I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
3. In this oligarchic regime, power was distributed. Different people were in charge of different tasks, and different branches of government. Stalin was basically the head of the HR office. He was responsible for cadres, and for the appointments. He was not in charge of economy and had nothing to with the economic policies of the era.
4. Through the 1920s, Soviet economy was managed by totally different people (whom Stalin would later label as “rightists”). That includes Rykov, the chairman of the Soviet government, who basically inherited Lenin’s formal position and most literally sat in his chair. On the photo, he sits to the right of Stalin.
5. These were the people who managed Soviet economic policies and who prepared the plans of industrialisation, later executed by Stalin. This is an important point and I want to stress it. Although the industrialisation happened under the Stalin’s rule, it was not planned by him. It was planned through the earlier, oligarchic phase, and by different people.
6. The “rightist” oligarchs who managed the Soviet economy through the 1920s, prepared plans of an ambitious industrialisation based on the direct import from the Western world. They prepared detailed plans that would be later executed, and taken credit for, by Stalin.
7. Basically, the plan was: pay 100 trillion bazillion dollars to the Americans, so that they build us heavy industry. The problem, however, was that the USSR did not have this 100 trillion bazillion. The plan of an ambitious industrialisation was limited by the lack of money.
8. Where will you take the money? From the peasantry, of course. Milk your own population and especially the countryfolk, and extract the funds you need for the industrialisation. Once again, I want to stress that this idea was not an invention of Stalin. By the late 1920s, it was almost a consensus of everyone in the party leadership, included the “rightist” grandees that guided its economic policies.
9. Almost everyone high above agreed with this plan to some extent. The opposite idea - let the market run free, the laissez faire policies to continue, and everyone enrich to the best of their abilities - had almost no supporters among the ruling circle. Part of the reason being: the knew they would not be able to do a forced industrialisation this way.
10. Therefore, the ruling circle inclined to the idea of milking the peasantry to extract the necessary resources. Again, it is not that Stalin wanted this, and others opposed. It is that everyone agreed with this, more or less. What they disagreed on was the specifics of this plan. What exactly we do, how, to what extent.
11. The “rightists” (= economic planners) wanted a balanced, measured, approach. Basically, we rob the peasantry a bit, in a moderate way. Part of the reason being: if we take too much, they would reduce production. What you get will be the chaos and mass starvation as it happened in the Civil War.
12. You take everything → Peasants stop sowing → Famine
So, you need to milk them in measure. That was the “rightist” perspective.
17. What differed Stalin from anyone, is that starting from 1928 (but not earlier) he comes with the plan of an ultra-radical robbery, far exceeding what any other leader suggested. What different him from others was not the direction of policy (they all had the same direction) but intensity and scale.
18. With this agenda, he takes the reigns of the economic policy from the former team of economic planners. Again, he does not discard their specific plans of industrial projects. He would steal them, basically, and execute them himself.
19. Of course, the ultra-radical robbery dicincentivized peasants from sowing. Exacerbated by the destruction of the most productive farmers, this led to the overall decrease in production, famine, and disorganisation of the agriculture. Just as the “rightists” predicted.
20. Economically speaking, Stalin’s involvement - and his personal management of economy - did not make much sense. He did not really “improve” the rightists’ policies . To the contrary, the higher level of extraction was compensated by the much higher level of mismanagement, damage, and pure loss. In purely economic terms, Stalin’s involvement made things worse, just worse.
21. Politically speaking, Stalin’s involvement was an absolute success. As of 1928, he was just one a few party leaders. Nobody knew him, really. The great majority of population never heard his name. Starting from 1930s onward, he was the God Emperor, the living deity with no equals and no companions.
22. Most importantly, it was through this personal involvement, that Stalin has fully submitted the state machine to his will. In 1928, his own colleagues in Politburo could disagree with him, argue with him and at times even vote against him. As late as in 1928, he at times struggled to get the vote he wanted.
23. Few years later, these very people addressed him simply as “master”. Total political victory
24. Now what I am saying is that politics lie in a completely different dimension from what we would normally see as “economy” or “economic rationality”. Economy is about efficiency, productivity, spreadsheets and other boring stuff no one cares about.
25. Politics is all about one’s personal power over other people. Not institutional. Personal.
26. As a politician, you don’t always have to optimise for the economic efficiency. Or technological efficiency. Or industrial efficiency. Or any efficiency whatsoever.
27. In fact, at times you may need sacrifice all of the described above, and it will be a smart thing to do. Because your personal power over the human beings will increase as a result.
