Login Attempts are over the last 2 years. This list might be useful for those researching crypto currency fraud/theft.
One note is at least some of the threat actors were smart in how they planned to maintain access. Some of them did succeed logging in since I didn't care about this account. But some of the threat actors setup API keys to try and maintain a backdoor.
Most victims would never realize an API key was setup allowing continued access even after they recovered their accounts.
Honestly, some of my old accounts that I don't care about become great honeypots for threat intel :).
Recently, Hancitor incorporated the use of COM to spawn IE and download stage 2 payloads. While many may have not understood the true risk of what the Hancitor campaign stumbled into it, its very dangerous.
Specifically, my research partners and myself around 1 year ago theorized that COM objects if used to spawn IE could be used to get around/through proxy servers in environments. Proxy servers have provided a severely overestimated layer of protection.
Organization's security teams have come to assume that "Since the malware doesn't know the proxy details, auth mechanism or have user credentials callouts will fail". However, this is a faulty assumption as with COM objects + IE you can automatically get that information!