, 429 tweets, 52 min read Read on Twitter
IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN

The Office identified multiple contacts- "links," in the words of the Appointment Orderbetween Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government.
The Office investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election.
In particular, the investigation examined whether these contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the Trump Campaign and RU, including with respect to RU providing assistance to the Campaign in exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future.
Based on the available information, the investigation did not establish such coordination.
This Section describes the principal links between the Trump Campaign and individuals with ties to the Russian government , including some contacts with Campaign officials or associates that have been publicly reported to involve Russian contacts.
Each subsection begins with an overview of the Russian contact at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts, which are generally presented in chron. order, beginning with the early months of the Campaign and extending through the post-election, transition period.
A. Campaign Period (September 2015 - November 8, 2016)

Russian-government -connected individuals and media entities began showing interest in Trump 's campaign in the months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015. (FN 288)
*FN 288: For example, on August 18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper Vzglyad, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phone or in-person candidate interview.
*FN 288 cont'd: 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to Hicks. One day earlier, the publication's founder (and former Russian parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites-Trump2016.ru and DonaldTrump2016.ru. No interview took place. (End FN 288)
Because Trump's status as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior business and entertainment dealings,
this Office investigated whether a business contact with Russia-linked individuals and entities during the campaign period-the Trump Tower Moscow project, see Volume l, Section IV.A. I, infra-led to or involved coordination of election assistance.
Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of 2016, when Trump was moving toward- and eventually becoming-t he Republican nominee for President.
As set forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period:
outreach to two of Trump 's then-recently named foreign policy advisors, including a representation that Russia had "dirt" on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails (Volume I, Sections IV.A.2 & IV.A.3);
dealings with a D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and has connections with its government (Volume I, Section IV.A.4);
a meeting at Trump Tower between the Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was "part of Russia and its government's support for [Trump]" (Volume I, Section IV.A.5);
events at the Republican National Convention (Volume I, Section IV.A.6); post-Convention contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to the United States (Volume I, Section IV.A.7);
and contacts through campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for a Russian oligarch and a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine (Volume I, Section IV.A.8).
1. Trump Tower Moscow Project

The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States as part of its real estate portfolio. Some projects have involved the acquisition and ownership (through subsidiary corporate structures) of property.
In other cases , the Trump Organization has executed licensing deals with real estate developers and management companies, often local to the country where the project was located. (FN 289)
*FN 289: See, e.g., Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committe e, 115th Cong. 151-52 (Sept. 7, 2017) ( discussing licensing deals of specific projects). (End FN 289)
Between at least 2013 and 2016, the Trump Organization explored a similar licensing deal in Russia involving the construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow.
The project, commonly referred to as a "Trump Tower Moscow" or "Trump Moscow" project , anticipated a combination of commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same building.
Between 2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization, including thenpresident of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties.
From the fall of 2015 until the middle of 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the Trump Organization's pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow project, including by reporting on the project's status to candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization. (FN 290)
*FN 290: As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.l , supra, in November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress concerning, among other things, the duration of the Trump Tower Moscow project.
*FN 290 cont'd: See Information ,r 7(a), United States v. Michael Cohen, 1 :18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 ("Cohen Information"). (End FN 290)
a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014)
The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group , a Russian real estate conglomerate owned and controlled by Aras Agalarov, began discussing a Russia-based real estate project shortly after the conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow. (FN 291)
*FN 291: See Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 13 (Sept. 7, 2017) ("Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr. Agalarov' s company, Crocus Group, began preliminarily discussion [sic] potential real estate projects in Moscow.").
*FN 291 cont'd: As has been widely reported, the Miss Universe pageant-which Trump co-owned at the time-was held at the Agalarov-owned Crocus City Hall in Moscow in November 2013.
*FN 291 cont'd: Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant, and Aras Agalarov's son Emin was a musical performer at the event, which Trump attended. (End FN 291)*
Donald J. Trump Jr. served as the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization;
Emin Agalarov (son of Aras Agalarov) and Irakli "Ike" Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations, (FN 292) with the occasional assistance of Robert Goldstone. (FN 293)
*FN 292: Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 2, 4-6 [redacted; grand jury] OSC KAV_00385 (12/6/13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kalveldaze & E. Agalarov. (End FN 292)*

*FN 293: [readacted; grand jury]. (End FN 293)*
In December 2013, Kaveladze and Trump Jr. negotiated and signed preliminary terms of an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow project. (FN 294)

*FN 294: [redacted; grand jury] (End FN 294)*
On December 23, 2013, after discussions with Donald J. Trump, the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the organization received a flat 3.5% commission on all sales, with no licensing fees or incentives. (FN 295)
*FN 295: OSC-KA V _00452 (12/23/13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov). (End FN 295)*
The parties negotiated a letter of intent during January and February 2014. (FN 296)

*FN 296: See, e.g., OSC-KAV_01158 (Letter agreement signed by Trump Jr. & E. Agalarov); OSCKAV_01147 (1/20/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.). (End FN 296)*
From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump Organization and Crocus Group discussed development plans for the Moscow project.
Some time before January 24, 2014, the Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be constructed at an Agalarov-owned site in Moscow called "Crocus City," which had also been the site of the Miss Universe pageant.
(FN 297)

*FN 297: See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00972 (10/14/ 14 Email, McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about specifications); OSC-KAV_00540 (1/24/14 Email, McGee to Trump Jr. et al.). (End FN 297)*
In Feb. 2014, Ivanka Trump met with Emin Agalarov and toured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow. (FN 298)

*FN 298: See OSC-KAV00631 (2/5/14 Email, E. Agalarov to Ivanka Trump Jr. & Kaveladze ); Goldstone Facebook post, 2/4/14 (8:01 a.m.) [Redacted; I.T.] (End FN 298)
From March 2014 through July 2014, the groups discussed "design standards" and other architectural elements. (FN 299)
*FN 299: See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00791 (6/3/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.; OSC-KAV_00799 (6/10/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze et al.); OSC-KA V _0081 7 (6/16/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze et al.). (End FN 299)
For example, in July 2014, members of the Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the "demographics of these prospective buyers" in the Crocus City area,
the development of neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions of the building. (FN 300)

*FN 300: OSC-KAV 00870 (7/17/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). (End FN 300)*
In August 2014, the Trump Organization requested specifications for a competing Marriott-branded tower being built in Crocus City. (FN 301)

*FN 301: OSC-KA V _00855 (8/4/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). (End FN 301)*
Beginning in September 2014, the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely fashion to correspondence and proposals from the Crocus Group. (FN 302)
*FN 302: OSC-KAV_ 00903 (9/29/ 14 Email, Tropea to McGee & Kaveladze (noting last response was on August 26, 2014)); OSC-KAV_00906 (9/29/14 Email, Kaveladze to Tropea & McGee (suggesting silence "proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project"));
*FN 302 cont'd: OSC-KA V _00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about development specifications)). (End FN 302)*
Communications between the two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency; what appears to be the last communication is dated November 24, 2014. (FN 303)

*FN 303: OSC-KAV_01140 ( 11/24/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). (End FN 303)*
The project appears not to have developed past the planning stage, and no construction occurred.
b. Communications with J.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015)

In the late summer of 2015 , the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing a Trump Tower project in Moscow.
In approximatel y September 2015, Felix Sater, a New Yorkbased real estate advisor , contacted Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump. (FN 304)
*FN 304: Sater provided information to our Office in two 2017 interviews conducted under a proffer agreement [Redacted; Grand Jury] (End FN 304)*

Sater had previously worked with the Trump Organization and advised it on a number of domestic and international projects.
Sater had explored the possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump Organization and therefore knew of the organization's general interest in completing a deal there. (FN 305)

*FN 305: [Redacted; Grand Jury] (End FN 305)*
Sater had also served as an informal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow previousl y and had accompanied lvanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid 2000s. (FN 306)

*FN 306: Sater9/19/1 7 302, at 1-2, 5. (End FN 306)*
Sater contacted Cohen on behalf of I.C. Expert Investment Company (LC. Expert), a Russian real-estate development corporation controlled by Andrei Vladimirovich Rozov. (FN 307)

