The Fixed-term Parliaments Act diagram in this BBC story is reasonably good. But it seems to based on what I call the "more deferred duty to resign" theory of the Act. That's not the best theory. bbc.co.uk/news/uk-493912… (1)
The problem is the little box that asks "Can MPs agree on alternative PM?". You only need to ask that question if you think the PM needn't resign unless and until someone else has a majority (or something). But that's a flawed way of thinking about it. (2)
You could have a minority group that was not far short of a majority, that could govern at least for a period—like Labour in 1974, say. The big question is whether you think the FTPA now locks such a minority government out (as the BBC diagram implies). (3)
I don't think it does, or should. It's far better to see the PM as having a duty to resign as soon as he's definitely lost the confidence of the Commons, rather than being entitled to hang on till someone else has it. (4)
So here’s my version of the diagram. This represents the “less deferred duty to resign” theory of the FTPA, which I think is correct. (5)
This has two advantages over the BBC's diagram. First, it aligns with what we know about precedent. It allows for incoming minority governments, which is something we have had in the past. So this is a descriptively more accurate theory. (6)
Second, this theory aligns much more closely with the traditional idea that the government needs to have the confidence of the Commons. On this theory, the PM needs to resign once this confidence is definitively lost. So it's a normatively more desirable theory. (7)
If the PM has lost the confidence of the House and all credible alternatives want an election, fine—on my theory, you get one. But a no-confidenced PM shouldn't have the unilateral right to lock them out. That's the problem with the BBC diagram and the "more deferred" theory. (8)
Important, in working out whether you agree with the BBC's implied theory or my explicit one, to put out of your mind any partisan considerations such as the identity of any incumbent and alternative PM. (9/9)
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The plan so obviously breaches the Withdrawal Agreement that some "senior figure advising the government on legal matters"—the Treasury Solicitor, Counsel or Parliamentary Counsel, say—is bound to have given advice like this. The Braverman line just is not legally credible.
Who could this "senior figure advising the government on legal matters" be? I've mentioned the Treasury Solicitor (the top legal official), Parliamentary Counsel (the drafting lawyer) and an external barrister. The other obvious possibility is the Legal Adviser to the FCDO.
As to the "correspondence", the main possibilities are I think a letter (a) from Parliamentary Counsel to FCDO lawyers about the bill, or perhaps more likely (b) from FCDO lawyers to the Law Officers asking for their view (which then becomes the government's official legal line).
The JR provisions in the Judicial Review and Courts Bill are limited, and reasonable as far as they go (though some will say "Cart" JRs shouldn't be abolished). The big worry is that clause 2—the ouster of "Cart" JRs—will be a prototype of further piecemeal ouster clauses later.
What I mean is: if this clause preventing a limited sort of JR is accepted and given effect by judges, then MPs might be invited by ministers to include similar clauses in future bills whenever they fancy excluding judicial review. Ministers might try pushing this worryingly far.
A good response from the courts might be to use the sort of approach the Court of Appeal took in the Privacy International case (which was later reversed by the Supreme Court): that is, to say that it's unproblematic to prevent JR of judicial bodies equivalent to the High Court.
The most interesting recent development in constitutional law has been the Supreme Court's enforcement of very strong presumptions about what Parliament means in its legislation.
One such presumption is the "principle of legality", that Parliament does not legislate in breach of fundamental common law rights. It's not all that easy for ministers to draft legislation clear enough to rebut the presumption.
Another is a very strong presumption that Parliament does not legislate to exclude judicial review. The Privacy International case shows it's really very hard (some judges may think, impossible) for ministers to get round that one.
Having watched Cummings in front of a select committee, I reckon the chance of him making a success of this statement and Q&A, and avoiding further damage to the PM, are vanishingly low. Johnson is mad to allow it.
There's a real risk he'll say or do something completely bonkers, and come across angrier and worse than Trump. Even if he resigns, he's quite likely to wound Johnson badly as he goes. Johnson is mad to allow it.
Is Johnson really such a fool that he trusts Cummings to stick to an agreed line? Can't he see the danger that Cummings might use this to satisfy some need of his own? He's putting his premiership in Cummings's hands today. As I keep saying, he's mad to allow it.
I'm still worried about why the government hasn't introduced legislation clearly empowering the PM to agree an a50 extension. I think it's needed to ensure there simply can't be a legal challenge to the extension.
I'm not saying a challenge would succeed. HMG has decent arguments that might well win the day. But the challengers would also have decent arguments and (a) might even win; (b) could destabilise policy just by challenging. HMG should exclude the risk.
The arguments would mirror Gina Miller's. They'd say prerogative extension would frustrate the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and would change the constitution temporarily, so going beyond the scope of prerogative. They'd say no clear words in the 2018 Act preserved this prerogative.
The success or failure of @TheIndGroup and perhaps other splits may be determined by marginal tactical decisions now, that turn out later to have been major strategic choices. Extreme care is needed. 1/
I think it *could* be a mistake to drift into becoming one all-purpose "centre party" drawing from all other parties. The risk is of having no clear identity, electoral positioning or mission. If this is where it's going, those joining now must communicate a clear aim. 2/
I think Conservatives tempted to follow the example of @TheIndGroup might do better to form their own separate "one nation" group. There's no reason moderates can't inspire each other and work together rather than join the same team. 3/