Thread by @usacac

AN INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY DECEPTION (in WWII)

In light of the recent release of a certain recruiting video this seems like a convenient time to introduce Psychological Operations and Deception, which we will cover more in-depth later in the series.

The skills used in Psychological Operations are done so carefully and with very specific purpose. We will see a few creative examples of this in the #WhyWeFight series, although we will see more prominent examples as we progress beyond 1942.

Sun Tzu’s Art of War notes “All warfare is based on deception… when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive.”

Deception is just one part of the skillset that encompasses Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and others.

In the First World War there was a “Propaganda Sub-Section” within the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), but the AEF was only set up for that particular purpose (fighting in WWI) so this went away after the war. arsof-history.org/icons/blankenh…

Before the US was officially involved in World War II, the nation established various information-focused agencies to serve different purposes.

The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, for example, was led by Nelson Rockefeller and tasked with countering Axis propaganda especially in Latin America. Outside of Latin America the Foreign Information Service was responsible for countering Axis propaganda.

William Donovan became the Coordinator of Information in July 1941, and this would ultimately lead to the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

There were issues, however, as a number of other information-related organizations popped up, and so the Office of War Information (OWI) was created in June 1942. We talked about this a bit last year in the Building an American Army series.

OWI was tasked with creating targeted content for radio broadcasts, posters, films, photographs, newspapers, and other mass media. A lot of this was done with these organizations publicly stamping their name on the content.

When we think of the term “propaganda” we often think of the active targeting of a population or group with information to persuade or otherwise manipulate, but the job of countering propaganda can be more challenging. And as with deception, propaganda is just one part of it all.

If we are getting technical about definitions and responsibilities, the Information Operations (IO) folks will undoubtedly have a thing or two to say regarding Military Deception and PSYOP.

But when talking historically, before the US Army had official IO and PSYOP fields, these tasks were handled by groups of Intel, Signal, and Engineer soldiers.

Later this year we will talk about Operation Torch as the “big event” when the US Army finally engaged Hitler’s forces in combat, but there were other battles and operations taking place in 1942 that also deserve some attention.

The concepts used to develop the “Ghost Army” later in the war and their deception tactics for the D-Day landings stem from the British use of deception and camouflage in Operations Bertram and Treatment before the Second Battle of El Alamein.

Don’t worry, we will cover the First Battle of El Alamein before then. Today we are just taking a quick look at the military deception that will be used to help ensure an Allied victory in the Fall.

Operation Bertram was to conceal the buildup of forces in the location from where the attack would be launched, while convincing the enemy that the attack would come from the south instead, and Operation Treatment was to convince Rommel the attack would not begin until November.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Richardson had recently joined the British Eighth Army’s planning staff in North Africa when he was put in charge of Operation Bertram. COL Dudley Clarke, commander of Advanced Headquarters ‘A’ Force, would run Operation Treatment.

Operation Bertram was one of the largest military deception plans so that will get more attention as we get closer to the time it occurred 80 years ago. It is also considered the last army-scale physical deception operation (without the use of electronic measures).

The camouflage tasks were accomplished by the British Army’s Middle East Command Camouflage Directorate under MAJ Geoffrey Barkas. MAJ Barkas had conducted a similar camouflage effort previously for GEN Auchinleck (Operation Sentinel).

Operation Treatment utilized an intelligence network in the eastern Mediterranean – “the Cheese Network, a fictitious network of spies that had been in use for some time.”

COL Clarke and his deputy, LTC Wild, “spread the idea that Montgomery wasn’t planning any major offensive against Rommel but was instead worried about a possible German advance through the Caucasus, which would threaten the Persian Gulf.”

“This had been a genuine concern earlier in the year (1942), and although the Germans were increasingly bogged down around Stalingrad it was still a convincing story.”

A second story was used in Operation Treatment that the British were planning an invasion of Crete. “This story had some impact… on 23 SEPT 1942 Hitler ordered the garrison to be reinforced.”

“He repeated this order on 21 OCT, although Rommel’s army at El Alamein still contained battalions that had recently moved from Crete.”

There was also “the creation of a high-level conference, to be held in Tehran on 26 OCT 1942.” Higher level officers and commanders were expected to attend, and “lower-level officers were said to be free to book leave… a number of hotel reservations were made in their names.”

Operation Bertram “focused on convincing the German commanders both that the offensive would not begin until sometime in November 1942 and that the main attack would come from the southern end of the front line.”

To accomplish this, LTC Richardson would have to conceal the buildup of British forces on the northern end of the Alamein line. Two dummy brigades were set up on the southern front, but Montgomery said it needed to be larger in scale.

With the Camouflage Directorate supporting the effort, Richardson worked to “create an entire fake armoured corps.”

So, for Operation Bertram, they had to “hide the massive British buildup in the north, create the impression of a bigger buildup in the south, and indicate that preparations were two weeks less advanced than was the case.”

We will come back to Operation Bertram, Operation Treatment, and the Second Battle of El Alamein later, but in the meantime, this thread from the Building an American Army series talks about some of the information-related offices FDR set up

If you’re just tuning in or you’ve missed previous threads in this series, you can find them all saved on this account under ⚡️Moments or with this direct link twitter.com/i/events/14830…