*FN 307: Sater 9/19/17 302, at 3. (End FN 307)*
Sater had known Rozov since approximately 2007 and, in 2014 , had served as an agent on behalf of Rozov during Rozov's purchase of a building in New York City. (FN 308)

*FN 308: Rozov 1 /25/18 3 02, at 1. (End FN 308)*
Sater later contacted Rozov and proposed that I.C. Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project in which l.C. Expert would license the name and brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own.
Sater worked on the deal with Rozov and another .employee of l.C. Expert. (FN 309)

*FN 309: Rozov 1/25/18 302, at I; see also 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (sending letter of intent). (End FN 309)*
Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with l.C. Expert or its agents. In approximately September 2015, Cohen obtained approval to negotiate with I.C. Expert from candidate Trump,
who was then president of the Trump Organization. Cohen provided updates directly to Trump about the project throughout 2015 and into 2016 assuring him the project was continuing. (FN 310)

*FN 310: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-2, 4-6. (End FN 310)
Cohen also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka Trump as to design elements (such as possible architects to use for the project)(FN 311), and Donald J. Trump Jr. (about his experience in Moscow and possible involvement in the project (FN 312) during the fall of 2015.
*FN 311: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. (End FN 311)

*FN 312: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4-5. (End FN 312)
Also during the fall of 2015, Cohen communicated about the Trump Moscow proposal with Giorgi Rtskhiladze, a business executive who previously had been involved in a development deal with the Trump Organization in Batumi, Georgia. (FN 313)
*FN 313: Rtskhiladze was a U.S.-based executive of the Georgian company Silk Road Group. In approximately 2011, Silk Road Group and the Trump Organization entered into a licensing agreement to build a Trump-branded property in Batumi, Georgia.
*FN 313 cont'd: Rtskhiladze was also involved in discussions for a Trum -branded ro'ect in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Office twice interviewed Rtskhiladze, [Redacted; grand jury] (End FN 313)*
Cohen stated that he spoke to Rtskhiladze in part because Rtskhiladze had pursued business ventures in Moscow, including a licensing deal with the Agalarov-owned Crocus Group. (FN 314)
*FN 314: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12; see also Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 1 (End FN 314)*
On September 22, 2015, Cohen forwarded a preliminary design study for the Trump Moscow project to Rtskhiladze, adding "I look forward to your reply about this spectacular project in Moscow."
Rtskhiladze forwarded Cohen's email to an associate and wrote, "[i]f we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian Government and Mr. Trump this project would definitely receive the worldwide attention."(FN 315)
*FN 315: 9/22/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Nizharadze. (End FN 315)*

On September 24, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a proposed "[l]etter to the Mayor of Moscow from Trump org,"
explaining that "[w]e need to send this letter to the Mayor of Moscow (second guy in Russia) he is aware of the potential project and will pledge his support." (FN 316)

*FN 316: 9/24/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. (End FN 316)*
In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, Rtskhiladze provided a translation of the letter,
which described the Trump Moscow project as a "symbol of stronger economic, business and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow and therefore United States and the Russian Federation." (FN 317)

*FN 317: 9/24/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. (End FN 317)
On September 27, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent another email to Cohen, proposing that the Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscow project with "Global Development Group LLC,"
which he described as being controlled by Michail Posikhin, a Russian architect, and Simon Nizharadze. (FN 318)

*FN 318: 9/27/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. (End FN 318)*
Cohen told the Office that he ultimately declined the proposal and instead continued to work with LC. Expert, the company represented by Felix Sater. (FN 319)

*FN 319: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12. (End FN 319)*
c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-January 2016)
i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization
Between approximately October 13, 2015 and November 2, 2015, the Trump Organization (through its subsidiary Trump Acquisition, LLC) and I.C. Expert completed a letter of intent (LOI) for a Trump Moscow property.
The LOI, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization and Rozov on behalf of I.C. Expert, was "intended to facilitate further discussions" in order to "attempt to enter into a mutually acceptable agreement" related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow. (FN 320)
*FN 320: 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (attachment) (hereinafter "LOI"); see also I 0/13/15 Email, Sater to Cohen & Davis (attaching proposed letter of intent). (End FN 320)*
The LOI contemplated a development with residential, hotel, commercial, and office components, and called for"[ a]pproximately 250 first class, luxury residential condominiums,"
as well as"[ o ]ne first class, luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors and containing not fewer than 150 hotel rooms." (FN 321)

*FN 321: LOI, p. 2. (End FN 321)*
For the residential and commercial portions of the project, the Trump Organization would receive between 1 % and 5% of all condominium sales,(FN 322) plus 3% of all rental and other revenue. (FN 323)
*FN 322: The LOI called for the Trump Organization to receive 5% of all gross sales up to $100 million ; 4% of all gross sales from $100 million to $250 million ; 3% of all gross sales from $250 million to $500 million;
*FN 322 cont'd: 2% of all gross sales from $500 million to $1 billion; and 1 % of all gross sales over $1 billion. LOI, Schedule 2. (End FN 322)*

*FN 323: LOI, Schedule 2. (End FN 323)*
For the project's hotel portion, the Trump Organization would receive a base fee of 3% of gross operating revenues for the first five years and 4% thereafter, plus a separate incentive fee of 20% of operating profit. (FN 324)

*FN 324: LOI, Schedule 1 (End FN 324)*
Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would receive a $4 million "up-front fee" prior to groundbreaking. (FN 325)

*FN 325: LOI, Schedule 2. (End FN 325)*
Under these terms, the Trump Organization stood to earn substantial sums over the lifetime of the project, without assuming significant liabilities or financing commitments. (FN 326)

*FN 326: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3. (End FN 326)*
On November 3, 2015, the day after the Trump Organization transmitted the LOI, Sater emailed Cohen suggesting that the Trump Moscow project could be used to increase candidate Trump's chances at being elected, writing:
"Buddy our boy can become President of the USA and we can engineer it. I will get all of Putins team to buy in on this, I will manage this process .... Michael, Putin gets on stage with Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump Moscow, and Donald owns the republican nomination.
[Sater quote continued] And possibly beats Hillary and our boy is in .. . . We will manage this process better than anyone. You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very shortly. That the game changer." (FN 327)
Later that day, Sater followed up:

"Donald doesn't stare down, he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin only want to deal with a pragmatic leader, and a successful business man is a good candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate.
[Sater quote continued] "Business, politics, whatever it all is the same for someone who knows how to deal"
I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump Moscow press conference. If he says it we own this election.
[Sater quote continued] Americas most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald is a good guy to negotiate .... We can own this election. Michael my next steps are very sensitive with Putins very very close people, we can pull this off.
[Sater quote continued] Michael lets go. 2 boys from Brooklyn getting a USA president elected. This is good really good." [End Sater quote] (FN 328)

*FN 328: 11/3/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:40 p.m.). (End FN 328)*
According to Cohen , he did not consider the political import of the Trump Moscow project to the 2016 U.S. presidential election at the time.
Cohen also did not recall candidate Trump or anyone affiliated with the Trump Campaign discussing the political implications of the Trump Moscow project with him.
However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the candidat e suggested that his campaign would be a significant "infomercial " for Trump-branded properties. (FN 329)
*FN 329: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3-4; Cohen 8/7/ 18 302, at 15. (End FN 329)*
ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia
Given the size of the Trump Moscow project, Sater and Cohen believed the project required approval (whether express or implicit) from the RU national government, including from the Presidential Administration of Russia (FN 330)
*FN 330: [Redacted; Grand Jury] (End FN 330)*

Sater stated that he therefore began to contact the Presidential Administration through another Russian business contact. (FN 331)

*FN 331: Sater 12/15/17 302, at 3-4 (End FN 331)
In early negotiations with the Trump Organization, Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and his attempts to set up meetings with Russian officials.
On October 12, 2015, for example, Sater wrote to Cohen that "all we need is Putin on board and we are golden," and that a "meeting with Putin and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th [of October]." (FN 332)

*FN 332: 10/12/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (8:07 a.m.). (End FN 332)*
[Redacted; Grand Jury] this meeting was being coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had no direct interaction with the Russian government. (FN 333)

