I agree with the main premise: "Sometime in the last two years, American hegemony died." But I disagree with Zakaria about why it happened.
The deep structural forces that cased American decline were not external, but internal #AgesOfDiscord
Zakaria asks: "So which was it that eroded American hegemony—the rise of new challengers or imperial overreach?"
My answer: neither.
It was "internal rot". Or, more academically, popular immiseration and elite overproduction leading to intraelite conflict. peterturchin.com/ages-of-discor…
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@BretDevereaux In his response to @Noahpinion Bret takes a swipe in passing at my work. It is not clear to what he refers ("effort to find support for this hypothesis in the ancient world"), as my my main effort for empirically testing this hypotheses has centered on the US from 1789 to ...
@BretDevereaux@Noahpinion ... the present. With a huge emphasis on the contemporary America (from the 1970s on). Perhaps America in the late 20 century is an ancient country? The main source is Ages of Discord peterturchin.com/ages-of-discor…
As I said, I really enjoyed this piece. Noah shows data for a bunch of new "proxies", variables that can help us with quantifying elite overproduction. Some reactions follow.
.@Noahpinion First, I disagree with the (apparent) criticism that my definition of elite overproduction focuses only on the supply -- it is explicitly the issue of balance of supply/demand. In #AgesOfDiscord I always consider both sides of the equation.
@Noahpinion Elite overproduction is always a relative thing, not an absolute one. The whole point is to understand what process generates frustrated elite aspirants, and how their numbers blow up, when supply starts to massively overwhelm demand.
2. The author writes, “Peter Turchin and his collaborators have championed a new approach in which history as a discipline will be replaced by cliodynamics”. This is an outrageous falsehood. The relationship between cliodynamics and history is a mutualistic symbiosis.
1. Thanks for this calculation! The starting point is very interesting, but I am not sure the answer is right (there seem to be a few extra orders of magnitude...)
3. 100 k people burn 200 k ha, so we have 2 ha burned per person.
4. Taking median standing crop biomass in grasslands as 300 g per sq.m (it varies, dry steppe is less, moist savanna is more, but let's for the order of magnitude).
5. That works out to 6,000 kg of dry matter (mostly cellulose) per capita burned.
6. Now let's compare it with my previous estimate of firewood burned by a Russian household, 3,000 kg. In per capita terms, 600 - 750 kg.
3. I now have three contenders, one that was a surprise for me, two that I had in mind when asked the question.
4. Let's start with the surprising one: hinter-gatherers burning grass-lands or brush-lands to create habitat suitable for their life-styles.
5. After initial resistance, I decided that this is a valid entry into the race. These people used energy to modify environment to suit their needs. Is that different from people using muscle power to cut forests for agriculture, or a modern farmer using bulldozers to clear land?