Thread by @simonbchen

A strategically-minded opponent may choose not to do the deed (for now), and instead use ambiguity and delaying tactics to further waste time and effort.
In late stage of Huaihai Campaign, 600,000-strong communist forces could’ve easily attacked and wiped out the 200,000- /1

strong encircled remnants of Gen. Du Yuming’s army group (Xuzhou Bandit Suppression Headquarters). But why didn’t they do that right away, and instead elected to keep the 200,000 confined in wretched starvation to what effectively amounted to a giant open-air concentration /2

camp, akin to the forgotten Courland Pocket of the Nazi-Soviet Eastern Front in the Second World War?
There were two reasons. The first is political, having to do with the simultaneous Pingjin Campaign and using a temporary respite of peace as psychological manipulation to /3

force Gen. Gu Zuoyi in Peiping (Peking) to surrender in that separate theatre of war.
The second is strategic—if the communists had done the deed, finished the job, by eliminating Gen. Du Yuming’s forces right away, then Chiang Kai-shek would be able to call it a draw there /4

move on.
But instead, with Gen. Du Yuming’s forces still in the balance, Chiang Kai-shek couldn’t move on.
As a result, an inordinate amount of governmental and military resources was spent on attempting a colossal aerial resupply effort for the starving encircled soldiers, by /5

the Republic of China Air Forces, because Chiang Kai-shek wasn’t psychologically willing to accept defeat and cut his loss in the Huaihai Campaign theatre.
Moral of the story: an opponent may elect to give you false hope, to further waste time and strength to your detriment. /e