*FN 333: [Redacted; Grand Jury] (End FN 333)*
Approximately a month later, after the LOI had been signed, Lana Erchova emailed lvanka Trump on behalf of Erchova's then-husband Dmitry Klokov, to offer Klokov 's assistance to the Trump Campaign. (FN 334)
*FN 334: Ivanka Trump received an email from a woman who identified herself as "Lana E. Alexander," which said in part, "If you ask anyone who knows Russian to google my husband Dmitry Klokov , you'll see who he is close to and that he has done Putin' s political campaigns."
*FN 334 cont'd: 11/16/15 Email, Erchova to I. Trump. (End FN 334)*
Klokov was at that time Director of External Communicati ons for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System, a large Russian electricity transmission company, and had been previously employed as an aide and press secretary to Russia's energy minister.
Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen. (FN 335)

*FN 335: 11/16/15 Email, I. Trump to Cohen. (End FN 335)*
He told the Office that, after receiving this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search for Klokov's name and concluded (incorrectly) that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter. (FN 336)

*FN 336: Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 17. During his interviews with the Office,
*FN 336 cont'd: Cohen still appeared to believe that the Klokov he spoke with was that Olympian. The investigation, however, established that the email address used to communicate with Cohen belongs to a different Dmitry Klokov, as described above. (End FN 336)*
Between November 18 and 19, 2015,-Klokov and Cohen had at least one telephone call and exchanged several emails.
Describing himself in emails to Cohen as a "trusted person " who could offer the Campaign "political synergy" and "synergy on a government level," Klokov recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary.
Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the candidate and an individual Klokov described as "our person of interest." (FN 337)

*FN 337: 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.). (End FN 337)*
In an email to the Office, Erchova later identified the "person of interest" as Russian President Vladimir Putin. (FN 338)
*FN 338: In July 2018, the Office received an unsolicited email purporting to be from Erchova, in which she wrote that "[a]t the end of2015 and beginning of 2016 I was asked by my ex-husband to contact lvanka Trump...
*FN 338 cont'd: and offer cooperation to Trump's team on behalf of the Russian officials." 7/27/18 Email, Erchova to Special Counsel's Office. The email claimed that the officials wanted to offer cand. Trump "land in Crimea among other things and unofficial meeting with Putin."
*FN 338 cont'd: Id. In order to vet the email's claims, the Office responded requesting more details. The Office did not receive any reply. (End FN 338)*
In the telephone call and follow-on emails with Klokov, Cohen discussed his desire to use a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump Moscow project with local developers.
Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump-
including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin-would need to be "in conjunction with the development and an official visit" with the Trump Org. receiving a formal invitation to visit. (FN 339)

*FN 339: 11/18/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (7:15 a.m.). (End FN 339)*
(Klokov had written previously that "the visit [by candidate Trump to Russia] has to be informal.") (FN 340)

*FN 340: 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.). (End FN 340)
Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations over a possible meeting between Trump and "the person of interest "from any existing business track. (FN 341)
*FN 341: 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.) ("I would suggest separating your negotiations and our proposal to meet. I assure you, after the meeting level of projects and their capacity can be completely different, having the most important support."). (End FN 341)*
Re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business, Klokov added in second email to Cohen that, if publicized well, such a meeting could have "phenomenal" impact "in a business dimension"
and that the "person of interest['s]" "most important support" could have significant ramifications for the "level of projects and their capacity."
Klokov concluded by telling Cohen that there was "no bigger warranty in any project than [the] consent of the person of interest." (FN 342)

*FN 342: 11/19/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (7:40 a.m.). (End FN 342)*
Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that "[c]urrently our LOI developer is in talks with VP's Chief of Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet." (FN 343)

*FN 343: 11/19/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (12:56 p.m.). (End FN 343)*
This email appears to be their final exchange, and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought Klokov's initial offer of assistance to the Campaign's attention or that anyone associated with the Trump Org. or the Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date.
Cohen explained that he did not pursue the proposed meeting because he was already working on the Moscow Project with Sater, who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government. (FN 344)

*FN 344: Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 12. (End FN 344)*
By late December 2015, however, Cohen was complaining that Sater had not been able to use those connections to set up the promised meeting with Russian government officials. Cohen told Sater that he was "setting up the meeting myself. " (FN 345)
*FN 345: FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (6:17 p.m.)). (End FN 345)*
On January 11, 2016, Cohen emailed the office of Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government's press secretary, indicating that he desired contact with Sergei Ivanov, Putin's chief of staff.
Cohen erroneously used the email address "Pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru" instead of "Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru," so the email apparently did not go through. (FN 346)

*FN 346: 1/11/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru (9: 12 a.m.). (End FN 346)*
On January 14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address (info@prpress .gov.ru) with the following message:
Dear Mr. Peskov, Over the past few months, I have been working with a company based in Russia regarding the development of a Trump Tower-Moscow project in Moscow City. Without getting into lengthy specifics, the communication between our two sides has stalled.
[Cohen email continued] As this project is too important, I am hereby requesting your assistance. I respectfully request someone, preferably you; contact me so that I might discuss the specifics as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals.
[Cohen email continued] I thank you in advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you soon. [End Cohen email] (FN 347)

*FN 347: 1/14/16 Email, Cohen to info@prpress.gov.ru (9:21 a.m.). (End FN 347)*
Two days later, Cohen sent an email to Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru, repeating his request to speak with Sergei Ivanov. (FN 348)

*FN 348: 1/16/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru (10:28 a.m.). (End FN 348)*
Cohen testified to Congress, and initially told the Office, that he did not recall receiving a response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump Moscow project as of January 2016.
Cohen later admitted that these statements were false. In fact, Cohen had received (and recalled receiving) a response to his inquiry, and he continued to work on and update candidate Trump on the project through as late as June 2016. (FN 349)
*FN 349: Cohen Information ¶¶ 4,7. Cohen 's interactions with President Trump and the President's lawyers when preparing his congressional testimony are discussed further in Volume II. See Vol. II, Section 11.K.3, infra. (End FN 349)*
On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's personal assistant. Writing from her personal email account, Poliakova stated that she had been trying to reach Cohen and asked that he call her on the personal number that she provided. (FN 350)
*FN 350: 1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen (5 :57 a.m.) ("Mr. Cohen[,] I can't get through to both your phones. Pis, call me."). (End FN 350)*
Shortly after receiving Poliakova's email, Cohen called and spoke to her for 20 minutes. (FN 351)

*FN 351: Telephone records show a 20-minute call on January 20, 2016 between Cohen and the number Poliakova provided in her email. Call Records of Michael Cohen [redacted; G.J.]
*FN 351 cont'd: After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contact list. 1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.). (End FN 351)*
Cohen described to Poliakova his position at the Trump Organization and outlined the proposed Trump Moscow project, including information about the Russian counterparty with which the Trump Organization had partnered.
Cohen requested assistance in moving the project forward, both in securing land to build the project and with financing. According to Cohen, Poliakova asked detailed questions and took notes, stating that she would need to follow up with others in Russia. (FN 352)
*FN 352: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2-3. (End FN 352)*
Cohen could not recall any direct follow -up from Poliakova or from any other representative of the Russian government, nor did the Office identify any evidence of direct follow-up.
However, the day after Cohen 's call with Poliakova , Sater texted Cohen, asking him to "[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat... It's about Putin they called today." (FN 353)

*FN 353: FS000l 1 (1/21/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen). (End FN 353)
Sater then sent a draft invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow to discuss the Trump Moscow project, (FN 354) along with a note to "[t]ell me if the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes you want and send it back to me." (FN 355)
*FN 354: The invitation purported to be from Genbank, a Russian bank that was, according to Sater, working at the behest of a larger bank, VTB, and would consider providing financing.
*FN 354 cont'd: FS00008 (12/31/ 15 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). Additional information about Genbank can be found infra. (End FN 354)*

*FN 355: FS000l I (1/21/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:44 p.m.)); 1/21/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (6:49 p.m.). (End FN 355)*
After a further round of edits, on January 25, 2016, Sater sent Cohen an invitation - signed by Andrey Ryabinskiy of the company MHJ-to travel to "Moscow for a working visit" about the "prospects of development and the construction business in Russia,"
"the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower," and "the oppo1tunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr. Donald Trump." (FN 356)

*FN 356: 1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:01 p.m.) (attachment). (End FN 356)*
According to Cohen, he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete proposals about land plots that could be considered as options for the project. (FN 357)

