, 78 tweets, 27 min read Read on Twitter
Dear Media, It is irresponsible to continue pretending we have a system that allows us to know whether or not our “official” election results are legitimate. 1/
2/ The terrible truth is that neither you, nor I, nor any other voter knows what happened inside the electronic voting machines, election management systems, ballot marking devices, and tabulators used to count our votes.
3/ All electronic vote tallies can be hacked through the internet, even if the voting machine itself isn’t connected to it. freedom-to-tinker.com/2016/09/20/whi…
4/ This is because, before every election, “all voting machines must accept electronic input files” via a “cartridge or memory card … prepared on an Election Management (EMS) computer” that connects to the internet. freedom-to-tinker.com/2016/09/20/whi…
5/ @danwallach, manager of Rice University’s Computer Security Lab, agrees that “When you dig down, [many vendors] often have election management systems connected to the Internet, albeit behind firewalls, VPNs, or other such devices.” thinkprogress.org/how-easy-would…
6/ So does PhD student @umbernhard (University of Michigan) who says “it’s likely that ballots are programmed by computers that are in some way connected to the Internet.” thinkprogress.org/how-easy-would…
7/ Moreover, results from the precincts are often transmitted into a central tabulator over a local area network, so that the “chain-of-custody of the images is not provable, and images may be manipulated in transmission by network-based attacks.” d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/jillstein/page…
8/ Central tabulators, in turn, transmit results to online Election Night Reporting Systems, creating another opportunity for internet hacking of voting machine tallies. nybooks.com/daily/2018/11/…
9/ “In Georgia, a flash drive transfers results from the central tabulator to the online election night reporting system, and the SAME flash drive is then reinserted into the tabulator for the next round of memory cards.” nybooks.com/daily/2018/11/…
10/ As explained by election integrity advocate @MarilynRMarks1, this is like “sharing needles.” nybooks.com/daily/2018/11/…
11/ Moreover, Wisconsin election official administrator Michael Haas has acknowledged that some of its voting equipment in 2016 was indeed connected to the internet! columbusfreepress.com/article/real-s…
12/ Presumably, he was referring to Wisconsin’s use of DS200 ballot scanners made by voting machine vendor Election Systems & Software (“ES&S”), which “upgraded” them in 2015 to include cellular modems. democraticunderground.com/12512657652
13/ “There are currently over 26,500 ES&S DS200 optical scan vote-counting machines in 25 states. It is not yet known how many of them have the cellular capability.” democraticunderground.com/12512657652
14/ Here’s a screenshot from an ES&S blog in which a Wisconsin county clerk gushes about the DS200’s modeming capabilities:
15/ Florida — another swing state — gave a “thumbs up” to the DS200 cellular modems in 2015 as well.
16/ In 2018, McClatchy confirmed that some Florida and Illinois counties have “cellular-enabled modems.” mcclatchydc.com/news/policy/te…
17/ According to Computer Science and election security expert Andrew Appel (Princeton University), these new cellular modems make it easy for a “man-in-the-middle” hacker to alter votes using a small “fake cell tower” device such as a Stingray. freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/02/22/are…
18/ In October 2018, “thirty cybersecurity, election security, and computer science experts sent a letter ...to the DHS & the Election Assistance Commission requesting they discourage states from using wireless modems in their voting systems..” axios.com/cybersecurity-…
19/ DHS (and apparently the EAC) declined to do so. via @ericgeller
20/ Meanwhile, it seems that Michigan uses cellular modems to transfer its precinct results as well.
21/ And although South Carolina officials claimed that “No voting machines in (SC) have any wireless capability,” computer scientist @duncanbuell said “logs from the June 12 primary in the state show 23 machines communicating data electronically...” mcclatchydc.com/news/policy/te…
22/ “‘There certainly seems to have been some modem connections, yes,’ Buell said.”
mcclatchydc.com/news/policy/te… mcclatchydc.com/news/policy/te…
23/ North Carolina apparently used cellular-modem transmission in 2016, but “enacted a law in June [2018] barring the 100 counties in that state from using any wireless communication.” It is unclear whether the modems must actually be removed. mcclatchydc.com/news/policy/te…
24/ Meanwhile, ES&S admitted last year (after prior denials) that it has installed remote access software in election management systems used in 300 jurisdictions that it won’t identify.
npr.org/2018/09/21/649…
25/ Diebold/Premier (previously called Global Election Systems) reportedly installed remote access software in election management systems as well. Another mega-vendor, Dominion Voting, refused to comment when asked by cybersecurity journalist @KimZetter. (Source in post 24)
26/ Election management systems are centralized county (or state) computers that program all voting machines, scanners, & ballot marking devices b4 each election. They also include the central tabulators that aggregate all electronic precinct totals. nybooks.com/daily/2018/11/…
27/ But vendors have managed to mislead by emphasizing that they have never installed remote access in “voting machines.” Most reporters (other than @KimZetter) apparently did not think to ask about the election management systems.
