Kamil Galeev Profile picture
Apr 5 30 tweets 6 min read Read on X
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think aboutImage
But let’s make a crash intro first

1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
3. In this oligarchic regime, power was distributed. Different people were in charge of different tasks, and different branches of government. Stalin was basically the head of the HR office. He was responsible for cadres, and for the appointments. He was not in charge of economy and had nothing to with the economic policies of the era.
4. Through the 1920s, Soviet economy was managed by totally different people (whom Stalin would later label as “rightists”). That includes Rykov, the chairman of the Soviet government, who basically inherited Lenin’s formal position and most literally sat in his chair. On the photo, he sits to the right of Stalin.
5. These were the people who managed Soviet economic policies and who prepared the plans of industrialisation, later executed by Stalin. This is an important point and I want to stress it. Although the industrialisation happened under the Stalin’s rule, it was not planned by him. It was planned through the earlier, oligarchic phase, and by different people.
6. The “rightist” oligarchs who managed the Soviet economy through the 1920s, prepared plans of an ambitious industrialisation based on the direct import from the Western world. They prepared detailed plans that would be later executed, and taken credit for, by Stalin.
7. Basically, the plan was: pay 100 trillion bazillion dollars to the Americans, so that they build us heavy industry. The problem, however, was that the USSR did not have this 100 trillion bazillion. The plan of an ambitious industrialisation was limited by the lack of money.
8. Where will you take the money? From the peasantry, of course. Milk your own population and especially the countryfolk, and extract the funds you need for the industrialisation. Once again, I want to stress that this idea was not an invention of Stalin. By the late 1920s, it was almost a consensus of everyone in the party leadership, included the “rightist” grandees that guided its economic policies.
9. Almost everyone high above agreed with this plan to some extent. The opposite idea - let the market run free, the laissez faire policies to continue, and everyone enrich to the best of their abilities - had almost no supporters among the ruling circle. Part of the reason being: the knew they would not be able to do a forced industrialisation this way.
10. Therefore, the ruling circle inclined to the idea of milking the peasantry to extract the necessary resources. Again, it is not that Stalin wanted this, and others opposed. It is that everyone agreed with this, more or less. What they disagreed on was the specifics of this plan. What exactly we do, how, to what extent.
11. The “rightists” (= economic planners) wanted a balanced, measured, approach. Basically, we rob the peasantry a bit, in a moderate way. Part of the reason being: if we take too much, they would reduce production. What you get will be the chaos and mass starvation as it happened in the Civil War.
12. You take everything → Peasants stop sowing → Famine

So, you need to milk them in measure. That was the “rightist” perspective.
17. What differed Stalin from anyone, is that starting from 1928 (but not earlier) he comes with the plan of an ultra-radical robbery, far exceeding what any other leader suggested. What different him from others was not the direction of policy (they all had the same direction) but intensity and scale.
18. With this agenda, he takes the reigns of the economic policy from the former team of economic planners. Again, he does not discard their specific plans of industrial projects. He would steal them, basically, and execute them himself.
19. Of course, the ultra-radical robbery dicincentivized peasants from sowing. Exacerbated by the destruction of the most productive farmers, this led to the overall decrease in production, famine, and disorganisation of the agriculture. Just as the “rightists” predicted.
20. Economically speaking, Stalin’s involvement - and his personal management of economy - did not make much sense. He did not really “improve” the rightists’ policies . To the contrary, the higher level of extraction was compensated by the much higher level of mismanagement, damage, and pure loss. In purely economic terms, Stalin’s involvement made things worse, just worse.
21. Politically speaking, Stalin’s involvement was an absolute success. As of 1928, he was just one a few party leaders. Nobody knew him, really. The great majority of population never heard his name. Starting from 1930s onward, he was the God Emperor, the living deity with no equals and no companions.
22. Most importantly, it was through this personal involvement, that Stalin has fully submitted the state machine to his will. In 1928, his own colleagues in Politburo could disagree with him, argue with him and at times even vote against him. As late as in 1928, he at times struggled to get the vote he wanted.
23. Few years later, these very people addressed him simply as “master”. Total political victory
24. Now what I am saying is that politics lie in a completely different dimension from what we would normally see as “economy” or “economic rationality”. Economy is about efficiency, productivity, spreadsheets and other boring stuff no one cares about.
25. Politics is all about one’s personal power over other people. Not institutional. Personal.
26. As a politician, you don’t always have to optimise for the economic efficiency. Or technological efficiency. Or industrial efficiency. Or any efficiency whatsoever.
27. In fact, at times you may need sacrifice all of the described above, and it will be a smart thing to do. Because your personal power over the human beings will increase as a result.
28. Why does it? Let’s look. Before 1928, Stalin was restricted by many things, including the power of boring economic planners (“rightists”). This you cannot do. That you cannot do. No, we don’t do that, because it would be suboptimal. He has to listen to them.
31. If I were to formulate a lesson of this story, I would say the following. Complex systems may be more «efficient», in a sense that they produce better result at a lower cost. And yet, they may be suboptimal politically, in that they do not allow for the free execution of power.
31. If I were to formulate a lesson of this story, I would say the following. Complex systems may be more «efficient», in a sense that they produce better result at a lower cost. And yet, they may be suboptimal politically, in that they do not allow for the free execution of power.
31. If I were to formulate a lesson of this story, I would say the following. Complex systems may be more «efficient», in a sense that they produce better result at a lower cost. And yet, they may be suboptimal politically, in that they do not allow for the free execution of power.
32. Contrary to what a vulgar Marxist may say, you don’t always have to accommodate your style of leadership to the material, economic or other circumstances. In many cases, it is perfectly possible to accommodate reality, including the industrial, economic and well, physical landscape to your style of leadership.