*FN 357: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-7. (End FN 357)*
d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December 2015-June 2016)
i. Sater 's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia
The late January communication was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project.
Beginning in late 2015, Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump, as representatives of the Trump Organization, to travel to Russia to meet with Russian government officials and possible financing partners.
In December 2015, Sater sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to Russia for meetings. (FN 358)
*FN 358: See, e.g., 12/1/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:41 p.m.) ("Please scan and send me a copy of your passport for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs."). (End FN 358)*
On December 19, 2015, Sater wrote:

"Please call me I have Evgeney [Dvoskin] on the other line. (FN 359) He needs a copy of your and Donald's passports they need a scan of every page of the passports.
[Sater quote cont'd] Invitations & Visas will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower Moscow. Politically neither Putins office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue invite, so they are inviting commercially/ business.
[Sater quote cont] VTB is Russia's 2 biggest bank and VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business meeting not political. We will be invited to Russian consulate this week to receive invite & have visa issued." [End Sater quote] (FN 360)
*FN 359: Toll records show that Sater was speaking to Evgeny Dvoskin. Call Records of Felix Sater [redacted; grand jury]. Dvoskin is an executive of Genbank, a large bank with lending focused in Crimea, Ukraine.
*FN 359 cont'd: At the time that Sater provided this financing letter to Cohen, Genbank was subject to U.S. government sanctions, see Russia/Ukraine -related Sanctions and Identifications, Office of Foreign Assets Control (Dec. 22, 2015),
*FN 359 cont'd: available at treasury.gov/resource-cente…. Dvoskin, who had been deported from the United States in 2000 for criminal activity, was under indictment in the United States for stock fraud under the aliases Eugene Slusker and Gene Shustar.
*FN 359 cont'd: See United States v. Rizzo, et al., 2:03-cr-63 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003). (End FN 359)*

*FN 360: 12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (10:50 a.m.); FS00002 (12/19/15 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen, (10:53 a.m.). (End FN 360)*
In response, Cohen texted Sater an image of his own passport. (FN 361)

*FN 361: FS00004 (12/19/15 Text Message , Cohen to Sater); ERT_0198-256 (12/19/15 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater). (End FN 361*)
Cohen told the Office that at one point he requested a copy of candidate Trump's passport from Rhona Graff, Trump's exec. assistant at the Trump Organization, and that Graff later brought Trump 's passport to Cohen's office (FN 362)

*FN 362: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. (End FN 362
The investigation did not, however, establish that the passport was forwarded to Sater. (FN 363)
*FN 363: On December 21, 2015, Sater sent Cohen a text message that read, "They need a copy of DJT passport," to which Cohen responded, "After I return from Moscow with you with a date for him." FS00004 (12/21/15 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater). (End FN 363)*
Into the spring of 2016, Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in connection with the Trump Moscow project. On April 20, 2016, Sater wrote Cohen, "[t]he People wanted to know when you are coming?" (FN 364)
*FN 364: FS00014 (4/20/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (9:06 p.m.)). (End FN 364)*
On May 4, 2016, Sater followed up:
"I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after the convention. I said I believe, but don't know for sure, that's it's probably after the convention.
[Sater quote cont'd] Obviously the pre-meeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but the 2 big guys where [sic] the question. I said I would confirm and revert. . . .
[Sater quote cont'd] Let me know about If I was right by saying I believe after Cleveland and also when you want to speak to them and possibly fly over. FN 365

*FN 365: FS000l 5 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:38 p.m.)). (End FN 365)*
Cohen responded, "My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention." (FN 366)

*FN 366: FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (8:03 p.m.)). (End FN 366)*
The day after this exchange, Sater tied Cohen's travel to Russia to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum ("Forum"), an annual event attended by prominent Russian politicians and businessmen.
Sater told the Office that he was informed by a business associate that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to the Forum. (FN 367)

*FN 367: Sater 12/15/17 302, at 4. (End FN 367)*
On May 5, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen:
"Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia's Davos it's June 16-19.
[Sater quote cont'd] He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev, as they are not sure if 1 or both will be there. This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia wiU be there as well.
[Sater quote cont'd] He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to discuss[. ]" (FN 368)

*FN 368: FS00016 (5/5/16 Text Messages , Sater to Cohen (6:26 & 6:27 a.m.)). (End FN 368)*
The following day, Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel; Cohen wrote back, "[w]orks for me." (FN 369)

*FN 369: FS00016 (5/6/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater). (End FN 369)*
On June 9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a notice that he (Sater) was completing the badges for the Forum, adding, "Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well." (FN 370)

*FN 370: FS000 18 (6/9/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). (End FN 370)*
On June 13, 2016, Sater forwarded Cohen an invitation to the Forum signed by the Director of the Roscongress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the Forum. (FN 371)

*FN 371: 6/13/16 Email , Sater to Cohen (2:10 p.m.). (End FN 371)*
Sater also sent Cohen a Russian visa application and asked him to send two passport photos. (FN 372)

*FN 372: FS00018 (6/13/16 Text Message , Sater to Cohen (2:20 p.m.)); 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen. (End FN 372)*
According to Cohen, the invitation gave no indication that Peskov had been involved in inviting him. Cohen was concerned that Russian officials were not actually involved or were not interested in meeting with him (as Sater had alleged), and so he decided not to go to the Forum.
(FN 373)

*FN 373: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-8. (End FN 373)*
On June 14, 2016, Cohen met Sater in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed him that he would not be traveling at that time. (FN 374)

*FN 374: FS00019 (6/14/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater (12:06 and 2:50 p.m.)). (End FN 374)*
ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia
The investigation identified evidence that, during the period the Trump Moscow project was under consideration, the possibility of candidate Trump visiting Russia arose in two contexts.
First, in interviews with the Office, Cohen stated that he discussed the subject of traveling to Russia with Trump twice: once in late 2015; and again in spring 2016. (FN 375)

*FN 375: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2. (End FN 375)*
According to Cohen, Trump indicated a willingness to travel if it would assist the project significantly. On one occasion, Trump told Cohen to speak with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski to coordinate the candidate's schedule.
Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski , who suggested that they speak again when Cohen had actual dates to evaluate.
Cohen indicated, however, that he knew that travel prior to the Republican National Convention would be impossible given the candidate 's preexisting commitments to the Campaign. (FN 376)

*FN 376: Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. (End FN 376)*
Second, like Cohen, Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
In late December 2015, Mira Duma-a contact of lvanka Trump 's from the fashion industry-first passed along invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump from Sergei Prikhodko, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. (FN 377)
*FN 377: 12/21/15 Email, Mira to Ivanka Trump (6:57 a.m.) (attachments); TRUMPORG_16_000057 (1/7/16 Email, I. Trump to Graff(9:18 a.m.)). (End FN 377)*
On January 14, 2016, Rhona Graff sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was "honored to be asked to participate in the highly prestigious" Forum event,
but that he would "have to decline" the invitation given his "very grueling and full travel schedule" as a presidential candidate. (FN 378)

*FN 378: 1/14/16 Email, Graff to Mira. (End FN 378)*
Graff asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff "send a formal note to the Deputy Prime Minister" declining his invitation; Duma replied that a formal note would be "great." (FN 379)

*FN 379: 1/15/16 Email, Mira to Graff. (End FN 379)*
It does not appear that Graff prepared that note immediately. According to written answers from Pres. Trump,(FN 380) Graff received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on March 17, 2016, again inviting Trump to participate in the 2016 Forum in St. Petersburg. (FN 381)
FN 380: As explained in Volume II and Appendix C, on September 17, 2018, the Office sent written questions to the President's counsel. On November 20, 2018, the President provided written answers to those questions through counsel. (End FN 380)*
*FN 381: Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Pait (e)) ("[D]ocuments show that Ms. Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation."). (End FN 381)*
Two weeks later, on March 31, 2016, Graff prepared for Trump 's signature a two-paragraph letter declining the invitation. (FN 382)
*FN 382: Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part (e)); see also TRUMPORG_l6_000134 (unsigned letter dated March 31, 2016). (End FN 382)*
The letter stated that Trump's "schedule has become extremely demanding" because of the presidential campaign, that he "already ha[d] several commitments in the United States" for the time of the Forum,
but that he otherwise "would have gladly given every consideration to attending such an important event." (FN 383)