29/ “Although election officials often claim our computerized election system is too ‘decentralized’ to allow an outcome-altering cyber-attack, it is, in fact, centralized in one very important way...” nybooks.com/daily/2018/11/…
30/ Just two vendors, ES&S and Dominion Voting, account for more than 80 % of US election equipment. “A third company, Hart Intercivic, ... accounts for another 11 %.” nybooks.com/daily/2018/11/…
31/ “The enormous reach of these three vendors creates an obvious vulnerability and potential target for a corrupt insider or outside hacker intent on wreaking havoc.”
32/ ES&S is the largest vendor of all. It alone accounts for 44% of US election equipment. trustthevote.org/wp-content/upl…
33/ Each of the states shown in orange below uses at least some type of election equipment from ES&S. verifiedvoting.org/verifier/
34/ Regardless of what vendor supplies the equipment, it is also easy to insert malware onto voting machines when they are updated. freedom-to-tinker.com/2016/09/20/whi…
35/ Optical scanners are also easy to rig bc (in addition to other vulnerabilities) they use memory cards that can be programmed w/o detection to +1K votes for one candidate and -1K for the other candidate (or whatever +/- number a bad actor chooses). dailykos.com/story/2005/6/1…
36/ As explained by computer science expert @jhalderm (Univ. Michigan), the only way to verify if an electronic tally is correct is to hand count the paper ballots or to forensically audit the machines. link.medium.com/N9d2W3TmMV
37/ “DHS officials admitted … that they [did] not conduct[] a forensic analysis of any voting equipment used in the [2016] presidential election.” thenation.com/article/americ…
38/ As implied in this letter from @RonWyden, it is also highly improbable that they conducted such an analysis in 2018.
39/ Indeed, private vendors routinely block forensic analysis of their software & equipment on the grounds that it is proprietary. thenation.com/article/touch-…
40/ As to the 2016 recount, the Wisconsin court refused to order that it be conducted by HAND. jsonline.com/story/news/pol…
41/ Although a few Wisconsin counties hand recounted voluntarily, most large counties refused. d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/jillstein/page…
42/ Michigan excluded from the 2016 recount (a) those precincts where the number of voters and the number of votes differed and (b) votes from voting machines with broken seals. It was also shut down after only three days. truthout.org/articles/the-r…
43/ As for PA, most of its machines are paperless, but the court refused to order a recount even as to those machines that used paper. chicagotribune.com/news/nationwor…
44/ The following states do not require manual audits to confirm that electronic outcomes are legitimate:

Alabama
Arkansas
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Kansas
Illinois
Indiana
Louisiana
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
Mississippi
45/

Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
46/ Source for posts 44 and 45. americanprogress.org/issues/democra…
47/ Moreover, experts agree that only two or three states currently conduct manual audits anywhere near sufficient to detect election fraud.

Link: editions.lib.umn.edu/electionacadem…

Link: politico.com/magazine/story…
48/ Also, many jurisdictions plan to use machine-marked summary cards (which they misleadingly call “paper ballots”), rather than hand marked paper ballots. Manual audits based on summary cards are unreliable bc it’s impossible to know if voters reviewed the machine-marked text.
49/ Source for post 48. salon.com/2019/02/16/phi…
50/ Moreover, a recent study suggests that most voters won’t review the summary cards at all (even if instructed to do so) and won’t notice erroneous or fraudulent text even if they do conduct such a review. salon.com/2019/02/16/phi…
51/ Alarmingly, some of these new machines (a) give voters the option to NOT review the paper summary card and (b) don’t mark the summary card at all until AFTER this decision is made. salon.com/2019/03/28/new…
52/ Experts call this a “Permission to Cheat” design defect bc it tells the machines which voters definitely aren’t looking and thus enables bad actors to program or hack the machines to create entirely fraudulent summary cards just for those voters. (See Source in post 51.)
