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Aug 7, 2021, 84 tweets

PUBLIC AFFAIRS & WWII CENSORSHIP EFFORTS

The @USArmy has a Chief of Public Affairs now, but it took time to get that field more organized in a formal or professional way. (Hold your comments to the end, please and thank you 🙂)

During the Military Intelligence threads, we noted that for a time, during the period we focus on in this series, the MI Officers would be tasked with Public Affairs duties. Obviously that would be less than ideal in today’s world.

Throughout the Interwar Years and right up to the start of WWII, there were very strong currents of isolationism throughout American public opinion. The Roosevelt Administration really had their work cut out for them, even in 1939 when Germany invade Poland.

Roosevelt knew that we needed to effectively communicate the rationale for American preparedness and brace the country for the reality of potential (or likely) involvement in the war.

From the time that WWII started in Europe, with the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, it would be over two years before the attack on Pearl Harbor and the official entry of the United States into the war.

In 1939, FDR and the US government and military wouldn’t know that they would have 2+ years to prepare, but they knew they had to maximize efforts in the time they did have in order to get the necessary public support.

Roosevelt began authorizing the creation of various agencies that would be tasked with “information activities” – not necessarily Information Operations, but somewhat related to those concepts.

What Public Affairs Officers do not do is Information Operations or Psychological Operations – those are separate fields and separate responsibilities even though they can sometimes deal with similar types of communications and media.

Public Affairs Officers advise commanders for interacting with the public at large, leverage communication techniques to help tell the Army’s story and connect with their audience(s) – that second one is like what we’re doing with this series.

They also engage the mainstream media outlets and communities, to keep the American public informed, and they help build and maintain trust and confidence for the @USArmy with the American people.

On 1 September, with the invasion of Poland, the US established a “Special Division” responsible for repatriating Americans who were overseas in Europe in current or potential war zones.

Travel to Europe was halted – special permission was required to travel outside the US. People had to really clearly and persuasively justify international travel in order to get permission to go.

The US also established a Watch Officer system with duties around the clock – nights, weekends, holidays.

In September of 1939, the US established the Office of Government Reports, which survived until June of 1942, when its functions were transferred to the Office of War Information, within the Office of Emergency Management.

The Office of War Information was set up in June 1942, so a bit beyond the scope of this series but it’s interesting stuff so let’s talk about it.

The Office of War Information “was responsible for formulating and implementing information programs to promote, in the United States and abroad, understanding of the status and progress of the war effort and of war policies, activities, and aims of the US government.”

This included propaganda efforts, except those aimed at Latin America, which were kept within the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

The Office of War Information would utilize radio broadcasts, newspapers, posters, movies, and other media to help show the connection between the war going on in Europe and the American people.

After all, if the US was going to get pulled into the war, we would need public support and to get public support the public had to care about the situation and see the potential for its impact on American life at home.

The Office of War Information had some overseas offices as well and they would be involved in information and propaganda campaigns – it’s important to understand that this type of work is completely contrary to the role of Public Affairs Officers.

The overseas offices were a sort of repurposing of the Foreign Information Service, which was a division of the Office of the Coordinator of Information.

The Office of the Coordinator of Information was set up in July of 1941, with the goal of improving coordination between existing agencies. This was partially done with the encouragement of the British, through William Donovan who FDR had sent to London to assess the situation.

William J. Donovan would become the head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA.

Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and War Secretary Henry L. Stimson decided that Public Relations needed to be better coordinated. Stimson began holding weekly press briefings and had a Bureau of Public Relations set up under his office. @georgecmarshall @MelissasLibrary

The FBMS was rebranded the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service in 1942, after the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The FBIS sent weekly reports to the War Department.

Examples of these reports include “Radio Tokyo’s Racial Propaganda to the United States” or “Underground Movements and Morale in Japan” and “New Nazi Portrait of the American Soldier”.

They also monitored “black stations” that pretended to be radio stations in the Midwestern US but were actually broadcasting foreign propaganda against FDR and also attempted to stir racial tensions and other social issues in the US.

There were various other information-related offices set up, rebranded, deactivated, reactivated, replaced, merged, and so forth during this time period. We knew we needed multiple lines of effort but it took some time to figure out which were best.

“This confusing mix of agencies remained in place until Roosevelt had to consider a more centralized public information effort.”

(The book this is from is with my household goods so I’ll have to share the exact title and author in a few weeks 😬 it's from @ArmyUPress though)

The Army didn’t have dedicated specialized Public Affairs Officers at that time but recognized the need for people to manage Public Affairs responsibilities.

Like today, those tasked with Public Affairs would be responsible for Army messaging, keeping the American public informed and connecting them with the armed forces, and sharing factual information in support of these messaging efforts.

Basic Public Affairs responsibilities fell to the G2 Division (Intel) within the War Department. This is where Public Affairs had existed since about 1916.

In July 1940, a Press Relations Bureau was set up within the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (also within the War Department).

The G2 retained responsibility for Public Affairs of units located outside Washington DC and the Press Relations Bureau focused on War Department press releases from Washington DC.

Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and War Secretary Henry L. Stimson decided that Public Relations needed to be better coordinated. Stimson began holding weekly press briefings and had a Bureau of Public Relations set up under his office. @georgecmarshall @MelissasLibrary

Initially, Major General Robert C. Richardson Jr headed the Bureau of Public Relations under Henry Stimson, but he returned to field command in August of 1941 and was replaced with Brigadier General Alexander Surles, who remained the head of the Bureau throughout the war.

