1/6: Thanks, and agree 100%, so it's not a rejoinder but a fact. Sadly, the US doesn't coordinate that especially well anymore. More important, I've argued over many years that the US seems oblivious to longer-term structural changes, in Asia especially, altering the landscape.
https://twitter.com/LukePatey/status/1163798890962927616
2/6: From 2011 (before the Belt and Road existed or Xi Jinping had yet taken power): Some of the writing of a more integrated Asia was already on the wall. I explored why the US had lost the plot in this essay, "Why America No Longer Gets Asia" in @TWQgw: csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/le… 
@TWQgw 3/6: From 2009: Two decades of post-Asian Financial Crisis ideas threatened to marginalize the US (or alter its role without major adaptations from Washington). I explored with @Rmanning4 in this @CFR_org monograph on "The United States in the New Asia": cfr.org/asia-and-pacif…
@TWQgw @Rmanning4 @CFR_org 4/6: From 2012: The collision of security and economics similarly threatened traditional US roles in Asia. The US has since compounded this problem with TPP withdrawal and Trump trade policies. This @ForeignPolicy essay, "A Tale of Two Asias" explored: foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/31/a-t…
@TWQgw @Rmanning4 @CFR_org @ForeignPolicy 5/6: From 2015: The US risked misidentifying the sources of its competition by conflating long-term structural trends in Asia with short-term "Sinocentric" trends. Explored in an essay on "The New Asian Order" in @ForeignAffairs: foreignaffairs.com/articles/14284…
@TWQgw @Rmanning4 @CFR_org @ForeignPolicy @ForeignAffairs 6/6: From 2018: The US had, in my view, finally lost the plot in Asia, whining a lot while competing too little and confusing some causes with effects. This @MacroPoloChina essay, "Reluctant Stakeholder," explored and built on some of my earlier arguments: macropolo.org/analysis/reluc…
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
