In 2017, I approached RI's Board of Elections concerned that our Internet-connected election management system carried elevated risks. Thankfully, the Board has been open to input and responded with changes. ES&S sold the same solution to other states. /1
Some of those customers are identified in the August 08 Vice story written by @kimzetter. Ideally, EOs in those jurisdictions are aware of those risks and have implemented the sufficient security controls to address the risks in this design. /2
@KimZetter Multihoming core election management systems used to configure ballots, program DS200s, and tabulate official results behind the same firewall that exposes AnyConnect VPN services and an election reporting server is suboptimal design for critical elections infrastructure. /3
@KimZetter There is too much at stake in elections, whether local, state, or federal, to surrender any bit of integrity or confidence in our voting systems to the desire for speedy election night reporting.
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Election Integrity Partnership's (EIP) report "The Long Fuse - Misinformation and the 2020 Election" deserves much more attention than it has received.
It serves as a chronicle, playbook, and policy guide for what continues to be a very challenging chapter in our democracy.
EIP set a narrow, non-partisan scope which in hindsight grew to be quite monumental. It sought to identify identify, counter, and illuminate instances of:
- Procedural Interference
- Participation Interference
- Fraud
- and Delegitimization of Election Results
EIP marshaled many resources and applied a misinformation triage, assessment and mitigation workflow which informed key civic stakeholders.