By the Fall of 1941, the War Department’s Bureau of Public Relations had 259 employees, of which 52 were military officers.

The War Department and the Department of the Navy both had $75,000 allocated for their respective Bureaus of Public Relations but estimates for the actual funds that went into Public Affairs efforts are typically much higher.

That $75,000 did not include the salaries for their Public Relations personnel and staffs.

In 1940, the Roosevelt Administration began reviewing its position on censorship.

(This is from the same book as mentioned above so I’ll have to provide the details for it once I get my household goods 🙂)

A board comprised of FBI, War Department, Department of the Navy, State Department, and other representatives met in April of 1940 to discuss possible legislation regarding censorship in the US.

In June of 1940, that board made a proposal to FDR for a “Basic Plan for Public Relations Administration” which included a budget request of $50-million to help establish complete censorship of all mass media outlets.

FDR was not interested in this. He felt the political backlash would be too much to justify the effort.

Instead, he told the War Department and the Department of the Navy to develop a plan that involved censorship of only international communications. In the meantime, both Departments worked to limit public release of information regarding the military.

Later, during the war, we would establish The Army Hour as a radio broadcast to bring controlled information to the general public with “on-the-spot stories and demonstrations from Army bases and fields of battle.”

In June of 1941, their plan was approved, authorizing the Joint Army and Navy Board to establish an office for censoring international communications. They were also authorized to assign personnel to this office in advance of the approved legislation.

The “Censorship Branch” would remain attached to the G2 division, since it was still related to intelligence.

The War Powers Act of December 1941 gave FDR the authority to establish an Office of Censorship, which he did immediately and appointed Byron Price as the director. Before WWII, Byron Price worked in wire services and as an executive editor for the @AssociatedPress

This Office of Censorship established guidelines for the Press. “Journalists and editors were called on the refrain from disclosing information about specific unit and ship names, locations, and movements.”

“A similar policy applied to the movement of the President and senior military and diplomatic personnel.”

Weather forecasts and detailed maps and pictures of military installations were also among the information that would be restricted.

And the Department of Justice gave Price “wide discretionary powers” to control the nation’s radio stations and broadcast programs, but he opted instead for a policy of voluntary cooperation on the part of the nation’s press, applied to both broadcast and print media.

Later, after we entered WWII, there would be an established policy that journalists traveling on @USNavy vessels and in war zones would have to be accredited. To be accredited, “a journalist had to agree to submit all stories to an Army or Navy censor before its release.”

“Theater commanders were responsible for establishing what would be censored in the respective combat zones.” Broad guidelines were established in Washington but the “theater commanders retained considerable discretion in establishing their public affairs policies.”

“To enter a theater, journalists had to submit to an official examination of their background, discuss their opinions about the war, and prove their reliability to officials in the War and Navy Departments.”

“Once they were accredited, the journalists were subjected to military censorship in theater, but in return, the military would feed, transport, and billet them.”

“Combat journalists were also issued officers’ uniforms devoid of insignia with green armbands that identified them as photographers and reporters.”

Later in this series we will discuss the role of journalists in the 1941 Maneuvers. They were also issued green armbands with a P for photographer or C for correspondent.

For more reading about Public Affairs, Public Relations, and Censorship in WWII, the following resources should prove interesting:

Fostering a Culture of Engagement by LTG William Caldwell, LTC Shawn Stroud, and Anton Menning armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/mili…

Keeping Friends and Gaining Allies: The Indivisible Challenge of Military Public Relations by BG (ret.) Huba Wass de Czege armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/mili…

Many Voices Telling One Story: Public Affairs Operations Across Africa in Support of Combatant Commanders by CPT Jason Welch armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Milit…

Multi-Domain Operations and Information Warfare in the European Theater by MAJ Jennifer Purser armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Milit…

I Followed My Heart, Not My Rank: My Journey into Army Public Affairs by SSG Nikki Felton armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/nco-…

The US Army and the Media in Wartime: Historical Perspectives, edited by Kendall D. Gott armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/comb…

Helping Shape Today’s Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function by John F. Kirby hsdl.org/?view&did=4481…

Elmer Davis and The News – Sept. 1939

World War 2 Radio Programs Broadcast to Troops at the Frontlines

World War II On the Radio otrcat.com/world-war-ii-o…

Radio Propaganda in World War II wargaming.com/en/news/radio_…

Photo Stories “This is the Army Hour” otrr.org/FILES/Magz_pdf…

World War II Chronicles Episode 28: The Office of War Information

US Army Public Affairs Specialist

MOS Spotlight: Public Affairs Mass Communications Specialist

What to expect as a US Army Public Affairs Specialist

Public Affairs Mass Communications Specialist

Public Affairs – What to Expect

MOS Explained in under 3 Minutes

46S Public Affairs Mass Communications Specialist goarmy.com/careers-and-jo…

46A Public Affairs Officer goarmy.com/careers-and-jo…

Functional Area 46 (FA46) Public Affairs cool.osd.mil/army/officer/f…

If you're just tuning in or you've missed any of the previous threads, you can find them all saved on this account under ⚡️Moments or with this direct link twitter.com/i/events/13642…

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