Today's BJS report is definitely interesting. Despite the inflammatory headline from the press release, the data actually shows that when you exclude immigration arrests, there are actually FEWER arrests of non-citizens than in previous years.
Here's data from Table 2:
Of course, the data looks VERY different when you start counting immigration-related crimes like improper entry or illegal reentry. Under the Trump administration, prosecutions for these crimes have surged—making federal arrest numbers go way up.
Here's data from Table 2 again.
The report also shows that certain kinds of federal arrests are weighted towards U.S. citizens, while others are weighted towards non-citizens.
Federal immigration-related arrests? Overwhelmingly non-citizens.
Federal weapons arrests? Overwhelmingly U.S. citizens.
In many ways this report seem to fit squarely with what people like @AlexNowrasteh have been saying for years; when you exclude crimes which are incidental to immigration and the border, non-citizens already inside the U.S. are no more likely to commit crimes than citizens.
@AlexNowrasteh Another interesting tidbit? Table 11 breaks out immigration-related arrests across the 9 SW Border Sectors, and matches it with CBP data—showing that prosecutions bear little relationship to apprehensions.
Apprehensions going up =/= prosecutions going up, and vice versa.
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Mexico commits to another large deployment of its National Guard to the northern border, claiming they will focus on preventing fentanyl trafficking, and Trump calls off the tariffs for now.
Of course, since most fentanyl is smuggled by US citizens, this won't stop much at all.
The deployment of Mexican National Guard troops to the U.S.-Mexico border in 2019 under Trump had zero impact on fentanyl smuggling before, because it's not migrants who are smuggling fentanyl in the overwhelming majority of cases. Fentanyl traffic continued to rise each year.
To emphasize once again: the vast majority of fentanyl traffickers are US citizens, who get less scrutiny when reentering the country at ports of entry.
Here's the Sentencing Commission noting that in FY 2023, 86.4% of people sentenced for fentanyl trafficking were US citizens.
Colombia has accepted hundreds of deportation flights in the past years. It rejected two flights using military planes, but agreed to continue taking flights using normal ICE planes.
In response, the Trump administration has done the equivalent of punching them in the face.
All repatriations are governed by bilateral agreements. Every country has an absolute right to set the terms by which they take deportations from another country.
And if you don’t know why military planes might be an issue, pick up a book on 20th century Latin American history.
Obviously I am not Gustavo Petro nor am I Colombian, so my thoughts on this are purely my own, but I can’t help but think that Trump’s actions eliminated an easy off-ramp for Petro to get the U.S. to say they’ll be nicer and then keep on taking deportation flights like normal.
When speaking to experts in Latin America, I've been told that the use of military planes by the United States could be seen as an insult. And now it seems they were right; Mexico's president just refused to take a deportation flight from the US for the first time in years.
Two military plane deportation flights were carried out to Guatemala, but as this user pointed out, Mexico appears to have denied the US permission to use Mexican airspace.
Mexico has been taking US deportations for a century, so that's noteworthy.
🚨NEW! The Trump administration has invoked a decades-old, never-before-invoked, legal authority that permits them to authorize willing state and local enforcement officers to carry out "any of the powers, privileges, or duties" of an immigration officer (ICE or Border Patrol).
The memo invokes an obscure law Congress enacted decades ago authorizing DHS (then INS) to declare a "mass influx" and deputize local law enforcement as full immigration officers.
DHS must enter into written agreements and oversee any deputized LEOs. dhs.gov/sites/default/…
This will be subject to legal challenge, especially given the sweeping delegation of authority, which claims a mass influx in all 50 states (including Alaska and Hawaii apparently, which is obviously absurd). But courts may be deferential to executive use of this authority.
I can quibble with the timeline on some of these (e.g. "restart wall construction" will take months to put into action given the state of contractual issues) but I agree that the majority of this will be attempted. The most immediate EO impact will be cuts to legal immigration.
Actually this is a great opportunity to do a thread on some of the things to look out for on in the first week. I'm going to mirror @David_J_Bier's thread here and go over some thoughts about each. Sorry David for spamming your mentions.
Let's start with CHNV parole.
@David_J_Bier The CHNV program came through a deal with Mexico, where they'd take US deportations of some non-Mexican nationals in exchange for the US taking a reciprocal number via alternate legal pathways.
The program worked. Border crossings dropped. But migrants do get to come in legally.