1/ Quick overview of the #Eurogroup deal on #EMU reform. Pretty much in line with expectations. That it took the whole night to agree on a pretty modest package shows how difficult it has become to even get to minimal compromises.
Voilà the main features:
2/ First on the euro area budget: Ministers say they will work on an instrument for convergence and competitiveness if the summit asks them to. BUT: Stabilisation not included in that potential mandate. Instead, no agreement at all here. Interesting that France agreed to this.
3/ On ESM reform: Ministers say they can prepare the amendments to the ESM treaty by June 2019 - if the summit asks them to. So this is for the heads to confirm. Good that there is a deadline, otherwise other decisions would have been rather meaningless.
4/ On substance, there is agreement on the backstop, including on possibly changing the IGA, which is the precondition that a backstop before 2024 would make any sense. ECB/SRB will assess progress on reduction of bad loans in 2020.
5/ They clarified the rules for getting precautionary assistance (PCCL) - and they got tougher, not easier. So far, respect of a country's SGP commitments was enough. In the future, in addition the country will need to have complied also with hard quantitative benchmarks.
6/ This means that even if the @EU_Commission assesses a member state as compliant with economic governance rules, a country does not autmatically qualify for precautionary assistance. Under the agreement, Spain out of scope (b/c of EDP), Portugal b/c of debt rule also rather out
7/ There is a commitment to introduce single-limb CACs, so to make debt restructuring more straightforward. Quite the concession by the Italians. Also ministers endorse the COM/ESM position on their division of labour, leaving main parts to COM.
8/ Finally, ministers "reaffirm the principle that financial assistance should only be granted to countries whose debt is sustainable" - except that this principle is nowhere to be found in the ESM treaty. Will be interesting to see what this means in terms of treaty language.
9/ To sum up: Very modest package, but with impressively little left for the heads. Only open issue seems to be the eurozone budget and the go-ahead for changing the ESM treaty. So glass half-full in terms of keeping the ball rolling. But glass more than half-empty on substance.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
FAZ reports that the federal president is consulting with the chancellor and the leader of the opposition on next steps if the coalition collapses.
Good moment to run you through the main options and steps that would follow if indeed it's over:
There are essentially two ways this could end. Lindner could just pull the plug. FDP ministers would resign from their posts. Or Scholz runs out of patience and asks the federal president to remove Lindner (and presumably also the other FDP ministers).
The government would have no majority in parliament anymore. But in Germany, you cannot force a chancellor or a government out of office by simple no-confidence vote. The Bundestag would need to elect another chancellor to do that. And there is no majority in sight for anyone.
Draghi hat seinen Bericht zur Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas vorgelegt - und natürlich konzentriert sich die Diskussion in 🇩🇪 sofort auf die Frage neue EU-Schulden ja/nein/vielleicht.
Warum das ein Fehler und dieser Bericht eine große Chance auch aus Berliner Perspektive ist:
Der Bericht ist zunächst eine ziemlich schonungslose Standortbestimmung der europäischen Wirtschaft im globalen Vergleich. Und Draghi sagt: Es sieht nicht gut aus. Als zentrale Gründe macht er fehlende Produktivität und mangelnde Innovation aus.
Außerdem nennt er die Herausforderungen durch Fachkräftemangel, hohe Energiepreise und notwendige Dekarbonisierung. Und eben die globale, teilweise unfaire, Konkurrenz. Klingt alles bekannt aus der deutschen Debatte? Eben.
The Draghi report has just dropped - and it is surprisingly good and low-bullshit.
My initial takeaways:
Such reports tend to be boring to read: Because the authors are mincing their words, because of too many cooks in the kitchen, because the "outside expert" is not really allowed to say what they want or do not know what they want to say.
The Letta report suffered from several of these ailments. The Draghi report suffers from none thereof. The man obviously knows what he wants to say and doesn't mince his words. The report is refreshingly low-bullshit, puts fingers in obvious wounds and largely avoids euphemisms.
The 🚦 agreement is actually pretty good news for a number of Eurozone files, including the fiscal rules and EDIS.
Here are the main bits:
1/ Most importantly, the text says that the fiscal rules can be "developed further" to reach three goals: Secure growth, safeguard debt sustainability and foster green investment. They should also become "simpler and more transparent, also to strengthen implementation".
2/ This is pretty big. No red lines here, but an open and constructive opening position for negotiations that can very well include a change to the rules themselves. It will be now up to the Commission and other member states to take up the offer that is in that text.
Das @_FriedrichMerz-Interview im @handelsblatt ist beeindruckendes Anschauungsmaterial, wie sich ein Teil der Konservativen im europapolitischen Wald verirrt hat und jetzt nicht mehr herausfindet.
Warum das ein Problem ist:
1/ Es geht mit dem klassischen Motiv los, dass man höllisch aufpassen muss, den faulen Südeuropäern (hier stv 🇮🇹🇪🇸) nicht ihr Hallodritum zu finanzieren. Dass gerade diese Länder die ambitioniertesten Pläne zur Verwendung der EU-Gelder vorgelegt haben, bleibt natürlich unerwähnt.
2/ Es geht dann weiter zu den Schuldenregeln. Hier räumt auch Merz ein, dass die Einhaltung für viele Länder schwierig wird. Und dann wird es spannend: Er drückt sich extrem wortreich um eine Antwort herum, ob man die Regeln denn nun wirklich so einhalten sollte.
Commissioner @PaoloGentiloni announces in @SZ that the Commission will only present its proposal for fiscal rules reform once there is a consensus among eurozone countries. Here's why this is a wise approach and why we are still far away from that point: sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/eu-…
1/ A weird feeling has grown in recent months that an expenditure rule is the way to go to reform the SGP and that what we basically need now is a Commission proposal that the technocrats then can tweak so that everyone is happy. Everyone is now waiting for that proposal.
2/ In my view, this feeling is a trap and the Commission is now trying to avoid falling into this trap by basically asking member states to come to a consensus what they want before puttting out a proposal.