Thread by @usacac

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (Part II)

The Army faced a harsh reality in the late 1930s. The Great Depression had reinforced the isolationist attitudes of many Americans while also providing opportunity for significant changes in international order, which helped contribute to the rise in totalitarianism.

With Hitler assuming the Chancellor position in 1933, Germany quickly rearmed and sought alliances with Italy and Japan. The UK and France responded with their own rearmament programs.

We talked about this in an earlier thread – these types of mobilization programs, in response to others mobilizing, became common in the early 20th century and they could be difficult to stop so they almost certainly guaranteed war.

Instead of initially rearming, the United States considered only our own national security and defense. In 1936, FDR directed the FBI to look into the possibility of Nazi and/or Communist subversion in the States.

The Military Intelligence Division was instructed to increase the attaché program again. They also began efforts to reestablish a Counterintelligence element and created a small CI branch in the Spring of 1939. (BG Robert McClure, military attaché to the US Embassy in London.)

In the Summer of 1939, faced with concerns over potential foreign espionage activities, the @USArmy issued “its first regulation dealing with the security of military information.”

But the Army was not ready for war in 1939. General Marshall, then Chief of Staff, would later say: “We had no field Army. There were bare skeletons of three and one-half divisions scattered in small pieces over the entire United States.” @MelissasLibrary @georgecmarshall

The Military Intelligence Division, in 1939, was led by a Colonel and contained 20 officers, 3 enlisted soldiers, and 46 civilians spread between 4 office buildings in Washington D.C.

Intel collection “was limited largely to what could be derived from the attaché system” which had been increased but due to the nature of these attaché positions, as representatives, intelligence was not their primary goal.

The MI division would continue to grow as the threat to the United States increased. By 1941, there would be 200 officers and over 840 civilians working in Military Intelligence for the @USArmy with regional offices on both the east and west coasts.

Intel collection efforts shifted toward Germany and Japan, with some focus on Central and South America due to concern of possible German influence there.

The attaché program had also increased to include 136 attachés in 50 countries, but they were still limited in their ability to conduct intelligence missions due to their primary responsibilities.

In 1941, the Army G2 reached the conclusion that it was “imperative that the Army develop an efficient espionage service that can function independently of any nation.” But nothing came of this conclusion.

The G2’s concerns over the Intel branch continued. A couple of months later he would note that although substantial growth had occurred in the Military Intelligence Division, it was “always in a piecemeal manner.”

The work the division was doing was “still far below what should be expected of the military intelligence of a great power in our present situation.” Many agreed, including FDR.

Roosevelt appointed William Donovan as the new coordinator of information, with guidance “to establish an organization to collect intelligence and conduct radio propaganda.” Donovan was a WWI hero and a lawyer.

Donovan would head the Office of the Coordinator of Information, which would ultimately lead to the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) – from the OSS, we would develop the @CIA (but not until 1947).

Counterintelligence efforts were handled by the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP), which was also expanding during this time. An Army Reserve Major, Garland Williams, was assigned as the head of the CIP.

MAJ Williams wanted more centralized control over the organization, on par with the FBI, and he wanted to be responsible only to the Secretary of War with regard to “all matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, and subversion.”

Army commanders were against this, much to MAJ Williams’ chagrin. He “protested in vain that this meant he would have to deal with ’14 different policies, 14 different practices, 14 different methods of work, and, in general, 14 separate and distinct units.’”

MAJ Williams was reassigned to the Infantry School.

All of Army Intelligence struggled with manpower issues. The needs for qualified Intelligence personnel far exceeded the availability of qualified Intelligence personnel. Intel training in the Army Reserve had not been prioritized.

The Corps of Intel Police and the Signal Intel Service both had specialized schools by 1941 but there was no established training in other Intelligence Disciplines, such as Human Intelligence. Part of the problem could be that the MI Division had no authority over Intel training.

There was some progress with regard to foreign language capabilities. The @USArmy established a secret language school at the Presidio of San Francisco in 1941, with a budget of only about $2000 and the task of teaching Japanese.

In November 1941, there were 4 Japanese language instructors at the Military Intelligence Service Language School and 60 students. By the end of 1941, there would be 90 students learning Japanese.

At this time, there were about 5000 second-generation Japanese Americans serving in the US Army.

While the @USArmy was working to grow and broaden the Military Intelligence branch, there were meetings in 1941 between top US and British military leaders that included the sharing of intelligence for the first time since WWI.

A permanent British liaison officer was assigned to the Signal Intelligence Service in the US Army in mid-1941. @LeavenworthThe @BritishArmy @BritishArmyUSA @kingsbury_ollie

In the Fall of 1941, about 300 US Army lieutenants were sent to England to study radar developments with the @BritishArmy. @BritishArmyUSA @InnovationArmy @kingsbury_ollie

Despite all these efforts, Military Intelligence would be unable to prevent the attack at Pearl Harbor in December of 1941.

“High-level Japanese diplomatic messages had simply not contained any mention of Japanese military plans; consular messages had contained clues, but resources had not been available for the timely exploitation of low-level traffic.”

But the @USArmy Military Intelligence branch would work hard to “set matters right and bring victory out of defeat.”

For those that would like further reading on Military Intelligence during the Interwar Years and in World War II, the following resources may be of interest:

CMH Army Lineage Series: Military Intelligence by John Patrick Finnegan and Romana Danysh history.army.mil/html/books/060…

A Short History of Army Intelligence by Michael E. Bigelow fas.org/irp/agency/arm…

The Evolution of American Military Intelligence, US Army Intelligence Center and School fas.org/irp/agency/arm…

US Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook (edited by James P. Finley) nebula.wsimg.com/527c865c88886f…

The Failure to Adapt and Innovate After a Drawdown: The US Army in the Interwar Years 1919-1939 smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-f…

Intelligence Between the World Wars, 1919-1939 by Douglas L. Wheeler afio.com/publications/W…

Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II fas.org/irp/agency/arm…

Military Intelligence Service (MIS): Using Their Words @WWIImuseum nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/m…

The US Army Military Intelligence Museum mica-national.org/mi-museum/

Military Intelligence Service: America’s Secret Weapon – Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service in World War II misveteranshawaii.com

Reports of General MacArthur @USArmyCMH history.army.mil/books/wwii/Mac…

Ralph Van Deman Becomes Father of Modern American Military Intelligence army.mil/article/185798…

Nisei Linguists and New Perspectives on the Pacific War: Intelligence, Race, and Continuity by James C. McNaughton @USArmyCMH history.army.mil/html/topics/ap…

Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II by James C. McNaughton history.army.mil/html/books/nis…

Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the US Army Signal Corps by Rebecca Robbins Raines @Signal_School @USArmyCMH history.army.mil/html/books/030…

On the Trail of Military Intelligence History: A Guide to the Washington DC Area hsdl.org/?view&did=4792…

Chasing Emergence: Historical Development of Planning and Intelligence in Great Power Conflict by Jared A. Carter apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD108…

The Sky Spies – @airandspace
airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/lo…

Shooting World War I: The History of the Army Signal Corps Cameramen, 1917-1918 @USNatArchives unwritten-record.blogs.archives.gov/2017/03/16/sho…

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