*FN 383: TRUMPORG_16_000134 (unsigned letter). (End FN 383)*
Graff forwarded the letter to another executive assistant at the Trump Organization with instructions to print the document on letterhead for Trump to sign. (FN 384)

*FN 384: TRUMPORG_l6 _000133 (3/31/16 Email, Graff to Macchia). (End FN 384)*
At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared, Robert Foresman-a New York-based investment banker- began reaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting with candidate Trump.
According to Foresman , he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian presidential aide involved with the Roscongress Foundation, to see if Trump could speak at the Forum. (FN 385)

*FN 385: Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 3-4. (FN 385)*
Foresman first emailed Graff on March 31, 2016, following a phone introduction brokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who produced the television show The Apprentice).
In his email, Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional expertise in Russia and Ukraine, his work setting up an early "private channel" between Vladimir Putin and former U.S. President George W. Bush,
and an "approach" he had received from "senior Kremlin officials" about the candidate.
Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate, Corey Lewandowski , or "another relevant person" to discuss this and other "concrete things" Foresman felt uncomfortabl e discussing over "unsecure email." (FN 386)
*FN 386: See TRUMPORG_16_00136 (3/31/16 Email, Foresman to Graff) ; see also Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 3-4. (End FN 386)*
On April 4, 2016, Graff forwarded Foresman 's meeting request to Jessica Macchia, another execut ive assistant to Trump. (FN 387)

*FN 387: See TRUMPORG_ l6_00136 (4/4/16 Email, Graff to Macchia). (End FN 387)*
With no response forthcoming , Foresman twice sent reminders to Graff-first on April 26 and again on April 30, 2016. (FN 388)

*FN 388: See TRUMPORG_16_00137 (4/26/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); TRUMPORG_16_00141 (4/30/16 Email, Foresman to Graff). (End FN 388)*
Graff sent an apology to Foresman and forwarded his April 26 email ( as well as his initial March 2016 email) to Lewandowski. (FN 389)

*FN 389: See TRUMPORG_16_00139 (4/27/16 Email, Graff to Foresman); TRUMPORG_16_00137 ( 4/27 /16 Email, Graff to Lewandowski). (End FN 389)*
On May 2, 2016 , Graff forwarded Foresman 's April 30 email-which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald Trump Jr. or Eric Trump
so that Foresman could convey to them information that "should be conveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate] absolutely trusts "-to policy advisor Stephen Miller. (FN 390)
*FN 390: See TRUMPORG_16_00137 (4/26/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); TRUMPORG_ 16_00141 (4/30/16 Email, Foresman to Graff). (End FN 390)*
No communications or other evidence obtained by the Office indicate that the Trump Campaign learned that Foresman was reaching out to invite the candidate to the Forum or that the Campaign otherwise followed up with Foresman until after the election,
when he interacted with the Transition Team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration. (FN 391)

*FN 391: Foresman's contacts during the transition period are discussed further in Volume I, Section IV.B.3, infra. (End FN 391)*
When interviewed by the Office, Foresman denied that the specific "approach" from "senior Kremlin officials" noted in his March 31, 2016 email was anything other than Kobyakov's invitation to Roscongress.
According to Foresman, the "concrete things" he referenced in the same email were a combination of the invitation itself, Foresman's personal perspectives on the invitation and RU policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank(EastWest Institute).
Foresman told the Office that Kobyakov had extended similar invitations through him to another Republican presidential candidate and one other politician.
Foresman also said that Kobyakov had asked Foresman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate withdrew from the race and the other politician's participation did not work out. (FN 392)

*FN 392: Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 4. (End FN 392)*
Finally, Foresman claimed to have no plans to establish a back channel involving Trump, stating the reference to his involvement in the Bush-Putin back channel was meant to burnish his credentials to the Campaign.
Foresman commented that he had not recognized any of the experts announced as Trump's foreign policy team in March 2016, and wanted to secure an in-person meeting with the candidate to share his professional background and policy views,
including that Trump should decline Kobyakov 's invitation to speak at the Forum. (FN 393)

*FN 393: Foresman 10 /17 /18 302, at 8-9. (End FN 393)*
2. George Papadopoulos

George Papadopoulos was a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign from March 2016 to early October 2016. (FN 394)

*FN 394: Papadopoulos met with our Office for debriefings on several occasions in the summer and fall of 2017,
*FN 394 cont'd: after he was arrested and charged in a sealed criminal complaint with making false statements in a January 2017 FBI interview about, inter alia, the timing, extent, and nature of his interactions and communications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationals:
*FN 394 cont'd: Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev. Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information charging him with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § l00l(a). (End FN 394)*
In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based professor Joseph Mifsud, immediately after Mifsud 's return from a trip to Moscow, that the Russian government had obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails.
One week later, on May 6, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign gvmnt. that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the RU gvmt. that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of info. that would be damaging to candidate Clinton.
Papadopoulos shared information about Russian "dirt " with people outside of the Campaign, and the Office investigated whether he also provided it to a Campaign official.
Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials with whom he interacted told the Office that they did not recall that Papadopoulos passed them the information.
Throughout the relevant period of time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government.
That meeting never came to pass.
a. Origins of Campaign Work

In March 2016, Papadopoulos became a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign. (FN 395)
*FN 395: A Transcript of Donald Trump's Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016). (End FN 395)*
As early as the summer of 2015, he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the Campaign but, in a September 30, 2015 email, he was told that the Campaign was not hiring policy advisors. (FN 395)
*FN 395: 7/15/15 Linkedln Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (6:57 a.m.); 9/30/15 Email, Glassner to Papadopoulos (7:42:21 a.m.). (End FN 395)*
As early as the summer of 2015, he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the Campaign but, in a September 30, 2015 email, he was told that the Campaign was not hiring policy advisors. (FN 396)
*FN 396: 7/15/15 Linkedln Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (6:57 a.m.); 9/30/15 Email, Glassner to Papadopoulos (7:42:21 a.m.). (End FN 396)*
In late 2015, Papadopoulos obtained a paid position on the campaign of Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson. (FN 397)

*FN 397: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. (End FN 397)*
Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 20I6, Papadopoulos had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016. (FN 398)

*FN 398: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2; 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris. (End FN 398)*
At that time, Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP) , which billed itself as a "unique institution...
comprising high-level professional international law practitioners, dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the practice of international law." (FN 399)
*FN 399 London Centre of lnternational Law Practice, at lcilp.org (via web.archive.org) (End FN 399)*
Papadopoulos said that he had finished his role with the Carson campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring. (FN 400)

*FN 400: 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris. (End FN 400)*
In early February, Papadopoulos agreed to join LCILP and arrived in London to begin work. (FN 401)

*FN 401: 2/5/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos (6:11:25 p.m.); 2/6/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos (5:34:15 p.m.). (End FN 401)*
As he was taking his position at LCILP , Papadopoulos contacted Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski via Linkedln and emailed campaign official Michael Glassner about his interest in joining the Trump Campaign. (FN 402)
*FN 402: 2/4/16 Linkedln Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:28 p.m.); 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Glassner (2:10:36 p.m.). (End FN 402)*
On March 2, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Glassner another message reiterating his interest. (FN 403)

*FN 403: 3/2/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Glassner (11:17:23 a.m.). (End FN 403)*
Glassner passed along word of Papadopoulos's interest to another campaign official, Joy Lutes, who notified Papadopoulos by email that she had been told by Glassner to introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clovis, the Trump Campaign's national co-chair and chief policy advisor. (FN 404)
*FN 404: 3/2/16 Email, Lutes to Papadopoulos (10:08:15 p.m.). (End FN 404)*
At the time of Papadopoulos's March 2 email, the media was criticizing the Trump Campaign for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security advisors within its ranks. (FN 405)

*FN 405: Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of 2), at 4. (End FN 405)*
To address that issue, senior Campaign officials asked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together on short notice. (FN 406)

