Thread by @KofmanMichael

A long thread on the war and the current situation. Although the worst-case scenarios didn’t materialize in 2024, it was the most difficult period since spring 2022. There were positive developments, and bright spots, but the current trajectory is negative. 1/

First, a brief retrospective. Last winter things looked bleak. Ukraine was dealing with a deficit of manpower, low supplies of ammunition, and was only starting to establish a network of fortifications. Russia held the initiative, and the materiel advantage going into 2024. 2/

Even though Avdiivka fell, by summer it became clear that a collapse of UA frontlines was unlikely. Russia’s Kharkiv offensive was unsuccessful, and they couldn’t capitalize on the strain imposed. Early results from UA mobilization in June-July seemed positive. 3/

It looked as though 2024 would be a difficult year, but the front could stabilize come winter, assuming sustained Western support, and Ukraine could address its manpower issues. Ukraine’s manpower, fortifications, and ammunition situation was improving. 4/

Unfortunately, while the critical shortages in ammunition were rectified, the more important positive trends on mobilization, and reconstitution were not sustained. Ukraine’s manning levels continued to decline, especially among infantry units holding the front lines. 5/

Mobilization rates dropped off considerably after the summer, and although AFU has been inflicting high casualties on Russian forces, it has also been taking significant casualties and dealing with increased numbers of troops AWOL. 6/

Despite the regular calls for more Western equipment, some units had to cannibalize their crews using said Western equipment to use as infantry, and in general, more equipment is unlikely to address the deficit of men at the front, or unwillingness to serve as infantry. 7/

The front is not imploding, but Russian forces have increased their rate of gain over July-December. The most problematic area is south of Pokrovsk. Following the fall of Avdiivka, then Vuhledar, RF forces have slowly taken important anchoring positions in Donetsk. 8/

Russian forces have not been able to convert their material advantage into operationally significant breakthroughs. This is partly due to force quality issues. They assault in a way that presses the front line, but is not conducive to achieving major breakthroughs. 9/

Attacks often employ small groups of dismounted infantry, along with light vehicle, and larger mechanized assaults. This is partly reduce equipment losses, but also due to a general inability to overcome prepared defenses, covered by pervasive reconnaissance, and strike UAS. 10/

These tactics yield incremental gains. Larger assaults have proven costly to Russian forces, which cannot afford sustained equipment losses of the kind seen earlier in Avdiivka, though company sized mechanized assaults were seen throughout the fall. 11/

Russia retains an advantage in airpower conducting standoff strikes. But Ukraine’s chief challenges include mobilization and training issues, force management, and how the force has been employed. It is not just insufficient men, or how they’re employed, but both. 12/

What’s different about the current dynamic? Russia lacks a decisive fires advantage, and there is parity in tactical strike drones. In some areas Ukraine is advantaged in UAS. Yet Russian progress has been increasing over the past six months. 13/

There is a visible slowdown in December, but weather is a significant factor. Russian forces advance south of Pokrovsk, flanking the city. AFU has lost more than 50% of the Kursk salient. Despite high RF/DPRK casualties there, Russian forces continue to press the pocket. 14/

The Kursk offensive forced a shift of some higher quality Russian forces, and RF airpower, to counterattack AFU units there, but it has not led to a change in the overall dynamic in this war and RF advances in Donetsk have only accelerated since August. 15/

Ukraine’s decision to make new brigades, instead of replacing losses at the front line among the best and most experienced units, had proven to be one of the more puzzling force management choices given the battlefield situation and problems with mobilization. 16/

Western countries did not promise UA 14 brigades of equipment, or even half that number. Expanding the force with new brigades, when men are desperately needed to replace losses among experienced formations deployed on the front lines, had visible tradeoffs. 17/

Not only are the new brigades inexperienced, lacking in good leadership, and generally combat ineffective, but they are also not being employed as brigades either. Instead, battalions are detached and sent piecemeal to reinforce other units. 18/

The scandal with the French trained 155th is just the most egregious case. As was seen in 2023, new formations perform poorly in offensive and defensive roles. Requiring considerable time to gain experience, cohesion, confidence, etc. 19/

Consequently, across the front units are being detached and attached to others short of men, leading to a steady fragmentation of the defensive effort and loss of cohesion. This patchwork groupings of forces must hold the front. 20/

UA still has to address longstanding issues with basic training, and command and control. Long overdue is a transition to corps from the current makeshift OSUV-OTU structure. Some existing brigades are already at or approaching the size of divisions. 21/

Meanwhile Ukrainian UAS units serve as essential force multipliers, employing remote mining, attriting Russian units before they’re able to make contact, and keeping Russian capabilities back in the critical 0-30km zone from the front line. 22/

However, tech innovation, tactical adaptation, and better integration are insufficient to compensate for failure to address the fundamentals. Russian gains may appear unimpressive, but UA needs to address manpower, training, and force management issues to sustain this fight. 23/

The air defense situation near the front line has improved, with Ukraine scaling successful use of FPV interceptors to take down Russian UAS behind the front lines. But air defense remains a major problem, especially for defending critical infrastructure. 24/

Russian long range drone strikes have increased significantly since the summer, with numbers at 5-6x compared to this spring. These attacks now employ a significant % of decoys, imitators, and other types of drones intended to exhaust air defense. 25/

Ukraine’s own long-range strike capacity has grown immensely, holding RF infrastructure at risk. As production of drones and ground launched cruise missile grows, in 2025 it will be far less dependent on Western strike capabilities, or dealing with associated restrictions. 26/

Yes, Russian losses are significant, but current RF contract rate is still providing replacements and enabling rotations. Russian payouts and bonuses have grown astronomically, raising questions on how long they can keep this up into 2025. Eventually, no amount of RUB will be enough. 27/

You could view the current situation positively: Ukraine is grinding down Russian forces. Russian gains are small relative to costs. There has been no collapse of the front. I find this narrative superficially appealing, but I think it obscures more than it enlightens. 28/

You won’t encounter these kinds of ‘positive vibes’ at the front line, or in Kyiv either. Ukraine is losing territory. The coldest part of the winter is yet ahead. The current theory of success is unclear, or what resources will be made available by the West in 2025. 29/

Given observed constraints, Russia can't sustain this intensity of combat operations either, and faces significant headwinds in the latter half of 2025. But the current situation requires course correction. Spinning the prevailing dynamic as positive strikes me as unhelpful. 30/

Increased long-range strike capability alone is unlikely to compel Russia to negotiate as long as RF keeps making gains along the front, and increasing its own strike capacity. Stabilizing the front line is essential to buying time and forcing Moscow to reassess. 31/

AFU could attempt another offensive this winter, like the Kursk operation, seeking to shift the narrative and attain more Russian territory to bargain with. This may yield tactical successes, but will come at considerable risk to other parts of the front. 32/

The war is far from over and options remain for course correction. UA can still stabilize the front, raising the costs to Russia considerably in 2025. But the Trump administration is inheriting a weak hand, that won’t be easily rectified, lacking a common strategy with Kyiv. 33/

Ukraine and the West need to come together and form a coherent approach, tethered to the resources available, and an actual plan with steps both Kyiv and its allies must take. 34/

It will require a vision on how to stabilize the front, exhaust the RF offensive, and compel Russia into negotiations on more favorable terms. Ukraine must also receive clarity on what security guarantees, and future support it can expect to deter another war.