The frequency of 'diversity and inclusion' mentions in the NYT was always low. By 2016, though, 0.086% of articles mentioned it (up from 0.0257% in 2015)
NYT mentions of 'police brutality' reached roughly 0.37% of all articles (or search results) in 2018.
In hindsight, I should have done a combined search for 'racism' and 'racist' (instead I only pulled data on the former). Thus, here's the graph for mentions of 'racist'
Note that the slope begins pointing upward before 2015, which is consistent with my findings that the 'wokening' was underway before Trump entered the picture.
This term was mentioned only 473 times overall--most of the articles of which were published only over the past few years.
Ran a combined search for this one (probably should have just used 'of color')
These terms saw 559 total mentions--most of which, once again, came over the past few years.
This is a less pronounced trend by comparison, though still some growth over the past few years
First NYT mention of LGBT (N=1,871) was in 2001
In response to @KatyaSedgwick's suggestion, I ran a combined LGBT + LGBTQ search. Such actually moves the first NYT appearance back to 1995 (though they didn't use the acronym. Impressed that Lexisnexis nonetheless caught it)
Someone requested a 'transgender' search. Here you go. First (and isolated) mention, believe it or not, was in 1986.
Also saw a request for 'safe space'. First (of 1,036) appearance of these words in the NYT was in a 1983 article on a school ('Safe Space') for the deaf. Something tells me the context of its usage has changed overtime. Anyways, here you have it.
Forgot to run the percentages for 'social justice' (which appears to be trending towards 1% of all NYT articles), so here
Oh, to clear up any confusion: I shifted over to percentages vs. absolute numbers out of concern that the trends were largely a function of increases in NYT article output.
Clear Trump/travel ban effect here, though some small degree of growth in the preceding years.
Also forgot to graph for percentages for 'whiteness' (see below). Someone asked me why I didn't calculate the percentages for some of the non-NYT graphs. Short answer: tallying the annual # of NYT articles is a lot more manageable than tallying the annual # of ALL news articles.
Just pulled this one out of my critical theory hat
For comparison, I graphed some random control terms
This graph was the result of a coding error. So as to not mislead (60%?!!), I've deleted it. On your right is the corrected figure
Could very well be a spurious correlation (r=0.714), but the number of monthly NYT articles mentioning 'racism' does correspond to increased Google search interest (note that GoogleTrends begins in 2004, so I had to limit the data accordingly)
Some potentially relevant contextual data: the percent of people saying they regularly read NYT roughly doubled between 2012-2016. Nearly all of this growth occurred among digital readers (i.e. those who visit NYTOnline).
I cross-verified this increase with data from Statista (though it only begins in 2014)
Readership seems to have doubled across the board, but liberals (16%->31%) still (naturally) constitute the majority of readers.
This might be relevant insofar as a) perceptions of the prevalence of discrimination among liberals saw tremendous increases across this period, and b) there's a robust relationship between NYT readership and perceiving more discrimination
Some of you requested it, so here it is
If conservatives would just have more empathy, we could finally redistribute all the wealth, dissolve the borders, pay reparations, sign the GND, and live in an egalitarian multicultural utopia.
As with racism, the number of monthly NYT articles mentioning 'empathy' closely tracks (r=0.825) Google searches for 'empathy'
This is over *all* newspaper results per year (not just NYT).
I knew it
LexisNexis shows results for 190 NYT articles referring to African American enslavement in 2012. That number grew to 805 in 2018.
White people have never been more popular. Number of articles mentioning between 2011-2018: 507 (2011), 547 (2012), 577 (2013), 843 (2014), 851 (2015), 1,476 (2016), 1,681 (2017), 2018 (1,827).
Made this one for you @PsychRabble. Unfortunately, I could find only 3 listings (overall) for 'stereotype accuracy'
This one probably took the longest to put together. Since 2016, NYT has published roughly 15-30 articles a day that mention these terms, as compared to 2-4 a day in the 1980s.
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Do Americans broadly oppose military action against Iran?
Recent polling suggests they do. A Reuters/Ipsos survey conducted May 15–18 found that 61% of Americans disapproved of U.S. military strikes against Iran, while 52% said the military action was not worth it.
But generic approval questions may not tell the whole story.
2/10
Our latest @fsuigc survey of 1,059 American adults (also conducted by Ipsos, May 19–28) approached the issue differently.
Instead of asking simply whether military action was “worth it,” we examined how Americans think about the tradeoffs involved—including the perceived threat posed by Iran, the prospects for diplomacy, and the costs people are willing to bear to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
The results paint a considerably more nuanced picture.
A short thread: 👇
3/10
First, baseline attitudes are hawkish on the Iranian nuclear threat itself:
58% of Americans—including 72% of Republicans and 46% of Democrats— say a nuclear-armed Iran would be a Very or Extremely serious long-term threat to the U.S. and its allies.
Only 12% say it’s “not too serious” or “not at all serious.”
1/Thrilled to share @fsuigc’s latest report, based on a national survey of 1,447 U.S. adults we conducted in late September—one week after the assassination of Charlie Kirk.
We examine how Americans think about harmful speech and whether physical violence can ever be justified to stop its public expression.
1/ I'm delighted to finally share some of the work I've done since joining @fsuigc.
Last month, we published a report about political tolerance based on national survey data (N=1,004) we collected during the summer. In this study, we measure political tolerance as the willingness to interact with or accept people with opposing political views across different relational contexts. For comparison, we also measured tolerance towards ex-felons and flat earthers.
2/ As shown in the table below, across all contexts, people are much more willing to engage with people with opposing political views than the other two target groups. Regardless of the target group, though, openness tends to decline as the intimacy of an engagement increases. For instance, whereas 73% would engage in a social/recreational activity with political opponents (ex-Felon: 54%, flat-earther: 49%) without reservation, just 41% would be willing to date them (ex-Felon: 22%, flat-earther: 19%)
3/Consistent with this intimacy 'gradient', our analysis finds that our 7 tolerance items best fit a 3-factor structure, which is depicted in the table below.
1/ Updated racial ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer differentials from the ANES. In sum, while the 'curve has flattened', the attitudinal effects of the Great Awokening persist (at least wrt race). If you thought or hoped otherwise, sorry to disappoint.
2/ In fact, coverage linking Israel to “genocide” now exceeds that of every actual or widely recognized genocide of the last 40 years, including:
Rwanda (1994)
Darfur (2003–2008)
Bosnia (Srebrenica, 1995)
Myanmar (Rohingya, 2017–Present)
Yazidis (ISIS, 2014–2017)
3/ In The New York Times, for example, the spike in 2023–2024 mentions of “genocide” alongside “Israel” is more than 9x larger than the peak for Rwanda in the mid-1990s and nearly 6x the peak for the more recent Darfur genocide.
1/ One of the more counterintuitive findings in my latest article:
Historically, when Democrats only control the House, an average of just over 10 race-conscious provisions are added to the NDAA per year.
When they control both the House and Senate? That number drops to about 4.
But why?
2/ First, what makes the House so powerful here?
Simple: the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) writes the first draft of the NDAA.
If you control the House, you control the blueprint—and the early language that often survives reconciliation. That’s where ideological riders get embedded.
3/But why are more race-conscious provisions added under divided government?
While I can’t say for sure, my reasoning is this: when Democrats only control the House, the NDAA becomes one of the few legislative vehicles guaranteed to pass.
Standalone race-conscious or DEI bills are less likely to survive the Senate.