A few thoughts after a long night. First, I think there's a strong case that Iran's reprisal was a strategic error. For months Israel was increasingly isolated, America looked feckless and Iran was projecting power through proxies whilst preserving detente with Arab states. 🧵 Then came last night. It was bad for Iranian deterrence. Iran opted for a big attack rather than a symbolic one, but a big attack that was calibrated not to do much damage. That won't deter Israel; on the contrary, it will make Iran look weak and ineffective.

In our cover package this week I write about how Israel has won the battle but lost the war. It has arguably achieved many of its goals. But it did so in a way that will ultimately leave it more insecure, more divided at home and more isolated abroad. 🧵 economist.com/briefing/2024/… Israel has done real damage to Hamas. Short of men and materiel, it will be years before the group can again pose a serious threat. It is also unlikely to rule Gaza, where its popularity has plummeted: many Gazans blame Hamas for dragging them into a war it could not hope to win.

I have a piece in @ForeignAffairs this week on myth and reality in the Middle East. The war has shattered a bunch of illusions about a shifting balance of power in the region. Instead the past five months revealed a power vacuum: no one is in charge. 🧵 foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/po… What were those illusions? Before October 7th policymakers in various countries argued that the Palestinian cause was dead, that an emerging Israeli-Gulf alliance would constrain Iran and that a multipolar, post-American moment had arrived in the Middle East.

A couple of good threads from Yemen experts on the strikes against the Houthis. This from @IbrahimJalalYE explains how they will use the strikes to boost their domestic and regional standing and distract from their atrocious governance in Yemen

https://twitter.com/IbrahimJalalYE/status/1745595354752360832

And this, by @gregorydjohnsen, on how America has a range of options in Yemen, from "do nothing" to limited box-ticking air strikes to attacking Iran directly, none of which are good options

https://twitter.com/gregorydjohnsen/status/1745638383399940585

A few half-formed late-night thoughts. Israel's room for maneuver on a ground invasion has just shrunk dramatically. Not just because it has lost a good deal of international support, but because the region is now boiling. 🧵 We've seen protests in the West Bank against Abbas (who is historically unpopular to begin with), protests in Jordan, crowds gathering outside the American embassy in Lebanon. And the risk of Iranian-backed groups opening other fronts has probably risen markedly.

On Israel and Lebanon: the messaging from Hizballah is that a major ground offensive in Gaza would draw it into the war. That is a threat worth taking seriously. But there are also a couple of caveats to throw out. One is that a broad swath of Lebanese do not want to get involved. The country is falling apart, mired in one of the worst economic crises in history. It cannot afford a war, and Hizballah would face unpredictable political consequences at home for dragging it into one.

Quick 🧵 on this @WSJ piece, which reports claims from Hamas and Hizballah that Iran "helped plan Hamas's Saturday surprise attack on Israel and gave the green light." Those claims are being used to support a narrative that is thus far unsubstantiated. wsj.com/world/middle-e… Let's state from the outset: of course there was some Iranian role in this attack. Iran finances Hamas and Islamic Jihad, smuggles weapons to Gaza and provides technical help for building rockets and drones. To say Iran was not involved *at all* is just propaganda.

A few thoughts on today, in no particular order. First, among Israelis: impossible to overstate the level of shock. The intelligence failure resembles 1973, but you almost have to go back to 1948 to find an analogue for the violence that played out in cities and towns. 🧵 It'll take a few days to know the scale of Israel's response. Netanyahu has historically been cautious about using military force. But he's now surrounded by a coterie of incompetent ideologues, and public opinion will probably be in favor of a dramatic change to the status quo.

Quick thread on oil, Biden and Saudi, because there are a few distinct issues that get muddled in the conversation: Is the latest OPEC+ production cut meant as a snub to America? Is it perceived as one? And what does this all mean for the Saudi-American relationship? First, is it meant as a snub? The oil market is a mess right now. OPEC+ has little spare capacity; many producers fail to meet their quotas; sanctions on Russia are bifurcating the market; all sorts of wild cards about demand; and so on.

