Thread by @PISM_Poland

1/21 🧵
Release of #PISMReport “Military-Technical Assistance to Ukraine: An Assessment of Its Short- and Medium-Term Needs”.
Full report here: bit.ly/3BP9PcM
Teaser of report: bit.ly/3G4Endg

2/21
Military aid has played a key role in preserving independence of Ukraine, but it is still insufficient to break Russia’s potential, to recapture Russian-held territory, or even to stop Russia’s next possible offensives—in short, to end the war. #PISMReport

3/21
Ukraine cannot rely on its own defence industry, which has been largely destroyed. It is necessary to increase both the scale and scope of military support for Ukraine, which should include more NATO-standard weapons than before. #PISMReport

4/21
Although the situation on the battlefield became favourable for Ukraine in autumn 2022, Russia still has an advantage in terms of quantity and reserves of arms. #PISMReport

5/21
Without breaking the Russian offensive potential, there is no chance for changing Russia’s strategic ambitions and calculus. #PISMReport

6/21
The course of the war has confirmed that the results at the strategic and tactical levels depend on the concentration and use of heavy conventional weapons. #PISMReport

7/21
The six essential for Ukraine types of capabilities are: heavy artillery, armoured vehicles (MBT, APC, IFVs), longer-range missiles, air power, UAVs and loitering munitions, and air defence systems. #PISMReport

8/21
So far, Ukraine has serious gaps in each category, and this asymmetry persists despite Russia’s high losses. Most barriers to providing military assistance to Ukraine are, above all, political in nature. #PISMReport

9/21
Ukraine’s partners differ in their calculations, scope, scale, and determination to provide assistance. Obstacles to aid stem also from limited reserves and decades-long policies of reducing the production capacity of defence industries.

10/21
In general, the first step for providing military aid to Ukraine is clarifying capability gaps, that is, the disparity with Russia. #PISMReport bit.ly/3BP9PcM

11/21
The next step is to analyse available options for supply of weapons and ammunition. #PISMReport

12/21
There are three set of available options: the Soviet/compatible systems, STANAG (NATO-standard weapons), and asymmetric means (systems that are not equal to a given capability but countering it).
bit.ly/3BP9PcM

13/21
A third step, esp. for Ukraine’s neighbours, could be to use the support of NATO forces and means, or accelerated individual modernisation efforts, to fill the gaps created by the transfer of their weapons to Ukraine.

14/21
In most of the capability gaps analysed, there are severe limitations to further pursue the eastern options, due to the rapidly depleting reserves of Soviet systems or ammunition in NATO countries. #PISMReport

15/21
At the same time, asymmetric options must be considered as interim or complementary solutions in the absence of a willingness by some of Ukraine’s partners to supply weapons analogous to Russia’s. #PISMReport

16/21
The most desirable and effective capabilities that can be offered to Ukraine are systems identified in this report as STANAG options, which are produced in NATO or by some Asian states. #PISMReport

17/21
NATO’s attention should focus on the capability gaps emerging in some Central European members due to their delivery of weapons to Ukraine. #PISMReport

18/21
NATO’s forces and systems on the Eastern Flank must support credible deterrence and defence posture, which to now relies mainly on U.S. efforts. #PISMReport

19/21
Only synchronised military aid to Ukraine and reinforcement of NATO’s Eastern Flank countries will ensure the complete failure of Russia’s plans in Europe. #PISMReport

20/21
Check out analysis and options for Ukraine in full report bit.ly/3BP9PcM

21/21
Follow discussion on #PISMReport and our social media! #PISMwithUkraine