@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news This is an extraordinary announcement. Why? Because despite the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system’s poor track record, Congress continued to provide money to expand the system. Most interceptors were fielded before their design had been successfully tested even once.
@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news This was possible due to missile defense's exemptions to “fly before you buy” regulations, allowing fielding of poorly tested equipment. The haste resulting from Pres Bush’s 2002 directive to rapidly build a missile defense ensured this would be the case. ucsusa.org/shieldedfromov…
@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news Since then, the bias has been strongly in favor of building more Potemkin village defense rather than stopping to try to make it work. The incentives were set up that way. Policymakers want to say they’re doing something about North Korea, defense contractors are getting paid.
@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news This just-cancelled RKV initiative marked the seventh
time in 15 years that the MDA has made a major effort
to fix the unreliable kill vehicle, so far at great expense and
without clear success. gao.gov/assets/680/670…
@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news This leaves the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to operate with its existing interceptors for the foreseeable future. Successful intercept tests for these variants: CE-I: 2/4, CE-II: 2/4, CE-II Block I: 2/2.
@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news The reliability issues that the RKV program was trying to fix are important. But that problem is distinct from trying to make a system that is effective against a real attack. Despite being "operational" for ~15 years, the system has never been tested under realistic conditions.
@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news The GMD system was to be expanded from 44 to 64 interceptors by 2023, using interceptors equipped with a new kill vehicle. This seems unlikely, especially as the Pentagon is saying it will be pursuing a “next-generation interceptor,” which could be quite different.
@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news Though the fact that a neutral particle beam missile defense program got through the Pentagon's budget process says something (not good) about the rigor of that process, too.
@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news Bottom line: strategic missile defense is hard to do. It’s impossible to do without a strong incentive for rigor and oversight. And it is likely to be unachievable to a high standard against a determined adversary. (GMD is designed for a small number of unsophisticated missiles.)
@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news Despite it never getting close to this promise, strategic missile defense plays an outsized role in thinking about nuclear weapons. It really shouldn’t.
@robertburnsAP@AP@JenJudson@defense_news [Background: the kill vehicle is the heart of the hit-to-kill missile defense system. It's a file cabinet-sized object, basically optics with a propulsion system, gets launched and directs itself to smash into a nuclear warhead (or decoy) and destroy it with the force of impact.]
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The US @StateDeptSpox confirms Russian ASAT test:
"destructive" "direct ascent" ASAT missile
"dangerous, reckless, irresponsible" (agreed)
"puts collective interests in great danger" (agreed)
"1500 of trackable debris" NOT good news, will be much more
@StateDeptSpox The Cosmos 1408 was reportedly about 2200 kg, three times heavier than the Fengyun 1C satellite destroyed by China, which generated about 40,000 pieces of debris large enough to damage satellites (but mostly too small to be reliably trackable). physicstoday.scitation.org/doi/10.1063/1.… (2007)
@StateDeptSpox The ~500 km altitude means many of the pieces of debris are likely to persist in orbit for years.
Did Russia destroy a satellite in an ASAT test? This has not yet been confirmed either by Russia or others. The Russian satellite that has apparently disintegrated into multiple pieces made a pass at the time and in the place of the exclusion zones for a Russian missile launch.
The defunct satellite, Cosmos 1408, orbits between about 460 and 490 km altitude. Over 600 active satellites have perigees between 400 and 500 km, including the International Space Station, which reportedly had to move to avoid debris from the breakup.ucsusa.org/resources/sate…
If this is confirmed it is an incredibly serious and irresponsible action by Russia. A collision with space debris the size of a marble can incapacitate a satellite. Keeping astronauts healthy in space is much harder when the spacecraft is dodging or being hit by debris.
(Slow to the draw, but I try not to work on weekends!)
@Dimi Not a space weapon the way you might be thinking. The Outer Space Treaty bars putting nuclear weapons into earth orbit. Stationing nuclear weapons in orbit isn’t something anyone really wants to do anyway. 2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm
Space is a harsh environment and a much less protected spot to keep your dangerous and precious nukes than a storage facility, silo, or sub. Once they’re up there, you cannot maintain them, and an accidental detonation would lead to disaster.
This morning the Missile Defense Agency announced a successful intercept test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system against an “ICBM target.” What does this mean? mda.mil/news/20news000…
In short, it was a demonstration test to show this regional missile defense system, designed to engage short to intermediate-range missiles, can also target ICBM-range missiles when using its upgraded interceptors. Put that way, it seems like an incremental technical achievement.
But that’s not the main story. Plans call for deploying hundreds of these new interceptors
on mobile, globally-deployable Aegis BMD ships. The dramatic expansion of strategic defense cannot escape the notice of Russia and China.
It would be easy to freak out about Space Force because of the ridiculous name or alternatively to just dismiss it as bureaucratic reshuffling. I think it’s a mistake to do either. Thread.
Space Force won’t *initiate* the militarization of space. Satellites have been used from the get go for strategic purposes like intelligence gathering and early warning of missile launch. The military use of space intensified in the last few decades
as modern militaries (most especially the United States) started to depend on satellites heavily for navigation and precision guided munitions, global communications, etc.