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More from @kamilkazani

Jun 28
Some thoughts on Zohran Mamdani’s victory

Many are trying to explain his success with some accidental factors such as his “personal charisma”, Cuomo's weakness etc

Still, I think there may be some fundamental factors here. A longue durée shift, and a very profound one Image
1. Public outrage does not work anymore

If you look at Zohran, he is calm, constructive, and rarely raises his voice. I think one thing that Mamdani - but almost no one else in the American political space is getting - is that the public is getting tired of the outrage
Outrage, anger, righteous indignation have all been the primary drivers of American politics for quite a while

For a while, this tactics worked

Indeed, when everyone around is polite, and soft (and insincere), freaking out was a smart thing to do. It could help you get noticed
Read 8 tweets
Jun 28
People don’t really understand causal links. We pretend we do (“X results in Y”). But we actually don’t. Most explanations (= descriptions of causal structures) are fake.
Theory: X -> Y

Reality:

There may be no connection between X and Y at all. The cause is just misattributed.

Or, perhaps, X does indeed result in Y. but only under a certain (and unknown!) set of conditions that remains totally and utterly opaque to us. So, X->Y is only a part of the equation

And so on
I like to think of a hypothetical Stone Age farmer who started farming, and it worked amazingly, and his entire community adopted his lifestyle, and many generations followed it and prospered and multiplied, until all suddenly wiped out in a new ice age
Read 6 tweets
Jun 26
Some thoughts on Zohran Mamdani's victory:

1. Normative Islamophobia that used to define the public discourse being the most acceptable form of racial & ethnic bigotry in the West, is receding. It is not so much dying as rather - failing to replicate. It is not that the old people change their views as that the young do not absorb their prejudice any longer.

In fact, I incline to think it has been failing to replicate for a while, it is just that we have not been paying attention
Again, the change of vibe does not happen at once. The Muslim scare may still find (some) audience among the more rigid elderly, who are not going to change their views. But for the youth, it is starting to sound as archaic as the Catholic scare of know nothings

Out of date
2. What is particularly interesting regarding Mamdani's victory, is his support base. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that its core is comprised of the young (and predominantly white) middle classes, with a nearly equal representation of men and women
Read 12 tweets
Jun 21
What does Musk vs Trump affair teach us about the general patterns of human history? Well, first of all it shows that the ancient historians were right. They grasped something about nature of politics that our contemporaries simply can’t.Image
Let me give you an example. The Arab conquest of Spain

According to a popular medieval/early modern interpretation, its primary cause was the lust of Visigoth king Roderic. Aroused by the beautiful daughter of his vassal and ally, count Julian, he took advantage of her Image
Disgruntled, humiliated Julian allied himself with the Arabs and opens them the gates of Spain.

Entire kingdom lost, all because the head of state caused a personal injury to someone important. Image
Read 4 tweets
Jun 19
On the impending war with Iran

One thing you need to understand about wars is that very few engage into the long, protracted warfare on purpose. Almost every war of attrition was planned and designed as a short victorious blitzkrieg

And then everything went wrong
Consider the Russian war in Ukraine. It was not planned as a war. It was not thought of as a war. It was planned as a (swift!) regime change allowing to score a few points in the Russian domestic politics. And then everything went wrong
It would not be an exaggeration to say that planning a short victorious war optimised for the purposes of domestic politics is how you *usually* end up in a deadlock. That is the most common scenario of how it happens, practically speaking
Read 12 tweets
Jun 18
Hard to swallow pill

Global politics are usually framed in terms of kindergarten discourse (“good guys” vs “bad guys”) with an implication that you must provide “good guys” with boundless and unconditional support

BUT

Unconditional support is extremely corrupting, and turns the best of the best into the really nasty guys, and relatively fast
Part of the reason is that neither “bad” nor “good” guys are in fact homogenous, and present a spectrum of opinions and personalities. Which means that all of your designated “good guys” include a fair share of really, really nasty guys, almost by definition.

Purely good movements do not really exist
That is a major reason why limitless, unconditional, unquestioning support causes such a profound corrupting effect upon the very best movement. First, because that movement is not all
that purely good as you imagine (neither movement is),
Read 4 tweets

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