Thread by @MiraRappHooper

While you were (rightly) focused on the President’s rage against NATO, something of as much—or more—consequence happened in America’s Asian alliances. Here’s why the demise of the Japan-ROK intelligence pact matters. (1/13)
washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pac…

South Korea and Japan have a long history of troubled relations born of colonialism and wartime atrocities. They have made numerous attempts to put historical grievances behind them, but tensions resurface periodically. (2/13) washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/…

Scholars have examined why there is no NATO-like alliance in Asia. This history is one reason. After WWII, regional states were loathe to ally with Japan; they wanted reassurance that it would not rearm. A hub-and-spoke system made more sense. (3/13) mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10…

This system has been remarkably successful (my book forthcoming in 2020!). With North Korea’s development of threatening nuclear and missile capabilities, however, it has been ever-more important that Tokyo and Seoul set aside differences to confront the shared threat (4/13).

Over the course of several administrations, the United States has invested considerable diplomatic effort into helping its allies improve their ties for the sake of better deterrence and reassurance against North Korea. (5/13) amazon.com/More-Than-Prov…

If American allies send uncoordinated signals, deterrence is less effective. By working together, they can accomplish shared objectives more efficiently than they possibly could alone. (6/13)
nbr.org/publication/ex…

In 2016, after a long political slog, the ROK and Japan signed the GSOMIA intelligence pact on North Korea. It was recognition that their shared, acute threat required them to overcome history—although it remained controversial in the ROK. (7/13)
reuters.com/article/us-sou…

Since 2017, ROK-Japan relations have decayed. Proximate causes: a re-ignition of wartime tensions, trade disputes, a fundamental mis-match between a left-leaning ROK government and right-leaning Japanese one. Also, obvious American disengagement. (8/13)
nytimes.com/2019/08/04/wor…

The loss of the pact is emblematic of the damage wrought when the United States turns against its own allies. Relative ROK-Japan reconciliation has been a major diplomatic achievements of the postwar era. And it is utterly necessary to take on NK (9/13).
nymag.com/intelligencer/…

By prioritizing reality show diplomacy with a brutal dictator while ignoring allies’ interests, the ROK and Japan have had space for age-old tensions to boil over once again—despite the fact that the shared threat is far more serious than ever (10/13).
amazon.com/Brink-Trump-Ki…

Not only has Kim Jong Un managed to win over the President of the United States, but in so doing, he has weakened our deterrence and defense against him. This is called alliance decoupling. It is a major blow to U.S. strategy (11/13).
warontherocks.com/2017/09/decoup…

The loss of GSOMIA weakens defense, deterrence; it is a win for Kim Jong Un, the CCP, and anyone else wants weaker U.S. alliances. It is a consequence of hostility and neglect at the highest levels (my latest with @mattwaxman1) (12/13) cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/…

@mattwaxman1 Unlike so many adverse international developments, this was completely foreseeable and totally avoidable. It may be reversible in a new admin. Until then, count this as another cost of autocrat affection, alliance antagonism, and a foreign policy that makes us less safe. (13/13)