Thread by @kamilkazani

I think Kremlin may view nuclear strike on Ukraine (with an American retaliatory strike) as a rational move. It may not make much sense in the context of foreign policy, but it does in the context of domestic policy. Meanwhile foreign policy is just domestic policy by other means

My argument is based on three premises:

1. Foreign policy serves domestic policy goals
2. Keeping power is *the* top priority of domestic policy
3. Kremlin is looking for a way out of the conflict

Launching a nuclear strike and getting a retaliatory one may be seen as a way out

If Putin is looking for a way out, that probably means he is looking for a way out that would allow him to keep the supreme political power. Which may be incompatible with suffering a humiliating military defeat from a supposedly inferior force. Like Japan in 1905 and Ukraine now

Many argued that Putin should be allowed to "save face". The thing is: it is nearly impossible for him to save face at this point. Inability to crush Ukraine is already a loss of face, no matter how you frame it. For a simple reason that Ukraine had been considered an inferior

The very idea that Ukraine can stand its ground against Russia would have been considered totally insane at the start of this year, both in Russia and outside of it. The fact that it does means that Putin has already suffered a major loss of face, and will continue suffering it

To keep power, you need to save face. And how can you save face? One obvious solution is: try to engage with the U.S. Make a nuclear strike that would inflict an American retaliatory strike. If you and your power survives that, that gonna be total win. Absolute victory

Russian public opinion considers Ukraine as absolutely inferior. That is why standards for not losing face in this conflict are pretty high. Since Ukraine is so ridiculous, inability to crush it is humiliating, no matter how you frame it. You can't defeat it, you lose your face

But Russian public opinion does not view the US as inferior, it's the other way around. That is why standards for not losing face in a conflict with the US are so much lower. I would say that inability of the US to crush Russia would be seen as American loss and Putin's win

Compare two scenarios:

1. Russia engages Ukraine. Then Russia not crushing Ukraine is Ukrainian victory. High bar
2. US engages Russia. Then the US not crushing Russia is Russian victory. (Seemingly) low bar

He absolutely may choose 2 as the bar for not losing face is lower

I would even say that provoking an American retaliatory strike may boost the regime. The US tried to defeat us, used the deadly force, but we still exist - that's the story of honour, heroism and stoicism. For the Putin's target audience I mean. That's a great and powerful myth

Meanwhile, mobilisation may stabilise the regime by simply getting rid of young males that could otherwise create problems. For example, if they were recruited by anti-regime forces, should the supreme power weaken. The less young males in the country, the stronger is Kremlin

Engaging with the US directly may sound suicidal foreign policy wise. At the same time it may sound totally rational domestic policy wise. Simply because the bar for saving your face (=keeping power) in this conflict would be much lower. They didn't destroy you = you win. The end

PS For example, the US destroying the Black Sea Navy as a response for a Russian nuclear strike absolutely may count as Putin's victory. It is very, very much easier to frame this scenario as honourable, than let's say an obvious military defeat from Ukraine

PPS Withdrawing before the US is very much preferable than withdrawing before Ukraine. In the first case, you can frame it correctly, save your face and prepare for a round 2. If you withdraw before Ukraine though, there may be no round 2