How Russia and Ukraine Tracks Mobile Phones on the Battlefield
Having covered the topic and related topics extensively here 👇 commsrisk.com/how-russia-and…
Not to turn on Bluetooth(even smartwatch),turn off Wifi,turn off 2G/3G/4G/5G,I might be able to see the GNSS messaging services,carry your KeyFob car keys with you,turn on your smartphone monitors(even at night for optical interceptions)...
If I were you I would check the # of previous Tweets. 😎
Use silent #SMS messages to track LTE users’ locations
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Smartphone interference with CUAS, CUAV, Drone / UAV interceptor, drone / UAV detector.....
Some details such as the brand or manufacturers or providers can provide sensitive information about you (for example nationality, language spoken and much more)
Let's say those HF signals could propagate very well on certain days and I can build a very powerful RF Beacon to activate the signal...
Leave credit cards, debit cards, health cards, e-passports and any card with an RF chip at home.
Issues with wireless charging of your smartphone?
An Investigation of Electromagnetic Radiated Emissions from Wireless Charging System for Mobile Device...
Wireless Battery Chargers Operating at Multiple Switching Frequencies...
researchgate.net/publication/32…
mdpi.com/1996-1073/16/9…
Don't forget that some chips are hidden!
Anti-counterfeiting chips, anti-theft chips, under the skin chips, chipped pets...
Location Tracking on The Battlefield
info.enea.com/tracking_on_th…
Location Tracking on The Battlefield
A.2 SMS Sending/Interception Screen Output Analysis
Status, IMSI, IMEI and other information detected from mobile phones in the areas displayed within the Leer-3 command vehicle
Leer-3/Orlan 10 Control Screen: SMS Traffic overview
Comments
I feel like this old Tweet belongs in this thread.
Detection of Dutch and unusual Russia SIM cards by Leer-3/Orlan-10 system 😎🤓🥸
yes, i know very well... 👌😎🤓🥸
STL Malware used to gather information from Ukrainian tablets with Starlink dish API access
SS7 (GSM MAP) PSI command detected from Russian-linked HiddenArt Threat actor
@IanWraith if you search my tweets you will find most of the information and if you search my followX circle you will find much more.
@IanWraith Sorry I didn't mention the SIM-Jacker Key Master 👊, still in the shadows, not fully understood nor known by the still evolving public especially in Russia 😎🤓🥸😇!
@wiley_inc Mykolaivka, Donetsk Oblast
@wiley_inc None of these 5 towns in Donbass, at least according to google images, match. The images could date back to 2017, I have to check.
@wiley_inc
@photon6800 In reality I am the enemy of scoundrels, incompetents, liars, opportunists, arrogant, bullies, presumptuous people, petty thieves & Co. I am not interested in social, work or economic position.
Geolocate
Even if it doesn't fully agree, it seems the most similar to me... those loops could change over the months and years...
The reverse geocole of the LAC, MCC, MNC and CellID gives no results.
48.3826355, 36.2904063
48.588592, 39.52369764
Match Geolocation
48.588592, 39.52369764
@wiley_inc Done
Possible match with GSM 3G/4G coverage map. But we need cells (CellID).
Not work
Very good.
CellID tracker (Not for all operators but the information reported is very important. for example the position of the pylons 😎🤓🥸)
What data was available?
IMSI, TIMSI, IMEI (you can try incomplete lookup):
...
25501245047
25501285080
8681090408
8608450452
...
Maybe?
LAC: 63100
CellID: seem 5045/5015
Network: GSM [maybe 2G/3G]
xy: 610 (frequncy channel?)
xy: Ukraine 99 (255 99) [MCC MNC]
From here you can see how Russia has established itself with its GSM, 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G, UMTS, LTE, etc. identifiers on Ukrainian territory.
Here are just a few of the necessary background concepts. But there is much more and more.
A related topic to what is being discussed and connected to Russian GSM activity in Ukrainian territory are Bot-Farms.
And some activity to intercept them.
Here you can find a discussion and an example of how to try to use lateral thinking to intercept "complex" and "assembled" technological systems (in this case EW system).
Similar to what was done in the activities of the discussion in question.
Mykolaiv paratroopers shot down enemy drone capable of jamming GSM connection
2022
How the enemy UAV "LEER-3" works.
How Russia-backed separatists use “pinpoint propaganda” in the Donbas by Drone & SMS
2017
mil.in.ua/en/news/mykola…
sprotyvg7.com.ua/lesson/yak-pra…
medium.com/dfrlab/electro…
Strange that Sentinel-1 scans are not full available before 2019(it has been active since 2014)in the 5Ghz Interference Tracker tool(Composite &Ascending VH layer not present).
Scans from 2020 to 2022 identified some interference zone.
From 2019 to 2023. Zoom out.
Burchak-Mykhailivka, Oblast' di Luhans'k, Ucraina Via 5Ghz Interference Locator & Sentinel-1 satellite.
Fingerprints of Radar observable via radio/RF/EMF observability by radiometers.
Interference Radar - Sentinel-1 satellite from Caspian Sea Vs Luhansk.
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