I have a few things to say about this — Need to eliminate distrust within private sector, ‘extraordinary’ steps needed: NITI Aayog on slowdown | Business News, The Indian Express. indianexpress.com/article/busine…
My first warning of an impending crisis of confidence in Indian finance was one year ago: google.com.hk/amp/s/www.bloo…
The official response was to view the crisis as a liquidity issue when the problem was of dubious collateral value (land/buildings); dwindling faith in counterparty solvency; and depressed cashflows of ultimate borrowers — shorthand it as 3C (collateral, counterparty, cashflows)
Take collateral first. We never paid any systemic attention to the problem of sold-but-not-completed homes even though in the aggregate it’s a much bigger mess than IL&FS. It’s really not a problem to dump on the judiciary.
Now to counterparties. Crises emanate from, but don’t get triggered by, dodgy stuff on a financier’s asset side. They spread when on the liabilities side, someone wakes up and says, “Without me, he’s dead; with him, I’m dead. Better him than me.” That’s the past 1 year for you.
Finally, borrower cashflows. It’s here that folks at Niti need to do serious introspection. Their bizarre GDP data, borne out of a mandate to justify the unjustifiable demonetisation, led to wrong monetary policy choices. What should’ve been cyclical problems became structural.
As to what a gigantic failure the “liquidity approach” has been, here’s some evidence. Read the piece on @dugalira’s thread:
In Merchant of Venice, Shakespeare solved all of my 3Cs: Portia sequestered the collateral; the aggrieved counterparty, Shylock, changed his religion (NBFC became bank, Indiabulls?). As for Antonio’s cashflows, the ships are truly sunk like Niti GDP. But hey, he’s on to tomorrow!
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Time for a longish thread 🧵 around the main points in my @opinion column today, and more generally around what I found out from reading 173 pages of the Indian Supreme Court-appointed expert panel’s report. (1/n)
@opinion This panel’s job was not to return a finding on allegations against Adani. It was tasked to see if it there were enough grounds to reject the null hypothesis of no regulatory failure. It couldn’t reject H0. That doesn’t necessarily invalidate H1, the alternative. (2/n)
When it comes to regulatory failure, Hindenburg alleged a) violation of minimum public shareholding; b) nondisclosures of related-party transactions c) price manipulation. Adani denied them all. As per panel, we can forget about ‘c’ — Sebi doesn’t have a gotcha finding. (3/n)
Here I argue that Indian outsourcing firms need to look at the state of work in their own firms, starting with freshers’ pay that has been stuck for nearly two decades at around 350,000 rupees ($4,250) a year. (TCS just reported attrition rate of 21.5%.): bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
Cloud is only 21% of tech spending, but growing much faster than legacy on-premise enterprise software like Oracle, SAP. Accenture and Deloitte have made large franchises out of implementing new tech platforms like Salesforce, ServiceNow and Workday. Indian IT must compete:
Heavily centralised outsourcing firms negotiating projects with the CIOs of client organisations is outdated. CIOs are losing power to functional heads who talk the language of business, not tech. Low code/No code “citizen development” is on the rise. Consultants are thriving.
A little thread around this piece. Bear with me. Templeton’s India Closures Leave a Bad Taste bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
In the early ‘90s, I stumbled upon Indian financial markets as a junior employee, thanks to my friend @BhartiSolanky. Back then, in the post-Harshad Mehta, pre-MS Shoes days, our firms — category 1 merchant bankers — made it like bandits. I could project any EPS on my Lotus 123.
There was an OTC market, where I could get any sweatshop from Ludhiana to list. In fact, the struggle was to get them from reception to the conference room because before they ate your Nirula’s pizza, they wanted to know the premium you — the bank — would pay for their shares.
This is the most personal thing I’ve ever written. A lot of you won’t share my pessimism. That’s fine. I, too, swing between blinding hope and crushing despair. But how about a “behind-the-scenes”? A short thread to set the context for this long piece? bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-…
We like to think it was our merit and hard work, but luck and timing played a huge role in expanding the opportunity set for my generation of Indians. Just contrast the dramatically different directions the country took after the ‘66 devaluation and the ‘91 devaluation.
Will the post-Covid world be as receptive? The ‘90s West had slain communism, defeated high inflation. They wanted to keep their consumer boom going. The likes of Jack Welch and John Reed wanted Indians to join the game of global labor arbitrage. But now? bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-…
A short thread on where I see India is going wrong in mounting an effective economic response to COVID-19. I’ll start with my piece today, laying out a blueprint for what needs to happen. bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
First of all, this isn’t something that the FM or the Guv will think up. Has to be done at the level of JS and CGM. They’ll make a plan their bosses can take to Modi. So what should urgently end is fingerprinting and point-scoring. Time to rise above all that.
Second, let me talk about what I didn’t address in my piece today: NBFCs. I have tackled it separately here: bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…