*FN 406: Clovis 10/3/ 17 302 (1 of2), at 4. (End FN 406)*
After receiving Papadopoulos's name from Lutes, Clovis performed a Google search on Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute , and believed that he had credibility on energy issues. (FN 407)
*FN 407: [redacted; grand jury] ; 3/3/16 Email, Lutes to Clovis & Papadopoulos (6:05:47 p.m.). (End FN 407)*
On March 3, 2016, Clovis arranged to speak with Papadopoulos by phone to discuss Papadopoulos joining the Campaign as a foreign policy advisor, and on March 6, 2016, the two spoke. (FN 408)

*FN 408: 3/6/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (4:24:21 p.m.). (End FN 408)*
Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mentioned as a topic, and he understood from the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of the Campaign's foreign policy. (FN 409)
*FN 409: Statement of Offense ¶ 4, United States v. George Papadopoulos, 1: 17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017), Doc. 19 ("Papadopoulos Statement of Offense"). (End FN 409)*
At the end of the conversation , Clovis offered Papadopoulos a role as a foreign policy advisor to the Campaign, and Papadopoulos accepted the offer. (FN 410)

*FN 410: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. (End FN 410).
b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts
Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor, Papadopoulos traveled to Rome, Italy, as part of his duties with LCILP. (FN 411)

*FN 411: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶5. (End FN 411)*
The purpose of the trip was to meet officials affiliated with Link Campus University, a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian government official. (FN 412)

*FN 412: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Stephanie Kirchgaessner et al.,
*FN 412 cont'd: Joseph Mifsud: more questions than answers about mystery professor linked to Russia, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2017) ("Link Campus University...is headed by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti."). (End FN 412)*
During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud.
Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London Academy of Diplomacy in London, England. (FN 413)

*FN 413: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 5. (End FN 413)*
Although Mifsud worked out of London and was also affiliated with LCILP, the encounter in Rome was the first time that Papadopoulos met him. (FN 414)

*FN 414: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. (End FN 414)*
Mifsud maintained various Russian contacts while living in London, as described further below. Among his contacts was [Redacted; investigative technique], (FN 415)
a one-time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out the Russian social media campaign (see Volume I Section II, supra).

*FN 415: See e.g., [redacted; I.T.]. [Redacted; h.o.m.] (End FN 415)*
In January and February 2016, Mifsud and [redacted; I.T.] discussed [redacted; I.T.] possibly meeting in Russia.
Later, in the spring of 2016, [redacted; I.T.] was also in contact [redacted; I.T.] that was linked to an employee of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian militarycontrolled Facebook accounts
that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the course of the GRU's hack-and-release operations (see Volume I, Section III.B.1, supra).
According to Papadopoulos , Mifsud at first seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when they met in Rome. (FN 416)

*FN 416: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 5. (End FN 416)*
After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump Campaign, however, Mifsud appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos. (FN 417)

*FN 417: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 5. (End FN 417)*
The two discussed Mifsud 's European and Russian contacts and had a general discussion about Russia; Mifsud also offered to introduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian government. (FN 418)
*FN 418: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 2. (End FN 418)*
Papadopoulos told the Office that Mifsud 's claim of substantial connections with Russian government officials interested Papadopoulos, who thought that such connections could increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump Campaign. (FN 419)
*FN 419: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 5. (End FN 419)*
On March 17, 2016, Papadopoulos returned to London. (FN 420)

*FN 420: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. (End FN 420)*
Four days later, candidate Trump publicly named him as a member of the foreign policy and national security advisory team chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulos as "an oil and energy consultant" and an "[e]xcellent guy." (FN 421)
*FN 421: Phillip Rucker & Robert Costa, Trump Questions Need for NATO, Outlines Noninterventionist Foreign Policy, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016). (End FN 421)*
On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos met with Mifsud in London. (FN 422)

*FN 422: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; 3/24/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos. (End FN 422)*
Mifsud was accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Polonskaya. Mifsud introduced Polonskaya as a former student of his who had connections to Vladimir Putin. (FN 423)

*FN 423: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. (End FN 423)*
Papadopoulos understood at the time that Polonskaya may have been Putin 's niece but later learned that this was not true. (FN 424)

*FN 424: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 2/10/17 302, at 2-3;
*FN 424 cont'd: Papadopoulos Internet Search History (3/24/16) (revealing late-morning and early-afternoon searches on March 24, 2016 for "putin's niece," "olga putin," and "russian president niece olga," among other terms). (End FN 424)*
During the meeting, Polonskaya offered to help Papadopoulos establish contacts in Russia and stated that the Russian ambassador in London was a friend of hers. (FN 425)

*FN 425: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. (End FN 425)*
Based on this interaction, Papadopoulos expected Mifsud and Polonskaya to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London, but that did not occur. (FN 426)

*FN 426: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 8 n. l. (End FN 426)*
Following his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump Campaign 's foreign policy advisory team. The subject line of the message was "Meeting with Russian leadership--including Putin." (FN 427)
*FN 427: 3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:21 a.m.). (End FN 427)*
The message stated in pertinent part:
"I just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsud, the director of the London Academy of Diplomacy--who introduced me to both Putin's niece and the Russian Ambassador in London
[Quote continued]--who also acts as the Deputy Foreign Minister. (FN 428)
The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump. They are keen to host us in a "neutral" city, or directly in Moscow.
[Quote cont'd:] They said the leadership, including Putin, is ready to meet with us and Mr. Trump should there be interest. Waiting for everyone's thoughts on moving forward with this very important issue." (FN 429)
*FN 428: Papadopoulos's statements to the Campaign were false. As noted above, the woman he met was not Putin's niece, he had not met the Russian Ambassador in London, and the Ambassador did not also serve as Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister. (End FN 428)*
*FN 429: 3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:21 a.m.). (End FN 429)*
Papadopoulos's message came at a time when Clovis perceived a shift in the Campaign 's approach toward Russia-from one of engaging with Russia through the NATO framework and takin a stron stance on Russian a ression in Ukraine, [redacted; G.J] (FN 430)
*FN 430: [redacted.; G.J.] (end FN 430)*
Clovis 's response to Papadopoulos, however, did not reflect that shift. Replying to Papadopoulos and the other members of the foreign policy advisory team copied on the initial email, Clovis wrote:
"This is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. No commitments until we see how this plays out. My thought is that we probably should not go forward with any meetings with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies,
[Clovis quote cont'd]: especially France, Germany and Great Britain. We need to reassure our allies that we are not going to advance anything with Russia until we have everyone on the same page.
More thoughts later today. Great work." (FN 431)
*FN 431: 3/24/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos et al. (8:55:04 a.m.). (End FN 431)*
c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting

The Campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team with Senator Sessions and candidate Trump approximately one week later, on March 31, 2016, in Washington, D.C. (FN 432)
*FN 432: *FN 432: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3. (End FN 432)*
The meeting-which was intended to generate press coverage for the Campaign (FN 433)-took place at the Trump International Hotel. (FN 434)

*FN 433: Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 16-17. (End FN 433)*
*FN 434: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4. (End FN 434)*
Papadopoulos flew to Washington for the event. At the meeting , Senator Sessions sat at one end of an oval table, while Trump sat at the other.
As reflected in the photograph below (which was posted to Trump's Instagram account), Papadopoulos sat between the two, two seats to Sessions's left:
During the meeting, each of the newly announced foreign policy advisors introduced themselves and briefly described their areas of experience or expertise. (FN 435)

*FN 435: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4. (End FN 435)*
Papadopoulos spoke about his previous work in the energy sector and then brought up a potential meeting with Russian officials. (FN 436)

*FN 436: Papadopoulo s 8/ 10/17 302, at 4. (End FN 436)*
Specifically, Papadopoulos told the group that he had learned through his contacts in London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help arrange that meeting. (FN 437)
*FN 437: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense, ¶ 9; see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 14; Carafan o 9/12/ 17 302, at 2; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at 1. (End FN 437)*
Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos's statement. Papadopoulos and Campaign advisor J.D. Gordon- who told investigators in an interview that he had a "crystal clear" recollection of the meeting--
have stated that Trump was interested in and receptive to the idea of a meeting with Putin. (FN 438)

*FN 438: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Gordon 9/7 /17 302, at 4-5. (End FN 438)*
Papadopoulos understood Sessions to be similarly supportive of his efforts to arrange a meeting. (FN 439)

