Thread by @KevinZollman

It's not uncommon to hear people say that computer simulations "just aren't philosophy."

No more!

Conor Mayo-Wilson and I have a new paper where we argue that computer simulation should be seen as a *core* philosophical method.

philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18100/

Our argument proceeds via a comparison with thought experiments. We first develop a list of purposes for engaging in thought experiments in philosophy. We then argue that computer simulations achieve many of these -- sometimes better than thought experiments.

On this later point, we appeal to the problem of complex social systems to motivate why thought experiments may be particularly poorly suited for this topic. But, many philosophers have used thought experiments about social systems anyway (eg Kant, Hobbes, Locke, Hume).

We also argue that the process of building a simulation (even one that is never actually used) is helpful in uncovering hidden assumptions and being precise in one's thinking. These are virtues that philosophers prize, and so are reasons to include simulations as methods.

We then consider several common objections to using computer simulations in philosophy. These objections pertain to issues like: correctness, validation, robustness, and the like.

To forestall misunderstanding, we are not trying to replace current philosophical methods. Nor are we arguing that *every* philosopher should be a simulator. But, we argue that philosophers should embrace simulations as a core method.

For those who know simulations in the sciences, much of what we say will be totally familiar. Our hope was to adapt these arguments explicitly for a philosophical audience who might think either philosophy is unique or might not have encountered simulations before.