Thread by @JonHawkes275

(1/n) The NAOs Ajax report has snuck out this morning, an evolving thread of initial highlights and thoughts

nao.org.uk/report/the-aja…

(2/n) Nice top line facts. Many will point to £3bn spent, 26 vehicles received but its obviously a little more nuanced than that, not least because of decision to run demonstration & manufacture together. Also there would have been a lot more than 26 if the issues hadn't arisen

(3/n) These are the scary ones. Late 2022 before a solution might be found. No idea of IOC. 'More than' £10bn through life cost vs £6bn originally. This isn't something that's going to suddenly get back on track

(4/n) Caveat that wording is unclear, £10bn vs £6bn might be more of a difference between initial and whole life. If so, mea culpa.

(5/n) A reminder Ajax today is much smaller than envisioned. A lot of variants fell by the wayside over the years - medium tank, bridgelayer, fire support variants. Lots of ideas that slowly got sliced away to the 6 we see today.

(6/n) This one is a big deal. Sat here in March 2022, the MoD has no date for IOC. Not a delayed date or wide estimated window, no date at all, because its entirely unknown how or when the vehicle will be fixed.

(7/n) I don't think this quote needs a comment "It has not yet changed the target for full operating capability
(FOC) – April 2025 – even though it has no confidence that this is achievable "

(8/n) MoD have appeared to successfully hold onto the terms of the fixed price contract - GD have to fix this at their own cost. But NAO point out every delay is more cost to extend very old extant fleets and capabilities, so there will be cost no matter what.

(9/n) Its been said for years, but MoD massively overcomplicate requirements and Ajax is a pinnacle of it. 1,200 requirements which neither the MoD nor GDLS understand, nor their interactions. The US had a similar issue which is what led to their novel approach on OMFV...

(10/n)... recently, which was super generic and focused on capability and outcome, not obscene granularity of specification around specific items. They've been outspoken that you focus on effect and not accidentally rule out bids because a vehicle was 1km/h short of a requirement

(11/n) There's a cluster of commentary on how mismanaged the programme appears to have been, that resets and recasts didn't solve anything. That's not new or surprising.

(12/n) We had much of this in the N&V report that was published (which was refreshingly open and frank) but worth really reiterating this quote here. As @FTusa284 has said many times, the commentating community has said since 2014 there were a few big issues, yet even in 2021...

(13/n) ...I was being told the issue(s) are brand new, or no-one had ever spoken up about them until now - its all new.

More confirmation that this isn't the case. It seems everyone across defence knew and was talking, but somehow the decision makers didn't hear anything? Odd.

(14/n) Are UK safety processes so complex in pursuit of safety that they become unsafe? Can't doubt DE&S, Army, dstl etc all have very professional systems in place yet many of them were shouting about issues & nothing happened. Systemic failures despite robust specific processes

(15/n) The big ticket noise and vibration remains unresolved. There are "mitigations" (unspecified, some claim it is very simple, but that doesn't marry with the pace of resolution under such public scrutiny). Interesting is the note of 136 dstl concerns, 132 are not N&V related

(16/n) GD haven't been paid since 2020, it appears, and are at least £1.1 billion down on planned payment planning. Good savings for MoD if nothing else.

"The Department will need to consider carefully whether the programme can deliver the intended capabilities" is troubling.

(17/n) A valuable nod to the little recognised fact that Ajax has a ton of dependencies, many of which are going through their own problems. Solving Ajax doesn't actually deliver the capability, MoD needs to solve a range of problems across the portfolio.

(18/n) VfM conclusion - flawed approach means the programme has not yet demonstrated VfM. That doesn't mean Ajax isn't going to, but has not done so yet. Pedantry perhaps, but important to be clear - it could theoretically whip back into shape and be good value for the £10bn cost

(19/n) A great bit here to stress. Reduction in vehicle count (both outright and elimination of whole special to role variants as mentioned earlier) whilst expanding the role the family has to deliver capability to. Scope creep whilst reducing top line capability to deliver it

(20/n) @thinkdefence has a great history of medium armour incuding Ajax to catch up, but the fact sentence two of the NAO report's history of Ajax starts "After 18 years exploring different options..." is all you need to know in many ways.

(21/n) Question to anyone (@thinkdefence especially) am I misremembering? The decision to build in UK only came after award as an unsolicited idea from GDUK?

(22/n) A very pleasant summary chart of Ajax manufacture, initially in Spain, then hulls in Spain and assembly in Wales.

(23/n) Starting to get to the crux of the issue, i suspect. The Army's approach to SRO has always been fatally flawed, but some specific focus needs to be made to the notion that management of the Army's £6bn flagship programme was only 10% of someone's job. 𝟭𝟬%. I wonder...

(24/n) ...if there are any project management schools of thought anywhere that would support that approach to volatility and overt lack of commitment to a project of any scale, let alone a multinational project costing billions for an incredibly complex system of systems? Anyone?

(25/n) And the next paragraph! 6 of 8 roles in the Ajax programme office were vacant in 2018. Good lord.

And then they cut resources...

None of this new per se, but some flesh on the bones of the broad brush "MoD struggles with complex programme management".

(26/n) As i head past the 25 post mark I suggest people just read the report. Every paragraph is remarkable, great bit of work by the NAO.

A few closing highlights rather than continued running commentary:

(27/n) Clearly there are technical issues with Ajax. Remember all AFV have issues, that's why they take years to develop, but evidently there are some big ones here with unknown resolutions. We're looking at end 2022/start 2023 for an estimated fix, though that is low confidence

(28/n) Its clear requirements are massively over specified, so its hard to tell if this 32% meeting of requirements to date is arbitrary or indicative of a really bad situation. Time will tell. Clearly the money is running out for any remaining development

(29/n) Pushing requirements into the broad 'later' bucket and sharing costs with the now cancelled WCSP is going to hurt later. Add in that MoD hasn't paid >£1bn to GD but will have to remediate that money if they get back on track and there may be a funding time bomb on Ajax now

(30/n) My main worry is that these are all symptoms, but will be taken as illnesses. Ajax is where it is because of the system that created and managed it, not because of the technical issues themselves. The NAO commentary around very volatile and low commitment management of...

(31/n) ...the programme, of serious institutional breakdowns in communication and governance, of requirements being written that numbered in the thousands and neither issuing authority nor contractor understood them - those things are what did this, but I'm not seeing...

(32/n) ...any evidence of a fundamental acknowledgement and change in the MoD and Services. @FTusa284 has spoken long and loud about foundational reform of UK procurement, project management and oversight. But...

(33/n) ...here we have Ajax standing as a £10 billion monument to where its been going wrong, yet I'm not convinced even from conversations with very relevant people at MoD, DE&S and the Army today that the right lessons are being heard? Ajax will be a quick fix, seems to be...

(34/n) ...the response., but the system is too big and old to change meaningfully. What a muddle.

Maybe a more distilled thread/blog post/something in the near future. Good luck @CommonsDefence, there's a lot to work through here. /end