I have had SO MANY conversations with junior colleagues who are terrified to give voice to their first-order views of sex & gender or their second-order views concerning the silencing of voices in that 1st-order debate. And it is totally /
/ impossible for me to understand how anyone could think this is a good thing: those who are in this position are NOT going to have their minds changed by being cowed into silence & told they are bigoted just for thinking what they do.
To the contrary, what actually happens is/
/ that those in this position grow ever more resentful of those who malign them and demand their silence, and ever more convinced that the arguments for the consensus position must really be no good.
PS. Obviously what I say here can be applied in turn to people on all "sides" of these debates, as well as many other ones. I don't mean to suggest otherwise. The phenomenon described here is bad for EVERYONE.
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PSA/Request: Recently I got an email from a graduate student asking for advice on getting into public-facing philosophy.
It surprised me I couldn't find a comprehensive list of resources to point him to, so I ended up making my own. I would be happy to learn what I missed! 🧵1/7
My immediate response to the student was that while editors are always open to pitches, it helps to have 1) a track record of prior work to point to and 2) a good sense of the kind of writing that the publication you are pitching tends to publish.
📢ing today about a new paper on the x-phi of personal identity I have forthcoming in Phil. Studies.
The title is "One -- but Not the Same". It is coauthored with @byrd_nick, Enoch Lambert, and Matthew Taylor.
Preprint at PhilPapers: philpapers.org/rec/SCHOB-7. Short 🧵 below:
How do considerations of norm or moral value bear on ordinary judgments of personal identity?
A popular answer is, "Quite a lot", as moral deterioration seems to make a larger difference than other kinds of psychological change in judgments of a person's continued identity.
E.g., in @kevin_tobia (2015) participants agreed more that "after the accident, the original man ... does not exist anymore; the man after the accident is a different person" when the accident resulted in moral deterioration rather than moral improvement: philpapers.org/rec/TOBPIA
Here is one more paper that I have newly forthcoming, co-authored with my brilliant doctoral student Marshall Bierson, on how to understand the way that what a person *thinks* makes a difference to the true description of what they *do*.
Our focus is on how this idea is developed in Anscombe's early writings, from the first edition of Intention (1957) to 'On Promising and its Justice' (1969), including other important papers like 'On Brute Facts', 'Modern Moral Philosophy', and 'Authority in Morals', as well as /
a lot of so-far unpublished (and often undated) work that is in the @Collegium_Penn's archive of Anscombe's papers. Of particular interest is the question of how allowing what we call "the bearing of thinking on doing" does not show it possible to use a strategy of cultivated /
How do normative considerations influence causal thinking? A short thread on my new experimental paper with Eric Sievers, "Cause, 'Cause', and Norm" (preprint here: philpapers.org/rec/SCHCQA-2). It's got video!
To begin, take 30 seconds to watch the following animation, and then ask yourself the following question, which hereafter I'll call "CAUSED":
At the end, which shape caused the triangle to break -- the circle, the square, or both of them?
Many of you likely gave "the square" as your answer to CAUSED. But why? After all, there's a clear sense in which both shapes did just the same thing, and what happened to the triangle depended equally on both of them. So what makes the square stand out as cause of what happened?
I agree with much of the argument in this thread by @rinireg. In particular, it's true that the hard work of defending open discussion comes when we have to identify the places where we think such discussion should not, in fact, be tolerated.
For one thing, a good number of those who are currently defending open discussion really do not think the thing that @rinireg says "almost everyone" agrees on, viz. that there should be exceptions to the norm of permitting open discussion of disagreeable topics.
Noam Chomsky is a case in point: he really does think that ANYTHING should be permitted, and indeed that "it is precisely in the case of horrendous ideas that the right of free expression must be most vigorously defended".
This is that, in my now 20 years of studying, teaching, & attempting to practice philosophy, my experience is that "calling into question ... the validity of [people's] own /
/ understanding of who they are" is SIMPLY THE THING THAT PHILOSOPHERS DO, and have done fairly consistently since Socrates got put to death for doing it.
No doubt this can be done better and worse, and with more or less concern for those whose self-understanding is at stake /
/ on any given occasion. (For the record, I favor "more".)
But to say that philosophers should not do these things is just to say that philosophers SHOULD NOT DO PHILOSOPHY, at least not in earshot of anyone to whom it might make a difference.