Needless to say, it's unusual for a president to issue a preemptive defense of a foreign trip. Biden has done so with a bizarre smorgasbord of an op-ed that unintentionally says a lot about his administration's Middle East policy over the past 18 months. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/… First, they don't have much to show for their efforts. Biden takes credit for last year's Gaza war lasting "just 11 days": inspirational stuff, guys. And for Yair Lapid calling Mahmoud Abbas to wish him a happy Eid, as if that was some sort of major diplomatic breakthrough.

If you've never been to Gaza it's hard to grasp just how bleak it is. A whole generation now has grown up locked in a tiny enclave. They're coming of age in a place with no work, endless blackouts, barely any clean drinking water, and little prospect of getting out. When I first started visiting, a decade ago, people directed their anger largely at Israel. In recent years they direct it at everyone: Israel, Egypt, America, the PA, Hamas, the UN. No one thinks the blockade will end; no one thinks political actors care about their plight.

A quick thread on this piece. James Jeffrey has obviously been on a months-long effort to polish his legacy from the Trump years. Can only speak for myself, but I've come away from every interview, and now this article, thinking he's done the opposite. foreignaffairs.com/articles/middl… First, the whole thing is a post hoc rationalization of Trump's approach to the Middle East. He didn't have a strategy. What he had, at best, were impulses that guided his policy: be tough on Iran; embrace Israel; don't criticize American partners in the region.

Let me preface this by saying that there's still much we don't know about the Beirut disaster. What ignited the ammonium nitrate stockpile? (Lots of rumors, no concrete answers.) Who kept it at the port for years? Who stood to benefit from it? But there is zero evidence that this was an attack, some kind of Israel/Hezbollah issue. In fact there is a growing body of fabricated "evidence," photos and videos doctored to support this claim—which should make people even more skeptical of it.

This is the Trump plan's "conceptual map" of Israel and Palestine. The occupied West Bank becomes isolated cantons, connected by a handful of roads; the Palestinians cede large chunks of territory, in return for a couple of random plots in the Negev awkwardly linked to Gaza. The plan "contemplates the possibility" of Umm al-Fahm, the third-largest Arab city in Israel, and other nearby towns "becoming part of the State of Palestine," which is basically the platform of ethnic cleansing that Avigdor Lieberman ran on in the 2015 election

Day two of the Kushner conference is underway with the director of the IMF talking about lessons from Mozambique we can apply to Palestine (seriously). I'll spare you all eight hours of live-tweeting but will thread occasional bits here A Saudi government adviser on the first panel just said, "everything that we're talking about today took place 25 years ago," which should be the official motto of all Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts

Jared Kushner in Manama: "To be clear, economic growth and prosperity for the Palestinian people are not possible without an enduring and fair political resolution to the conflict." (So, um, about this workshop then...) Jared Kushner, inexplicably, in Manama: "By implementing his policies, President Trump has created the best economy that America has seen in a very long time, perhaps the best we've ever had."

I'm reading the Kushner plan for economic peace—really, what else would I rather do on a beautiful Saturday evening in June?—and I'll tweet some thoughts on it as I go. whitehouse.gov/peacetoprosper… Just to start, the website for the "Peace to Prosperity" plan includes a glossy photo of Palestinians walking past a USAID-funded school. Donald Trump cut USAID funding in the Palestinian territories.

This is a volatile moment in the Gulf. To publish a story blaming Iran for the damaged tankers, based on one anonymous "official" who offers no hard evidence, is irresponsible. apnews.com/d5884f62de8c4f… Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not attributed blame. Pompeo and Brian Hook declined to do so. A single nameless person in Washington should not be driving the headlines here—especially when that person admits Washington has "no conclusive proof." reuters.com/article/us-sau…