Thread by @5GW_HotTakes

The @ODNIgov published an important report a few days ago, and it seems to have been lost in the information battle space. Let's break it down. #InformThePublic

FOREIGN THREATS TO US ELECTIONS AFTER VOTING ENDS IN 2024

Published: 22 October 2024
dni.gov/files/ODNI/doc…

The IC assesses that this year China, Iran, and Russia are better prepared to exploit opportunities to exert influence in the US general election after the polls close on election day due to lessons drawn from the 2020 election cycle.

It is expected that actors will at least conduct information operations denigrating US democracy through Inauguration Day.

Those conducting election operations after voting ends use: information operations, cyber operations, and potentially physical threats or violence.

Some foreign actors may conduct activities that seek to disrupt or delay time-sensitive & tightly sequenced series of processes/events that begin after polls close.

They might consider stoking unrest & conducting localized cyber ops to disrupt election infrastructure. However, the IC assesses that ops that could affect voting or official counts are less likely because they are more difficult & bring greater risk of US retaliation.

Foreign actors such as China, Iran & Russia have previously sought to amplify discord, including after the breach of the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 & probably are now better prepared to exploit opportunities after the polls close than in previous cycles.

POST-ELECTION DAY INFO OPS HIGHLY LIKELY
To create uncertainty & undermine the legitimacy of the election.

They will create false narratives or amplify content to create confusion & friction about the process, as they did after 2020, including the breach of the Capitol.

Influence actors will post & amplify claims of election irregularities, particularly if the electoral results are counter to their preferred outcomes. These activities will be designed to undermine faith in US democracy & could have ramifications for the post-election processes.

This year, Russian influence actors have posted about illegal voting, incl by undocumented immigrants & dead voters.
2020 & 2022, Russia identified alleged voter fraud as a "good topic" for influence efforts & promoted claims about irregular voting & the election being "stolen".

AI-generated materials to amplify doubts about the election's fair conduct, like false images of election officials taking part in activities to undermine the vote.

Russia & Iran have generated AI content.

Russia & Iran see opportunities to push content favoring their preferred outcome.

Russia has pushed negative messaging about VP Harris & alleged conspiracy theories about her elevation to the top of the ticket.

Iran may publish content denigrating candidate Trump.

FOREIGN ACTORS QUICKLY INCORPORATED CAPITOL BREACH INTO INFO OPS
7 Jan, a Russian official directed Russian media to exploit the violence to disparage the US. Russian proxies posted propaganda.
PRC & various Iranian gov oficials spread narratives that the US as a declining power.

Foreign actors are positioned to use cyber ops & espionage to sow doubt about the integrity of election & collect data. Actors might seek to disrupt or alter public-facing state gov & news websites to promote confusion; claim they've interfered, even if false, to undermine trust.

For instance, in 2022, pro-Russia, Main Intel Directorate (GRU)-connected cyber actors (Cyber Army of Russia Rebomn) conducted a DDoS attack against a public-facing US state election office website, rendering it periodically inaccessible throughout Election Day.

FOREIGN ACTORS GOALS TO PERSIST POST-ELECTION

After the polls close, China, Iran & Russia are likely to continue efforts to undermine US democracy, stoke societal unrest & position preferred candidates.

PHYSICAL THREATS & CYBERATTACKS

Capacity to stoke protests, take violent actions & conduct cyberattacks against some election infrastructure. They will be more likely to consider these tactics if they perceive it will resonate w/the population & maintain plausible deniability.

Foreign adversaries that have demonstrated a willingness to encourage participation in non-election-related, First Amendment-protected protests may extend this practice to any potential violent protests in the post-election period to further widen domestic divides.

Cyberattacks Against Election Infrastructure. Foreign actors will probably refrain from disruptive attacks to alter vote counts b/c they won't be able to impact the outcome w/o detection; risk retaliation & there is no indication they attempted such attacks the past 2 elections.

Foreign adversaries seek to undermine each stage of the post-voting process.
Vote tabulation is highly secure, but adversaries might exploit the period of uncertainty before results are finalized to spread disinfo about counting process & use cyber ops to reinforce narratives.

Foreign actors see the period between polls closing & certification as an opening to generate disinfo about election integrity. Likely concentrated on states/races identified as too close to call, although media about how close the election is might lead them to cast a wider net.

Vote Casting Resilient Against Manipulation Attempts
Foreign actors won't be able to manipulate official vote tallies & results on a large scale. Vote casting machines in poling stations are by standard practice not connected to the Internet or to each other.

CERTIFICATION & ELECTORAL COLLEGE PROCESS
Foreign actors may perceive a window of opportunity to push disinformation or foment or amplify protests & physical threats during the period between certification & the joint session of Congress to count electoral votes on 6 January.

Foreign actors creating or amplifying: narratives questioning the legitimacy of the election results or the voting process could try messaging to increase popular pressure on state or local officials not to certify results & challenge states' ability to meet deadlines.

The most critical dates in this time period include: the deadline for issuing Certificates of Ascertainment on 11 Dec; the meeting of electors to vote in each state & DC on 17 Dec; and when Congress convenes in a joint session o count the electoral votes on 6 January.

Adversaries' messaging campaigns also may seek to amplify any protests that could interfere with the certification process.

Foreign-driven or amplified violent protests, threats to election workers or state & local officials could challenge officials' ability to conduct elements of the certification & Electoral College process.

Adversaries' efforts to disrupt the peaceful transfer of power probably would hinge on info ops earlier that succeeded in fomenting lingering protests or threats. Foreign actors are likely to denigrate US political system & fan protests-as they did in 2020

A multipronged approach that includes direct warnings to adversaries, public messaging to Americans that prebunks or debunks false narratives & proactive comms between local officials & law enforcement has the best chance of thwarting foreign influence efforts after the election. #InformThePublic

The last page & a half is redacted.

Overarching goals of these foreign actors are to undermine US democracy & stoke societal unrest, with Russia focusing on denigrating American democracy, Iran on encouraging discord & violence & China on undermining democracy.
#InformThePublic