Overall, you can expect tech moguls to have much, much higher level of reasoning abilities compared to the political/administrative class. But this comes at a cost. Their capacities for understanding the Other (masses count as the “Other”) are much poorer.
E.g. Putin is much, much less of an outlier in terms of intelligence compared to Thiel. He is much more average. At the same time, I am positively convinced that Putin understands the masses and works with masses much better.
Putin understands: when you go fishing you think of what the fish likes, not what you like. You may prefer blueberries, but fish likes worms. So you take worms, not the blueberries.
I am not sure Thiel (or others) understand that
E.g. Putin is highly critical of Lenin and the early Bolsheviks (who destroyed the unity of Russia), while holding much more positive view of Stalin (who restored it). But Lenin’s cult is so deeply woven into the culture (esp. for the elderly) that Putin chooses not to fight it
Time after time, at nearly every big meeting he makes negative remarks about Lenin (for federalizing and autonomizing Russia). At the same time, he does nothing to fight his cult. Actually, in Donbass Russian authorities restore Lenin’s monuments, rename streets after Lenin, etc
So, Putin strongly dislikes Lenin and his legacy. But the Russian state does nothing to fight his cult. It actually expands and buttresses it whenever convenient. Why? Because it goes well for the population. For them, Lenin is just an element of generic patriotism & nostalgia
To put it simply, Putin sees Lenin as “bad”, destructive and anti-patriotic. But Putin’s support base, the elderly, are used to see him as “good”, constructive and patriotic. And they are not going to change their opinion. They will hold their beliefs & prejudices till death.
So, if Putin started “Lenin bad” campaign (based on what he actually thinks), the only thing he would achieve is confusing and disorienting his own supporters. That’s why he is not doing that.
He doesn’t fight Lenin’s cult. He is actually doing the opposite. In his conquest in Ukraine, he is harnessing and exploiting said cult, rallying the people around it, appealing to the Lenin’s name and legitimacy. Why? Because it works.
For Putin, Stalin > Lenin
But for internal propaganda purposes, Lenin works better. He is much less divisive, more unobjectionable. There are relatively few genuine haters.
Putin is such a hater. But, when he goes fishing, he thinks of what the fish likes. So Lenin it is.
Thinking of what you like vs Thinking of what the fish likes
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.