Only thing I would add to this great explanation is that the employer literally has a rule prohibiting women from wearing pants. DOJ says it was ok to fire Stephens for wearing a skirt because employer would also have fired a cis woman for wearing pants.
DOJ could have tried to argue that sex stereotyping against trans people is somehow different that sex stereotyping against cis people. Instead, it argued no one can bring sex stereotyping claims if the stereotypes are "equally" applied to men and women.
Here is a quote from the business’s attorney. By “dressing as a man” he means wearing pants instead of a skirt suit. www-m.cnn.com/2019/08/19/pol…
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1. I worry that the US’s briefing in the SB8 case makes this more complicated than it needs to be. The ability of the US to bring a suit against Texas in equity is a straightforward application of the principles articulated in Ex parte Young. (See rest of thread before replying)
2. Ex parte Young said that courts have the power sitting in equity to declare state laws unconstitutional if they conflict with the Constitution. But this power is limited by the 11A.
3. Because individuals cannot sue the state itself, they need to identify a specific officer who enforces the law so that officer can be enjoined under a legal fiction. If you can’t find an officer your suit is against the state itself and barred by 11A.
1. Last week we filed our CA2 brief on behalf of Andraya & Terry defending CT’s policy of allowing girls who are trans to participate in athletics without discrimination. Amicus briefs are being filed today aclu.org/sites/default/…
2. This case was brought by ADF on behalf of four cis girls and has been used as a marketing tool for passing discriminatory sports bans in other states. But—as our briefs shows—the actual facts don’t match the overheated rhetoric. Here is a basic fact check from our brief.
3. The cis plaintiffs say they “simply can’t win” when competing with girls who are trans. But these plaintiffs have repeatedly outperformed Andraya and Terry in direct competition.
1. New CA6 case recounts the harassment a transgender woman received from co-workers at City of Detroit after transitioning. opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/2…
2. Harassing complaints falsely accusing her of violating the dress code.
3. Someone defaced her nameplate to write "Mr." before her name
1. Latest dissent by Judge Duncan revealing hypocrisy of anti-trans compelled speech arguments. Recall that Duncan wrote an opinion saying that requiring counsel not to misgender litigants would show bias. And Thapar on CA6 said prohibiting profs from doing so violates 1A
2. Now the CA5 just issued a decision saying a student raised disputed questions of fact as to whether teacher required students to copy down the pledge of allegiance to demonstrate their patriotism and retaliated against a student who refused, in violation of Barnette
3. Judge Duncan goes on an anti-woke tirade about how this will open the door for all sorts of 1A challenges to class assignments. "We live in an easily offended age. Even Dr. Seuss is controversial."
After Gavin won in 2016, the Supreme Court issued an emergency stay to prevent him form using the restroom. Today the Court denied cert despite the School Board warning that millions of students will be affected by decisions protecting trans kids in CA 4, 7, 11.
North Carolina's bathroom bill is gone. Trans kids have been using the restrooms, and the sky hasn't fallen. Despite wild allegations, no one has ever been able to show that anyone's privacy has been harmed by letting trans kids use the restrooms in peace
By denying cert, the Supreme Court did not fall for the school board's scare tactics. Cert denials are, of course, not rulings on the merits. But the denial shows that the prospect of trans kids using the restrooms is not seen as the same cataclysmic event it was in 2016.
1. I re-read Dred Scott in light of that New Yorker article people are tweeting about and was struck again by how--in addition to being horrifyingly racist--the methodology of the opinion is a perfect illustration of bad "original anticipated applications" originalism.
2. The opinion acknowledges that the plain text of the Constitution (and Declaration of Independence) is obviously broad enough to include black people as citizens, but says that the people at the time were so racist that's not what they could have intended.
3. Now--without equating the two things substantively--compare the bad methodology of Dred Scott to the debate in Bostock between Gorsuch and the dissents about who is the better originalist.