Yes, agrees. Ironically democracy seems historically to be “in crisis” precisely when it is most proving its superiority to other systems, i.e. when it is managing us through a difficult, messy adjustment. The books cited here seem to worry that democracy is in trouble because...
...the electorate isn’t just, disinterested and well-informed, but I think this would only be a problem if the purpose of a political system were to express deep political truths. In fact I’d argue that nothing is more dangerous than such a political system: what we need is...
...one that allows our institutions to adjust, however clumsily, as conditions change, and unfortunately because there are times, like today, when change is extremely messy, chaotic and hard to predict, the best we can hope for is to adjust in a messy, chaotic and...
...unpredictable way. Like in the 1930s and the 1970s, I think the populism and “crisis of democracy” that we are experiencing today is just democracy doing what it is supposed to do. It is the non-democracies that are not adjusting, and while this may look like purpose and...
...stability, in fact I think it just reflects institutional rigidity. Jefferson is supposed to have wanted a bloody revolution every fifty years to drive institutional change, but while that may be more aesthetically pleasing, perhaps our way is better. tabletmag.com/jewish-news-an…
1/8 I just finished reading Chris Miller's excellent book on the collapse of the Soviet Economy. Some people might think that the topic is interesting, but largely irrelevant to global economic conditions today. They would be mistaken. This is a very relevant book.
@crmiller1
2/8 Among the important points it makes is this: "The notion that political and economic reforms were separate processes misunderstands Soviet politics. The most decisive debates during the perestroika period were about the distribution of economic resources."
3/8 Miller notes that China's reforms began in the late 1970s, when its economy was in such terrible shape that they resulted in an immediate surge in productivity, the benefits of which could be used effectively to buy off potential elite opposition (especially in the 1990s).
1/9 SCMP: "To address widening trade imbalances across the Asia-Pacific region, surplus-heavy nations such as China should be buying more, and deficit-running economies need to bolster their competitiveness, a top Apec official said on Thursday." sc.mp/y49ox?utm_sour…
2/9 The article continues: "Carlos Kuriyama warned that structural imbalances would remain wide in the near future and cautioned that protectionist responses could exacerbate regional fragmentation rather than resolving underlying issues."
3/9 We are definitely in the age of Joan Robinson. She warned that large, beggar-thy-neighbor trade surpluses would eventually force deficit countries into protectionist retaliation which could lead to a breakdown in trade that would harm the global economy.
1/10
Important FT article by Mark Sobel, Brad Setser and Robin Brooks. They make the seemingly counterintuitive point that while incremental trade agreements, in which one side or the other agrees to buy a little more of this or a little less of... ft.com/content/b600db…
2/10
that, may impress policymakers (and dealmakers) who don't understand trade – or, for that matter, how the balance of payments work – in fact they have no impact at all on the overall trade imbalances.
3/10
Whether or not China buys more soybeans or Boeings might matter to American soybean farmers or to Boeing shareholders, in other words, but it will have no impact on either the American trade deficit or on overall American deindustrialization.
1/5 It’s hard to know how significant this is, given the uncertainties created by the war, but April numbers were terrible for China. Industrial output grew 4.1% year on year in April, well below expectations. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/5 For the first four months of 2026, industrial output grew 5.6%. Against this, retail sales grew by a measly 1.9% year on year in the first four months of 2026, and by a shocking 0.2% in April.
3/5 Overall consumption growth is almost certainly a little higher, but it is hard to explain such a large gap between production and consumption except if more production is not resulting either in higher wages, higher profits, or stable household confidence.
1/4 NYT: "President Trump departed Beijing on Friday, touting trade deals to sell American-made airplanes, farm goods and other products, the signature outcome of his two-day summit with Xi Jinping, China’s top leader." nytimes.com/2026/05/15/bus…
2/4 This is the kind of thing that confuses far too many policymakers and analysts. China's huge trade surplus is the result of income distribution and transfer policies that force Chinese production to exceed, by a large margin, China's total consumption and investment.
3/4 The US trade deficit is largely driven by the extent to which economies with trade surpluses decide to balance those surpluses by acquiring US assets.
The purchase commitments last week will have no impact on either, and so won't change the imbalances.
1/12
Very good article by Greg Ip. I think the most important point he makes is this one: "The Achilles’ heel of Chinese industrial policy is its cost and waste. China runs bigger budget deficits relative to economic output than the U.S."
@greg_ip wsj.com/world/china/be…
2/12
Most trade and industrial policy consists effectively of transfers from less favored to more favored sectors. In China's case this has meant very large explicit and implicit transfers from the household sector to subsidize infrastructure and manufacturing investment.
3/12
Other countries have followed similar policies, but this was taken to such an extreme in China that one result has been the lowest consumption share of GDP and the highest investment share ever seen in history (no other country even came close).