*FN 439: Papadopoulo s 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3. (End FN 439)*
Gordon and two other attendees, however, recall that Sessions generally opposed the proposal, though they differ in their accounts of the concerns he voiced or the strength of the opposition he expressed. (FN 440)
*FN 440: Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 17; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 5; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at l ; Carafano 9/12/17 302, at 2. (End FN 440)*
d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of Clinton Emails

Whatever Sessions's precise words at the March 31 meeting,
Papadopoulos did not understand Sessions or anyone else in the Trump Campaign to have directed that he refrain from making further efforts to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government.
To the contrary, Papadopoulos told the Office that he understood the Campaign to be supportive of his efforts to arrange such a meeting. (FN 441)

*FN 441: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 2. (End FN 441)*
Accordingly , when he returned to London, Papadopoulos resumed those efforts. (FN 442)

*FN 442: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 10. (End FN 442)*
Throughout April 2016, Papadopoulos continued to correspond with, meet with, and seek Russia contacts through Mifsud and, at times, Polonskaya. (FN 443)

*FN 443: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶¶ 10-15. (End FN 443)*
For example, within a week of her initial March 24 meeting with him, Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text message which email exchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud-addressing Papadopoulos's "wish to engage with the Russian Federation." (FN 444)
*FN 444: 3/29/16 Emails, Mifsud to Polonskaya (3 :39 a.m. and 5 :36 a.m.). (End FN 444)*
When Papadopoulos learned from Mifsud that Polonskaya had tried to message him, he sent her an email seeking another meeting. (FN 445)

*FN 445: 4/10/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (2:45:59 p.m.). (End FN 445)*
Polonskaya responded the next day that she was "back in St. Petersburg" but "would be very pleased to support [Papadopoulos's] initiatives between our two countries " and "to meet [him] again." (FN 446)
*FN 446: 4/11/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (3:11:24 a.m.). (End FN 446)*
Papadopoulos stated in reply that he thought "a good step" would be to introduce him to "the Russian Ambassador in London," and that he would like to talk to the ambassador, "or anyone else you recommend, about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia." (FN 447)
*FN 447: 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (9:21 :56 a.m.). (End FN 447)*
Mifsud , who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on the morning of April 11, 2016. He wrote, "This is already been agreed. I am flying to Moscow on the 18th for a Valdai meeting, plus other meetings at the Duma. We will talk tomorrow." (FN 448)
*FN 448: 4/11/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (11:43:53). (End FN 448)*
The two bodies referenced by Mifsud are part of or associated with the RU government: the Duma is a Russian legislative assembly, (FN 449) while "Valdai" refers to the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that "is close to Russia's foreign-policy establishment."(FN 450)
*FN 449: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 10( c ). (End FN 449)*

*FN 450: Anton Troianovski, Putin Ally Warns of Arms Race as Russia Considers Response to US. Nuclear Stance, Washington Post (Feb. 10, 2018). (End FN 450)*
Papadopoulos thanked Mifsud and said that he would see him "tomorrow." (FN 451)
*FN 451: 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (11 :51 :53 a.m.). (End FN 451)*
For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had "already alerted my personal links to our conversation and your request," that "we are all very excited the possibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump,
and that "[t]he Russian Federation would love to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced." (FN 452)

*FN 452: 4/12/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (4:47:06 a.m.). (End FN 452)*
Papadopoulos's and Mifsud's mentions of seeing each other "tomorrow" referenced a meeting that the two had scheduled for the next morning, April 12, 2016, at the Andaz Hotel in London.
Papadopoulos acknowledged the meeting during interviews with the Office,(FN 453) and records from Papadopoulos 's UK cellphone and his internet-search history all indicate that the meeting took place. (FN 454)
*FN 453: Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 7. (End FN 453)

*FN 454: 4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (5:44:39 a.m.) (forwarding Libya-related document); 4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos & Obaid (10:28:20 a.m.);
*FN 454 cont'd: Papadopoulos Internet Search History (Apr. 11, 2016 10:56:49 p.m.) (search for "andaz hotel liverpool street"); 4/12/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos. (End FN 454)*
Following the meeting, Mifsud traveled as planned to Moscow. (FN 455)

*FN 455: See, e.g., 4/18/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (8:04:54 a.m.). (End FN 455)*
On April 18, 2016, while in Russia, Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos over email to Ivan Timofeev, a member of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). (FN 456)

*FN 456: Papadopoulos 8/ l 0/17 3 02, at 5. (End FN 456)*
Mifsud had described Timofeev as having connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),(FN 457) the executive entity in Russia responsible for Russian foreign relations. (FN 458)
*FN 457: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 11. (End FN 457)*

*FN 458: During the campaign period, Papadopoulos connected over Linkedln with several MFA affiliated individuals in addition to Timofeev.
*FN 458 cont'd: On April 25, 2016, he connected with Dmitry Andreyko, publicly identified as a First Secretary at the Russian Embassy in Ireland. In July 2016, he connected with Yuriy Melnik, the spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington and with Alexey Krasilnikov,
*FN 458 cont'd: publicly identified as a counselor with the MFA. And on September 16, 2016, he connected with Sergei Nalobin, also identified as an MFA official. See Papadopoulos Linkedln Connections [redacted; I.T.] (End FN 458)*
Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos and Timofeev had multiple conversations over Skype and email about setting "the groundwork " for a "potential" meeting between the Campaign and RU gov. officials. (FN 459)

*(FN 459) Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 11. (End FN 459)*
Papadopoulos told the Office that, on one Skype call, he believed that his conversation with Timofeev was being monitored or supervised by an unknown third party, because Timofeev spoke in an official manner and Papadopoulos heard odd noises on the line. (FN 460)
*FN 460: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 10 (End FN 460)*
Timofeev also told Papadopoulos in an April 25, 2016 email that he had just spoken "to Igor Ivanov[,] the President ofRIAC and former Foreign Minister of Russia," and conveyed Ivanov's advice about how best to arrange a "Moscow visit."(FN 461)
*FN 461: 4/25/16 Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (8:16:35 a.m.). (End FN 461)
After a stop in Rome, Mifsud returned to England on April 25, 2016. (FN 462)

*FN 462: 4/22/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (12:41:01 a.m.). (End FN 462)*
The next day, Papadopoulos met Mifsud for breakfast at the Andaz Hotel (the same location as their last meeting). (FN 463)

*FN 463: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶14; 4/25/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos.
During that meeting, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level Russian government officials during his recent trip to Moscow . Mifsud also said that, on the trip, he learned that the Russians had obtained "dirt" on candidate Hillary Clinton.
As Papadopoulos later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the "dirt" was in the form of "emails of Clinton," and that they "have thousands of emails." (FN 464)

*FN 464: Papadopoulo s Statement of Offense ¶ 14. (End FN 464)*
On May 6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information
that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton. (FN 465)

*FN 465: This information is contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials
*FN 465 contd: T̶h̶e̶ ̶i̶n̶f̶o̶r̶m̶a̶t̶i̶o̶n̶ ̶i̶s̶ ̶l̶a̶w̶ ̶e̶n̶f̶o̶r̶c̶e̶m̶e̶n̶t̶ ̶s̶e̶n̶s̶i̶t̶i̶v̶e̶ ̶(̶L̶E̶S̶)̶ ̶a̶n̶d̶ ̶m̶u̶s̶t̶ ̶b̶e̶ ̶t̶r̶e̶a̶t̶e̶d̶ ̶a̶c̶c̶o̶r̶d̶i̶n̶g̶l̶y̶ ̶i̶n̶ ̶a̶n̶y̶ ̶e̶x̶t̶e̶r̶n̶a̶l̶ ̶d̶i̶s̶s̶e̶m̶i̶n̶a̶t̶i̶o̶n̶.̶
The foreign government conveyed
*FN 465 cont'd: this information to the U.S. gov.on July 26, 2016, a few days after WikiLeaks's release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI opened its investigation of potential coordination between RU and the Trump Campaign a few days later based on the information. (End FN 465)*
e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign
While he was discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised of his efforts.
On April 25, 2016, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopoulos wrote to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that "[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr. Trump to meet him when he is ready,"
and that "[t]he advantage of being in London is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities ." (FN 466)

*FN 466: 4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (8: 12:44 p.m.). (End FN 466)*
On 4/27/16, after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that "some interesting messages [were] coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right."(FN 467)

