Thread by @raguileramx

A lot of people see the figures for destroyed Russian equipment and think "but Russia has hundreds/thousands of tanks, vehicles, aircraft etc". It might seem like this is just a tiny fraction of an overwhelming force but let me explain why it is significant /1 🧵

For a military unit, say a Russian Battalion Tactical Group (it's main maneuver formation), to fight effectively it needs to maintain some degree of cohesion among its combined arms forces /2

This cohesion is lost the moment that the number of men or vehicles that are committed to undertake particular tasks, particularly offensive ones, is reduced below the point in which these tasks can be undertaken effectively /3

The rule of thumb is that when a unit loses around 1/3 of its paper strength, it is effectively destroyed. For a 800-man Russian BTG, that amounts to just 3 tanks and around 20 other armored vehicles /4

The problem with Russian BTGs is that while they have a force mix that is more varied than, say, a Western battalion, and also considerably more fires (artillery), they can't replace these losses by say, cannibalizing other BTGs /5

In short, it's much easier to disrupt the operations of three Russian BTGs, than disrupt a Western brigade of three battalions. Additionally, those three Western battalions will be of a single type meaning they don't have a critical component that erodes the others if lost. /6

So why does Russia rely on BTGs? 1) because they find it logistically more difficult to engage full brigades. 2) BTGs are, in fact, tremendously effective in small scale engagements and they have a more varied force mix and far more firepower than a Western battalion /7

So now let's put this into perspective. Assuming Ukrainian estimates are relatively accurate, the right way of thinking is not that those 211 tanks are less than one tank division but rather, that this represents **70** BTGs losing their tank component (3 per BTG, remember?). /8

Now, most of them will have them replaced. They aren't destroyed permanently. But that forced those BTGs to suspend offensive operations for hours or days. Keep doing this over and over and you can see how Ukraine is resisting rather well. /9

Also note how on defense this is not a problem. A BTG defending can fight well past the 30% losses threshold (to the last vehicle even). Presumably many have done so resisting Ukrainian counterattacks. /10

Anyway, hope this helps understand why comparing pre-war equipment totals is a very amateurish way of understanding how modern war is actually waged, and how "small" losses are actually more significant than they appear. /11

Since this thread is getting traction, I'm going to share the source for some of these statements (Armor Magazine from the U.S. Army Armor School): benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/c… /12

Since this thread is getting even more traction, here's also another thread on how I see the war developing over the next week or two /13

Oh and I called it on the second day #NotBragging #OkImBragging ☺️/14

Some other resources for people who want to read a bit about modern Russian warfighting. Check out The Russian Way of War (from the US Foreign Military Studies Office) /15 armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%…

And here's an assessment of Russian tactics from the first Donbas war (2014-15): Making Sense of Russian
Hybrid Warfare /16 ausa.org/publications/m…