28. Why does it? Let’s look. Before 1928, Stalin was restricted by many things, including the power of boring economic planners (“rightists”). This you cannot do. That you cannot do. No, we don’t do that, because it would be suboptimal. He has to listen to them.
31. If I were to formulate a lesson of this story, I would say the following. Complex systems may be more «efficient», in a sense that they produce better result at a lower cost. And yet, they may be suboptimal politically, in that they do not allow for the free execution of power.
31. If I were to formulate a lesson of this story, I would say the following. Complex systems may be more «efficient», in a sense that they produce better result at a lower cost. And yet, they may be suboptimal politically, in that they do not allow for the free execution of power.
31. If I were to formulate a lesson of this story, I would say the following. Complex systems may be more «efficient», in a sense that they produce better result at a lower cost. And yet, they may be suboptimal politically, in that they do not allow for the free execution of power.
32. Contrary to what a vulgar Marxist may say, you don’t always have to accommodate your style of leadership to the material, economic or other circumstances. In many cases, it is perfectly possible to accommodate reality, including the industrial, economic and well, physical landscape to your style of leadership.
Yes, and that is super duper quadruper important to understand
Koreans are poor (don't have an empire) and, therefore, must do productive work to earn their living. So, if the Americans want to learn how to do anything productive they must learn it from Koreans etc
There is this stupid idea that the ultra high level of life and consumption in the United States has something to do with their productivity. That is of course a complete sham. An average American doesn't do anything useful or important to justify (or earn!) his kingly lifestyle
The kingly lifestyle of an average American is not based on his "productivity" (what a BS, lol) but on the global empire Americans are holding currently. Part of the imperial dynamics being, all the actually useful work, all the material production is getting outsourced abroad
Reading Tess of the d'Urbervilles. Set in southwest England, somewhere in the late 1800s. And the first thing you need to know is that Tess is bilingual. He speaks a local dialect she learnt at home, and the standard English she picked at school from a London-trained teacher
So, basically, "normal" language doesn't come out of nowhere. Under the normal conditions, people on the ground speak all the incomprehensible patois, wildly different from each other
"Regular", "correct" English is the creation of state
So, basically, the state chooses a standard (usually, based on one of the dialects), cleanses it a bit, and then shoves down everyone's throats via the standardized education
Purely artificial construct, of a super mega state that really appeared only by the late 1800s
There's a subtle point here that 99,999% of Western commentariat is missing. Like, totally blind to. And that point is:
Building a huuuuuuuuuuge dam (or steel plant, or whatever) has been EVERYONE's plan of development. Like absolutely every developing country, no exceptions
Almost everyone who tried to develop did it in a USSR-ish way, via prestige projects. Build a dam. A steel plant. A huge plant. And then an even bigger one
And then you run out of money, and it all goes bust and all you have is postapocalyptic ruins for the kids to play in
If China did not go bust, in a way like almost every development project from the USSR to South Asia did, that probably means that you guys are wrong about China. Like totally wrong
What you describe is not China but the USSR, and its copies & emulations elsewhere
What I am saying is that "capitalist reforms" are a buzzword devoid of any actual meaning, and a buzzword that obfuscated rather than explains. Specifically, it is fusing radically different policies taken under the radically different circumstances (and timing!) into one - purely for ideological purposes
It can be argued, for example, that starting from the 1980s, China has undertaken massive socialist reforms, specifically in infrastructure, and in basic (mother) industries, such as steel, petrochemical and chemical and, of course, power
The primary weakness of this argument is that being true, historically speaking, it is just false in the context of American politics where the “communism” label has been so over-used (and misapplied) that it lost all of its former power:
“We want X”
“No, that is communism”
“We want communism”
Basically, when you use a label like “communism” as a deus ex machina winning you every argument, you simultaneously re-define its meaning. And when you use it to beat off every popular socio economic demand (e.g. universal healthcare), you re-define communism as a synthesis of all the popular socio economic demands
Historical communism = forced industrial development in a poor, predominantly agrarian country, funded through expropriation of the peasantry
(With the most disastrous economic and humanitarian consequences)
Many are trying to explain his success with some accidental factors such as his “personal charisma”, Cuomo's weakness etc
Still, I think there may be some fundamental factors here. A longue durée shift, and a very profound one
1. Public outrage does not work anymore
If you look at Zohran, he is calm, constructive, and rarely raises his voice. I think one thing that Mamdani - but almost no one else in the American political space is getting - is that the public is getting tired of the outrage
Outrage, anger, righteous indignation have all been the primary drivers of American politics for quite a while
For a while, this tactics worked
Indeed, when everyone around is polite, and soft (and insincere), freaking out was a smart thing to do. It could help you get noticed