Thread by @usacac

CHANGING NEEDS AND CONFLICTING AGREEMENTS

Earlier in this series we mentioned the Arcadia Conference, which took place in December 1941 and January 1942, when Winston Churchill visited FDR in DC following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Arcadia Conference, among other things, resulted in the decision to prioritize Germany and Europe, although the US would fight in the Pacific the whole time as well.

The United States wanted to plan an invasion of Europe as soon as possible, and one option was called Operation Sledgehammer – it would involve crossing the English Channel and capturing seaports in France. The hope was to have this happen early in 1942.

There was another plan, Operation Roundup, which was to take place in the Spring of 1943 and involve an Allied invasion of the Continent employing 48 divisions with the American forces comprising the majority. This plan was favored at the time, but it will change.

Sledgehammer was scrapped in mid-1942 – the US would only be able to provide a few divisions to the operation if it occurred this soon. The 1943 plan seemed more promising, along with plans to open a second front in North Africa. history.army.mil/books/wwii/sp1…

The British continued to push the idea that the American forces should first be put to use in North Africa since this would give them fighting and leadership experience that they still lacked at this time. Remember, the British had been fighting for over 2.5 years at this point.

In late April of 1942, another conference was held, and the two nations began working on details for Roundup. This plan was given the codename BOLERO and tentatively completed the following month.

“The work done on the BOLERO Plan in Washington during the Spring of 1942 was an exercise as useful in its way as maneuvers and rehearsal by troops in training.”

“It was excellent practice for planners to try to fit the next movements of men and equipment to the British Isles into a long-range program running well into 1943. But it was still an exercise.”

The pace of all of these processes is important to understanding the full story of our involvement in WWII. Here we are now in April 2022, and 80 years ago the US was already over 4 months into its official involvement in the war.

Initial troops were deployed to the UK, but it was a slow process to get them there and the units that followed would also be slow to arrive. That’s why the concept for Operation Sledgehammer could only hope to include maybe three US divisions.

But there were other considerations that influenced and affected the planning and deployment processes, and some of those considerations included agreements and policies that were already in place and now conflicting with immediate and future planning.

There were four major conflicts within the planning process that held immediate significance at this time 80 years ago:

(1)US Army Air Force plans and the defense of the Middle East

(2)British-American plans and China

(3)War Department plans and Lend-Lease

and

(4)BOLERO, prioritizing Germany over the Pacific, and the need to defend the Hawaii-Australia Pacific “line”

“The outcome of these [planning] conflicts, largely dependent on highly unpredictable military developments, was so uncertain that long-range planning by the military staffs necessarily remained exploratory and controversial…”

And this was “exploratory and controversial” in spite of the fact that agreements were already set to prioritize Europe and concentrate American forces in the British Isles.

It is also important to understand that this was a completely different type of deployment and commitment to fighting than the US had experienced in WWI (or ever before).

During the First World War, what we sent was an “Expeditionary Force” and we established that force, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), specifically for a given task in a given location – kind of like a Joint Task Force.

Now we were expanding the military as a whole and preparing to deploy the entire force, ideally in cohesive, (mostly) self-sustaining armies – short of a continued need for bullets, food, and fuel.

This was a relatively new concept for the US Army, but it is one that we have continued to develop since WWII.

The force that we would deploy for Operation Torch, which we will discuss later this year, was a relatively cohesive and self-sustaining force that arrived with nearly everything they would need, including things like railroad tracks and train cars. (Pic is from 1944)

Despite the planning conferences, American involvement in the defense of British positions in the Middle East was still unclear and undefined.

Since before Pearl Harbor, the War Department had missions set up for North Africa and parts of the Middle East “to supervise the moving, storing, and transfer of lend-lease supplies and equipment” to the British and the Soviets.

The understanding was that the British would retain full responsibility for the Middle East, and to aid this the US could provide transport sufficient to move up to 40,000 troops, plus the lend-lease support.

At the same time, rather than deploy US forces to British posts in the Middle East, the US would send a couple divisions to the Southwest Pacific which would allow Australia and New Zealand to aid the British military in the Middle East with their divisions.

There were problems with these American missions as the commanders worked to cooperate with the British forces in the Middle East, with one commander requesting American service support troops rather than continuing to struggle with coordination.

There was a lack of troopships, however, and this was already affecting the rate at which the US forces could deploy to the British Isles.

Also, service troops could really only go “to areas where they will eventually come under the control of a theater commander of our own combat forces” which would also be problematic if they were sent to the British posts in the Middle East at this time.

And this is all without noting that, should American units replace British units in the Middle East in 1942, “this could lead to controversy and questions regarding British and American policies.”

Eisenhower’s advice in March of 1942 “was to do everything possible to help the British except to send combat troops.”

GEN Marshall offered to send US Army Air Force units, without aircraft, to aid the British. The offer was for five groups, but only the personnel and auxiliary equipment – all of the aircraft would have to come from British allocations.

At the same time, discussions were taking place regarding lend-lease and the need to now prioritize expanding and equipping the US forces.

GEN Arnold noted in March of 1942 that of the equipment promised under lend-lease to the Soviets and the British, and combined with the current demand for American aircraft for American forces, the total far exceeded the production capabilities in place.

There were developments to aid China at the same time, and this was also proving difficult to continue at the same level as before the US entered the war. But we would need help containing the Japanese forces in the Pacific so some compromise would be necessary.

Since October of 1941 there was a plan to deliver set quantities of supplies to the Soviet Union each month through June of 1942. However, “after the attack on Pearl Harbor, American armed forces had taken over critical munitions and ships” including those under this agreement.

Stopping the diversion of munitions allocated to Allied nations was easier said than done now that the US was fully committed to World War II. But ultimately FDR agreed to divert seven cargo ships to the Pacific; they had previously been set for lend-lease shipping.

Of all critical items, aircraft were among the most highly sought by both foreign governments and overseas American commands. The Army Air Force wished to add more advanced training for air units including training on the same equipment they would deploy with.

“Of all the Army programs… the program for training air units was by far the most exigent in its demands for extended advanced training with precisely the equipment the units would use in combat.”

In March/April 1942, Secretary of State Henry Stimson said, “All requests for planes for areas not essential to our own plans must be refused. The time is past for all gift planes – all gifts of planes based upon sentimental and good will development purposes.”

GEN Marshall made a similar point around the same time. “In the course of discussion by the JCS on the allocation of planes between the US and Great Britain he stated, ‘while no change should be made in delivery of planes in accordance with existing protocol…’

“… ‘the number of planes… would have to be drastically reduced, if not altogether stopped, by August or, at the latest, in September.’”

MacArthur, in the Pacific, had his own concerns about getting US reinforcements and supplies. He sent a message to Marshall, who passed the message on to FDR, as he normally did with messages from MacArthur regarding “grand strategy or policy.”

FDR’s reply to MacArthur was not exactly what the General had hoped. In the reply FDR explained all the difficulties he faced with regard to decision-making at this time.

FDR also assured MacArthur that the US would (1) send “all the air strength we possibly can”, (2) “secure, if possible, the Pacific lines of communication” and (3) strike “as often as possible” against Japanese communications lines.

MacArthur replied, expressing his concerns and objecting to the offers in FDR’s message, offering instead his own counterproposals, including the establishment of a second front in the Pacific.

“Thus, early in May of 1942, the President had to reckon with the objections to the BOLERO plan of GEN MacArthur as well as those of Admiral King.”

“To carry out the plan as GEN Marshall envisaged it would require the President to overrule the two senior American officers that were preoccupied with strategy in the Pacific.”

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