invader -> Get steamrolled -> Be left to your fate among ashes and ruins
Why not accept your fate now, skipping ashes & ruins part?
15. Should Ukraine lose, I expect "standing up against China" becoming a politically indefensible position in Taiwan
16. The preventive lowkey surrender will look as the only reasonable & responsible choice
17. With a good degree of certainty, you may consider Taiwan as gone
18. Yes, there are strong reasons for the US to avoid a potential escalation with Russia
19. But most of these reasons apply to the escalation with China, perhaps even to a greater degree
20. Therefore, we can expect the US to be *less* decisive about China than about Russia
21. A defeat in Ukraine will vastly undermine the US political standing in Asia
22. Its allies will be under impression that the US is either uncommitted or incapable to win. Probably, both
23. While China is certainly very committed to win
Only a fool will stand on its way
24. Now an interesting thing is that the US have every chance to win. That is because the supply chain for precision metalworking equipment is controlled by its allies
25. And metalworking is how you make weaponry. No, it's not all about microchips. Production of complex weaponry such as an intercontinental ballistic missile is primarily constrained by the metalworking capacity. And metalworking capacity is mostly precision machining capacity
26. In late 20th c. machining has very quickly went from the manual to computer control. As a result, it became very much more productive. At the same time, machining equipment, parts and consumables became increasingly more difficult to produce
That's how the air defence missiles has changed (Kalinin Plant, Almaz Antey)
Before: manually operated, steel instruments, often domestically produced
Now: computer controlled, carbide instruments, nearly 100% Western import
27. This had a double effect on catching development powers:
a) Allowed them to produce precise parts (-> weaponry) cheaper and more consistently than before
b) Made them almost totally reliant upon the Western import to produce weaponry
(NITI Snegireva)
28. And China is a catching development power itself. It cannot substitute for the Western import, and won't be able for a while. It may produce more lasers than anyone. But when you want a precision laser cutter, you are not gonna buy Chinese
You gonna buy Trumpf (Germany)
29. Western machine tool producers may not be technically breaking sanctions. That is because sanctions are designed not to work. Trumpf for example, continued supporting its laser cutting equipment in Russia well into this war and is almost certainly continuing it now
30. Once again, it's not about Western producers "breaking sanctions". It is about Russian capacity for metalworking (= weaponry production) being almost fully based upon the equipment imported from the US allies between 2003-2023
If you want to make an S300 erector...
... You will need a Tos Varnsdorf (Czechia) machine
Production of metalworking equipment has been outsourced to the West, long, long before this war started
31. How can Russia even continue producing complex weaponry if we don't see the Russian machinery around? Where is Russian machinery?
People with above room temperature IQ have been asking this question for long, long time
32. And if your ruling class has not been asking this question, that is not because it is "dumb", but because it consists of low curiosity people
They are not really low in intelligence. They are just low in curiosity
33. People on top spend half of their life forcing their way to the top and the second half guarding their position
You spend your youth climbing the ladder, and maturity kicking the ladders away
There is no time for curiosity or pursuing any sort of deep personal interest
34. Our social hierarchies select for high ambition low curiosity people. Productive, socially intelligent, people on the top tend to be shockingly narrow minded
They can't think out of the box, because they don't have out of the box knowledge. They never had time to acquire it
35. A life spent in acquiring unobvious knowledge is the life not spent in forcing your way to the top of the hierarchy. And vice versa, a life spent acquiring the knowledge that allows you to even ask the right questions will not lead you to the top of the hierarchy
The end
I will post revised and edited versions in my substack and patreon. Generally speaking, what I post here is more of notes than texts in their own rights
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In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.
Literacy rates in European Russia, 1897. Obviously, the data is imperfect. Still, it represents one crucial pattern for understanding the late Russian Empire. That is the wide gap in human capital between the core of empire and its Western borderland.
The most literate regions of Empire are its Lutheran provinces, including Finland, Estonia & Latvia
Then goes, roughly speaking, Poland-Lithuania
Russia proper has only two clusters of high literacy: Moscow & St Petersburg. Surrounded by the vast ocean of illiterate peasantry
This map shows how thin was the civilisation of Russia proper comparatively speaking. We tend to imagine old Russia, as the world of nobility, palaces, balls, and duels. And that is not wrong, because this world really existed, and produced some great works of art and literature