*FN 467: 4/27/16 Email, Papad. to S. Miller (6:55 :58 p.m.) (End FN 467)*
The same day, Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had "been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right." (FN 468)
*FN 468: 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14 p.m.). (End FN 468)*
Papadopoulos' s Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued throughout the spring and summer of 2016.
On May 4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an email from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow , asking Lewandowski whether that was "something we want to move forward with." (FN 469)
*FN 469: 5/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (8:14:49 a.m.). (End FN 469)*
The next day, Papadopoulos forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email "Russia update." (FN 470)

*FN 470: 5/5/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (7:15:21 p.m.). (End FN 470)*
He included the same email in a 5/21/16 message to senior Camp. official Paul Manafort, under the subject line "Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump," stating that "Russia has been eager to meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me to discuss." (FN 471)
*FN 471: 5/21/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort (2:30: 14 p.m.). (End FN 471)
Manafort forwarded the message to another Campaign official, without including Papadopoulos, and stated: "Let[']s discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send any signal." (FN 472)
*FN 472: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶19 n.2. (End FN 472)*
On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski "want[ed] to have a call about this topic" and whether "we were following up with it." (FN 473)
*FN 473: 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (3:08:18 p.m.).(End FN 473)*
After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to "connect with" Clovis because he was "running point," Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that "the Russian MFA" was asking him "if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point." (FN 474)
*FN 474: 6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03 p.m.); 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). (End FN 474)*
Papadopoulos wrote in an email that he "[w]anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what's best to do with it and what message I should send (or to ignore)." (FN 475)
*FN 475: 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). Papadopoulos's email coincided in time with another message to Clovis suggesting a Trump-Putin meeting.
*FN 475 cont'd: First, on May 15, 2016, David Kleina distant relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt-emailed Clovis about a potential Campaign meeting with Berel Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia.
*FN 475 cont'd:The email stated that Klein had contacted Lazar in February about a possible Trump-Putin meeting and that Lazar was "a very close confidante of Putin." DJTFP00011547 (5/15/16 Email, Klein to Clovis (5:45:24 p.m.)).
*FN 475 cont'd: The investigation did not find evidence that Clovis responded to Klein's email or that any further contacts of significance came out of Klein's subsequent meeting with Greenblatt and Rabbi Lazar at Trump Tower. Klein 8/30/18 302, at 2. (End FN 475)*
After several email and Skype exchanges with Timofeev, (FN 476) Papadopoulos sent one more email to Lewandowski on June 19, 2016, Lewandowski's last day as campaign manager. (FN 477)
*FN 476: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 21 (a). (End FN 476)*

*FN 477: [redacted; grand jury] (End FN 477)*
The email stated that "[t]he Russian ministry of foreign affairs" had contacted him and asked whether, if Mr. Trump could not travel to Russia , a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could attend meetings. (FN 478)
*FN 478: 6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:11:11 p.m.). (End FN 478)*
Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was "willing to make the trip off the record if it's in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meet specific people."(FN 479)
*(FN 479): 6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:11:11 p.m.). (FN 479)*
Following Lewandowski's departure from the Campaign, Papadopoulos communicated with Clovis and Walid Phares , another member of the foreign policy advisory team, about an offthe-record meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials or with
Papadopoulos's other Russia connections, Mifsud and Timofeev. (FN 480)

*FN 480: Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 21; 7/14/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (11:57:24 p.m.); 7/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud; 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (2:14:18 p.m.). (FN 480)*
Papadopoulos also interacted directly with Clovis and Phares in connection with the summit of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism (TAG), a group for which Phares was co-secretary general. (FN 481)
*FN 481: Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17; 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism. (End FN 481)*
On July 16, 2016, Papadopoulos attended the TAG summit in Washington, D.C., where he sat next to Clovis (as reflected in the photograph below). (FN 482)

*FN 482: 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism. (FN 482)*
Although Clovis claimed to have no recollection of attending the TAG summit, (FN 483) Papadopoulos remembered discussing Russia and a foreign policy trip with Clovis and Phares during the event. (FN 484)
*FN 483: [Redacted; Grand Jury] (End FN 483)*

*FN 484: Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17. (End FN 484)*
Papadopoulos's recollection is consistent with emails sent before and after the TAG summit. The pre-summit messages included a July 11, 2016 email in which Phares suggested meeting Papadopoulos the day after the summit to chat, (FN 485)
and a July 12 message in the same chain in which Phares advised Papadopoulos that other summit attendees "are very nervous about Russia . So be aware."(FN 486)
*FN 485: 7 /11/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos. (End FN 485)*

*FN 486: 7/12/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos (14:52:29). (End FN 486)*
Ten days after the summit, Papadopoulos sent an email to Mifsud listing Phares and Clovis as other "participants" in a potential meeting at the London Academy of Diplomacy. (FN 487)

*FN 487: 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (14:14:18) (End FN 487)*
Finally, Papadopoulos 's recollection is also consistent with handwritten notes from a journal that he kept at the time. (FN 488)

*FN 488: Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 3. (End FN 488)*
Those notes, which are reprinted in part below, appear to refer to potential September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the "office of Putin," and suggest that Phares, Clovis, and Papadopoulos ("Walid/Sam me")
would attend without the official backing of the Campaign ("no official letter/no message from Trump"). (FN 489)
*FN 489: Papadop. declined to assist in deciphering his notes, telling investigators that he could not read his own handwriting from the journal. Papadop. 9/19/17 302, at 21. The notes, however, appear to read as listed in the column to the left of the image above. (End FN 489)*
Later communications indicate that Clovis determined that he (Clovis) could not travel. On August 15, 2016, Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that he had received requests from multiple foreign governments,
"even Russia[], " for "closed door workshops/consultations abroad," and asked whether there was still interest for Clovis, Phares, and Papadopoulos "to go on that trip."(FN 490)
*FN 490: 8/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (11:59:07 a.m.). (End FN 490)*
Clovis copied Phares on his response, which said that he could not "travel before the election" but that he "would encourage [Papadopoulos] and Walid to make the trips, if it is feasible."(FN 491)

*FN 491: 8/15/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos (12:01 :45 p.m.). (End FN 491)*
Papadopoulos was dismissed from the Trump Campaign in early October 2016, after an interview he gave to the Russian news agency Inter/ax generated adverse publicity. (FN 492)
*FN 492: George Papadopoulos: Sanctions Have Done Little More Than to Turn Russia Towards China, Interfax (Sept. 30, 2016). (End FN 492)*
f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of "Dirt"

Papadopoulos admitted telling at least one individual outside of the Campaign--specifically, the then-Greek foreign minister-about Russia's obtaining Clinton-related emails. (FN 493)
*FN 493: Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 14-15; Def. Sent. Mem., United States v. George Papadopoulos, I :17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 45. (End FN 493)*
In addition, a different foreign government informed the FBI that, 10 days after meeting with Mifsud in late April 2016,
Papadopoulos suggested that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton. (FN 494)
*FN 494: See footnote 465 of Volume I, Section IV.A.2.d, supra. (End FN 494)*
(This conversation occurred after the GRU spearphished Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta and stole his emails, and the GRU hacked into the DCCC and DNC, see Volume l, Sections III.A & III.B, supra.)
Such disclosures raised questions about whether Papadopoulos informed any Trump Campaign official about the emails.
When interviewed, Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials who interacted with him told the Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos 's sharing the information that Russia had obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of emails
or that Russia could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information about Clinton.
Papadopoulos stated that he could not clearly recall having told anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether he accurately remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell Clovis that Papadopoulos thought "they have her emails." (FN 495)
*FN 495: Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 2. (End FN 495)*
Missing some Tweet in this thread?
You can try to force a refresh.

Like this thread? Get email updates or save it to PDF!

Subscribe to The Mueller Report In Tweets
Profile picture

Get real-time email alerts when new unrolls are available from this author!

This content may be removed anytime!

Twitter may remove this content at anytime, convert it as a PDF, save and print for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video

1) Follow Thread Reader App on Twitter so you can easily mention us!

2) Go to a Twitter thread (series of Tweets by the same owner) and mention us with a keyword "unroll" @threadreaderapp unroll

You can practice here first or read more on our help page!

Follow Us on Twitter!

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just three indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3.00/month or $30.00/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!