1. Over the next few months, one Washington event, and a series of Middle East events shall converge to drive a fatal stake into the FP/NatSec ‘establishment’. I expect this to be a significant moment marking the demise of the old influence industry re: America’s policies.
2. The establishment is already caught within two forces sapping its relevance: it is mistrusted by a significant portion of the general/voting public, as well as the top reaches of the executive—itself picked by the public.
3. FP/NatSec is the most prestigious of the establishment’s many temples. It gave a participating individual much leeway in formulating very big oeuvres; this is why public/executive trust is critical. Hence the tremors it may experience will have disproportional effect.
4. And the damage won’t be compartmentalized within part of the temple or one part of the ruling class: the system works by circuitous accreditation to firm up reputational standing. One part falls, the rest follows.
5. The establishment refuses to reflect on the reasons as to why it lost the confidence of the public. A big reason for that, in this generation, has to do with the Iraq War. The establishment felt that blaming the whole thing on the neocons was enough of a convincing narrative.
6. Scapegoating W and the neocons absolved the establishment of what went wrong; folks out in Hicksville would buy that, the thinking goes. They haven’t, though. This explains why the establishment’s consensus on Trump being a danger to national security did not take.
7. They aren’t trying to win back their stature in the voters’ eyes. The establishment’s hive mind tried a different route: neutralize the problem with the top executive.
8. They couldn’t merely co-opt Trump. They needed to destroy him, showcasing their potency. It was more pique than politics.
9. They came at Trump with a set of talking points proving that he was a national security risk. In their haste and in their general lack of discipline and prowess, they oversold it as treason. That effort has flopped in a spectacular way.
10. The flop will turn disastrous for them with a renewed focus on the Steele dossier. This will make the FP/NatSec establishment look exceedingly bad and contemptible. Even if the voters reject Trump, they are unlikely to choose someone the establishment likes (Biden, for e.g.).
11. Individuals at the Principal level of decision-making had to be involved for something like the Steele dossier to track. Don’t have evidence, just a sense of how these things happen. At the end of this, it will perceived as if even President Obama was personally implicated.
12. Those championing former VP Biden as Trump’s counter have not factored in such perceptions taking shape among a wider public once the investigation into the Steele dossier gets going.
13. Many of these general trends are easy to discern. The question for me, from the very beginning, was how long will the process take: along the lines of “How long before the established think tanks tank?” The answer is becoming clearer these days: very soon.
14. Sensible people would have been judging matters sensibly if they had said it would take +10 years for the system/apparatus to unravel. They would be, however, neglecting to factor in irrational vectors, as well as speeded-up time, in their calculations.
15. What would collapse look like? The NYTimes is not going out of print in a year’s time, CFR or Yale are not shuttering either. But there will be a wider sense that such levers are not where it’s at. Power, in NatSec and other matters, will be sought elsewhere.
16. So many panels, so many papers, so many briefings, so many leaks, so many books. The content/liturgy churned out in FP/NatSec is massive, both inside and outside government. There are thousands of people involved, with hundreds of millions of dollars slushing around.
17. NatSec debates in DC always had the feel of “talking among ourselves”. But they were massively consequential: once opinion broke in a certain direction, policy followed.
18. Nowadays this content, and the assiduous energy that goes into it, seems redundant. Consensus or policy momentum doesn’t matter if the American public and Trump (or a Sanders) don’t buy into it. What’s left are the rites and rituals of a fading cult.
19. Much of the influence industry revolves around explaining world events in billionaire-ese. But the billionaires will see what others can see: the old gods have been surpassed.
20. It will lather up with further irrelevance as the next few months are spent with revelations of the who/where/what of the Steele dossier, and as Iran decides to call America’s bluff through a series of confrontations over the shortcomings of “maximum pressure”.
21. “Yet another war in the Middle East??!” “You don’t have a defined endgame for a confrontation with the Iranians??!” These are the likely reactions one would hear. Trump has signaled that this is where his heart is too.
22. It will get quite embarrassing when rhetoric does not match action. I don’t think it’ll resemble previous stand-offs. Mostly because I think there are certain Iranians who always believed that conditions are auspicious for a ‘hot’ confrontation.
23. Those Iranians, such as Gen. Qasim Soleimani, seek a moment of clarity, one in which they reveal to their regional adversaries that Iran had won its battles in Iraq-Syria-Lebanon, and that the Americans are no longer a significant factor in regional balances.
24. From that moment of clarity, Soleimani et al will advance towards a rapprochement with the Turks, with the Saudis, and even with the Americans. A ‘Pax Soleimana’, if you will. But first, he wants acknowledgment of victory.
25. His dividend is the extent of American humiliation accompanying that moment of clarity. U.S. policy crafters should have been focused on minimizing that. But Sec Pompeo is somewhat of a dork. He does not see it coming.
26. There was the option of ignoring the Iranians; shrugging away Iranian advances as a byproduct of America’s widening disinterest in the regional. That would have saved some face.
27. The Trump administration should have capped its escalations at scrapping the Iran deal. It would then work to frustrate Soleimani and his ilk at every turn through clandestine action. That would have denied him an opportunity to show up a superpower.
28. There are many obvious problems with a big humiliation. One of them is Iranian hubris and overreach. Soleimani thinks he will carry his wins towards consolidation, the region towards stabilization. He too is reading it all wrong.
29. Those of you who’ve followed my writings will see that I am repeating myself here. But what’s new is the matter of timing: the influence industry is really close to its breaking point. This is a really big deal. Now the question becomes one of what replaces it. END
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