53/ If the text on the summary cards (paper audit trail) has been corrupted to match a fraudulent electronic outcome, it is impossible for a manual audit to detect that.
54/ And for most systems that use these machine-marked summary cards (that are misleadingly called “paper ballots”), the only portion of the summary cards that is actually counted as our vote is a barcode that humans can’t read and thus can’t verify. whowhatwhy.org/2019/01/11/geo…
55/ In short, machine-marked summary cards enable cheating bc voters can’t verify the only part counted as their vote (the barcode), most states won’t conduct robust manual audits of the machine-marked text in 2020 (if ever), & any such manual audits would be meaningless anyway.
56/ Then of course there’s Russia’s infiltration of VR Systems, the software provider for voter registration poll books in 8 states, including North Carolina, which was a critical 2016 swing state & experienced massive problems with those systems in 2016. link.medium.com/pPp2DSZsMV
57/ IF the 2016 election had harmonized with exit polls, there might be some basis to conclude that — despite our use of easily rigged voting machines, scanners, & ballot marking devices — the electronic tallies themselves probably were not altered.
58/ Instead, there was a significant “red shift” between the official tallies and the exit polls (before they were adjusted to match the official results), including in key swing states: OH (7.9%), PA (5.1%), WI (4.7%), NC (3.7%), FL (1.2%). tdmsresearch.com/2016/11/10/201…
59/ The info in post 58 was compiled by @JonathanSimon14.
60/ Nor can we take comfort in the rigorous vetting of who is allowed to control the voting machines.
61/ Diebold/Premier — which accounted for about 30% of US election equipment before it was acquired by ES&S in 2009 — was reportedly founded by criminals. freepress.org/article/felons…
62/ Diebold (previously called “Global”) brought on convicted felon Jeffrey Dean as majority shareholder and Senior VP just before the 2000 election. people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/voting/… [Vanity Fair] people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/voting/…
63/ “Dean had served time on 23 counts of embezzlement involving computer tampering and a “high degree of sophistication and planning” wired.com/2003/12/con-jo…
64/ According to Wired, convicted felon Dean “wrote & maintained…code used to count hundreds of thousands of votes.” wired.com/2003/12/con-jo… … …
65/ Dean programmed the GEMS central tabulator system, which counted one-third of the votes in 37 states in 2004. theguardian.com/politics/2005/…
66/ When the media began asking questions about Dean (thanks to the investigative efforts of @BevHarrisWrites), Diebold told them that Dean had left the company. tyt.com/stories/4vZLCH…
67/ "But election-integrity advocate and author Bev Harris obtained Dean's court file, which included internal Diebold memos showing that Dean had remained as a consultant." tyt.com/stories/4vZLCH…
68/ Diebold's president at that time was Bob Urosevich, who had previously founded ES&S with his brother, Todd Urosevich. ES&S acquired Diebold in 2009. tyt.com/stories/4vZLCH…
69/ There is no way for ordinary citizens to determine whether or not Dean or members of his family are still involved with voting equipment. The mainstream media and Congress have apparently decided not to ask.
70/ According to @VoterGA, Georgia's State Election Board knew Diebold's chief programmer was a convicted embezzler, received a copy of his sentencing document, & took NO ACTION. voterga.org/category/uncat…
71/ I know you know that democracy dies in darkness. So why do you refuse to shine a light on America's voting machine vendors?!
72/ It is a scandal that states have not even enacted laws to require written confirmation from the voting system vendors that no one affiliated with the company has committed a felony.
73/ It is also a scandal that jurisdictions don't require robust manual audits and have continued using and buying electronic equipment without #HandMarkedPaperBallots, thus precluding manual audits altogether or rendering them meaningless.
74/ We would be fools to think that the same elected officials who created this monstrous situation will fix it without substantial public oversight. Thanks to your inadequate reporting, however, the public has been lulled into a false sense of security & thus inaction.
75/ Please do better so that voters understand the importance of demanding robust manual audits in 2020 and #HandMarkedPaperBallots, not the machine-marked kind from hackable touchscreen systems (except for voters who are unable to hand mark). Thank you. #ProtectOurVotes
76/ Correction to post 62. The convicted embezzler was the largest shareholder, not the majority shareholder.
77/ Here is the Medium version of this Thread. The thread includes some updates, but the Medium version conveys most of the same points. medium.com/@jennycohn1/de…
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