Yes, agrees. Ironically democracy seems historically to be “in crisis” precisely when it is most proving its superiority to other systems, i.e. when it is managing us through a difficult, messy adjustment. The books cited here seem to worry that democracy is in trouble because...
...the electorate isn’t just, disinterested and well-informed, but I think this would only be a problem if the purpose of a political system were to express deep political truths. In fact I’d argue that nothing is more dangerous than such a political system: what we need is...
...one that allows our institutions to adjust, however clumsily, as conditions change, and unfortunately because there are times, like today, when change is extremely messy, chaotic and hard to predict, the best we can hope for is to adjust in a messy, chaotic and...
...unpredictable way. Like in the 1930s and the 1970s, I think the populism and “crisis of democracy” that we are experiencing today is just democracy doing what it is supposed to do. It is the non-democracies that are not adjusting, and while this may look like purpose and...
...stability, in fact I think it just reflects institutional rigidity. Jefferson is supposed to have wanted a bloody revolution every fifty years to drive institutional change, but while that may be more aesthetically pleasing, perhaps our way is better. tabletmag.com/jewish-news-an…
1/9 Brilliant article by Martin Wolf on global imbalances. Wolf is one of the few economists who have an intuitive sense of the global economy as an economic system, which means he is also one of the few who understands how global imbalances work. ft.com/content/72ab51…
2/9 He notes in this piece that "the domestic counterpart of its external deficits today is borrowing by the US government."
Many economists find this almost impossible to understand. They do not see how net capital inflows can contribute to rising US debt.
3/9 But when surplus economies export weak domestic demand to trade partners, it is mainly a rise in household and/or fiscal debt that prevents this from causing a rise in domestic unemployment.
Wolf then goes on to make a point similar to the one Keynes made in 1944.
1/4 Brad Setser explains why China didn’t truly de-dollarize—it just shifted its dollar holdings from official reserves at SAFE to less transparent state entities like banks and investment funds.
@Brad_Setser cfr.org/articles/china…
2/4 But his explanations will probably continue to be ignored in favor of much more exciting stories about the collapse of USD as a reserve currency. That's because as long as the PBoC shifts out of its direct holdings of US Treasuries (mainly, it seems, into indirect...
3/4 holdings through custodian accounts), something that is relatively easy to measure, confused analysts will ignore everything else that is happening in the direct and shadow reserves and take this shift as representing the full story of China's reserve management.
1/9 Interesting SCMP article: "China’s top market regulator is intensifying its crackdown on debt-laden “zombie companies” – rolling out a pilot programme in seven economic hubs to facilitate the forced exit of unprofitable firms." sc.mp/q2aq0?utm_sour…
2/9 Developing a robust bankruptcy framework in China is among the most important steps Beijing can take to reduce the role of non-productive investment in driving the economy. Hard budget constraints are what force economic activity to remain economic value creating.
3/9 But it's not so easy to do this. The fact that China has far more "zombie" companies – highly inefficient businesses that are kept alive only by surging debt – than any other country is not an accident or an oversight.
1/8 Brendan Greeley on the development of the eurodollar. If Beijing truly wants CNY to be more widely used in international finance, the eurodollar market provides one potentially useful model to show how that might happen. ft.com/content/be3459…
2/8 From the 1960s through the early 1980s, the eurodollar was a separate offshore dollar market and not simply an extension of the onshore USD markets. it was a way for dollars to circulate outside US regulation and US control. Its separation was created by...
3/8 a series of frictional costs between the onshore market and the offshore needs of foreigners, including US capital controls, US bank regulation, and the refusal of Soviet bloc nations to hold their badly-needed dollars in onshore US banks.
1/5 It's true that China was able to withstand the effects of the Iran war better than many other countries because it had stockpiled commodities. But it is a little silly, perhaps even a little orientalist, to say that it did so because of strategic thinking. bloomberg.com/news/features/…
2/5 We forget that Japan also stockpiled massive amounts of commodities in the late 1980s, and given the subsequent fall in commodity prices (driven in part by ja[an's own economic slowdown), this later turned out to be an additonal drag on economic performance.
3/5 In both cases, the country was running enormous trade surpluses that had to be recycled, and were causing increasing concern abroad. In both cases, perhaps in order to disguise reserve accumulation, part of the reserve accumulation occurred through state banks.
1/6 Good Steven Barnett piece. He points out that "targeting growth rates inconsistent with productivity trends leads to distortive policies", and argues instead for a "dramatic, permanent payroll tax cut" to boost consumption. ft.com/content/d078c7…
2/6 This would certainly work, as would any other policy that increases the disposable income of average Chinese households relative to GDP. China's extraordinarily low consumption share of GDP is mainly a consequence of the low household income share.
3/6 Notice however that unless the cut in payroll taxes were matched by higher taxes on households or businesses, or by cuts in spending to either sector, a reduction in payroll taxes would have to be balanced dollar for dollar by more government debt.